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Executive summary 
 
In order to counteract the negative impacts resulting from the increase of intermittent 
renewable energy sources (RES) and distributed generation (DG) on electricity 
systems (identified in deliverable D4 of the RESPOND project), a number of 
response options were defined, analysed and assessed in deliverable D5 of the 
same project. Subsequently, this document has been developed to detect actual and 
potential barriers that may hinder the implementation of the identified respond 
options. For this purpose, a detailed questionnaire was developed in order to expand 
and collect additional information for the five country case studies (Spain, UK, 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands) regarding the national situation and the 
position of national regulators and parties on the different key barriers. 
 
D5 market responses were aimed at reducing the (potential) increase of system 
costs resulting from generating more electricity with intermittent generation 
technologies now and in the future. The topics covered by this report (deliverable D6) 
concern the barriers that form a blockade to the implementation of D5 recommended 
options, measures, system changes, etc.  
 
This report follows the structure of the aforementioned questionnaire and survey. 
Thus, we analyse and present the barriers in the context of their application in 
different segments or parts of the system, i.e. generation (including both conventional 
generation and renewable and combined heat and power (RES/CHP) generation), 
demand of electricity, national and regional electricity markets, and finally 
transmission and distributions (T&D) networks. The main division of identified 
barriers is presented in the following in the following paragraphs. 
 
Concerning RES/CHP generation the key issues are related to pricing mechanisms 
(of energy and ancillary services provided by this generation), the role of support 
schemes to achieve a diversification of the generation mix, and the improvement of 
the technical capabilities of this type of generation. Regarding conventional 
generation barriers are classified in those that have to do with the incentives to 
provide reserves (primary and secondary) and balancing energy, the mechanisms to 
provide firmness in critical periods and the economic incentives to install new 
generation capacity. 
 
Concerning demand options, the main hurdles identified concern volatile market 
prices, metering and communication issues, heat or electricity storage, pricing rules 
and managing system security in the short term through, for example, the application 
of interruptible contracts, the access to ancillary services markets and the direct 
control of consumer equipment. Within national markets (including energy and 
ancillary services markets), the main issues that barriers refer to are market access 
(together with size limitations and aggregation of units) and prediction of energy 
production (together with responsibility of deviations and gate closures closer to real 
time). 
 
The increase of interconnection capacity and the integration of national markets into 
regional ones are covered in the regional markets chapter. Transmission network 
issues addressed include implementation of locationally and time differentiated 
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transmission charges, the construction of new transmission lines and the 
implementation of fair and efficient congestion management schemes. Finally, 
Regarding distribution network issues that are dealt with include: the design of time 
of use tariffs, the design of incentives for active network management to Distribution 
System Operators (DSOs), the integration of distributed generation in efficient 
network planning, and the provision of Ancillary Services by DG. 
The following sections summarize the analysis of barriers carried out within the 
different segments. 
 
RES and CHP Generation 
 
Use of efficient pricing mechanism of energy and AASS 
 
Sending efficient price signals to RES/DG generators should encourage them to 
behave efficiently, thus enhancing their value for the system. One first barrier to the 
implementation of efficient pricing mechanisms concerns the fact that charges to 
RES/CHP are not dependent on the location of these generators in some of the 
countries considered, namely Spain, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As a 
consequence of this, the geographical distribution of new generation shall not take 
into account the system needs. Besides, in Spain RES/CHP units that earn a Feed in 
Tariff are not allowed to provide ancillary services. This may cause a reduction in the 
flexibility of the system. Finally, in Spain and the Netherlands, generators are not 
paid their contribution to the primary load-frequency regulation service, which may 
erode the revenues expectation of RES/DG generation units to be installed.    
 
Implementation of support schemes to achieve diversification of the mix 
 
Given that a significant fraction of revenues obtained by RES/DG comes from 
support payments, the amount of investment in each of the different RES 
technologies is clearly dependent on the levels of these payments. Therefore, 
efficiently designing support payments is a prerequisite for achieving a balanced mix. 
One first barrier in this regard is related to the fact that, neither FITs applied in Spain 
and Germany, nor tradable green certificates implemented in the UK are dependent 
on the time of the day or the year when energy is produced by generators. 
Consequently, the production profile of these generators does not adapt to the level 
of load to be covered or the conditions in the system. Besides, support payments 
implemented in Spain, Denmark and Germany have not been efficiently designed, 
thus resulting in a evolution of installed DG/RES generation capacity that is not in 
accordance with predetermined objectives. 
 
RES/CHP Technical capabilities 
 
In general, there seem not to be major technical hurdles that prevent RES/CHP 
access to markets. This is owed to technical improvements in RES generation 
technology characteristics. Of course, participation in specific markets such as AS 
ones is still limited to those units that meet certain requirements (regarding, mainly, 
controllability).  
 
Controllability of units can be improved through the combination of these 
technologies with storage ones. Non-controllable units can be required to provide 
some kind of frequency response such as primary frequency control. However, in the 
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Netherlands, Germany, and UK, small units connected to distribution networks are 
not obliged by network codes to provide power reserves. In Spain, the role of 
centralized control centres for the aggregation of RES/DG units has proved very 
relevant to facilitate the participation of units in reserve and balancing markets. 
 
Conventional generation 
 
Incentives to provide reserves and balancing energy 
 
Main barriers to the provision of regulation reserves by conventional generation, 
which is necessary in order for the system to adapt to the variable output of 
intermittent RES generation, are of two types. First, in some countries like Germany, 
reserve prices are quite low compared to energy prices and conditions to be fulfilled 
in order to be eligible for the provision of reserves are rather complex. This, 
effectively discourages generators from providing these reserves, which may result, 
among other things, in less liquid AASS markets. Apart from this, as mentioned in the 
previous section about RES/DG, in some other countries like Spain and Germany 
generators do not receive any payment for the provision of the primary frequency 
regulation service. 
 
Mechanisms to provide sufficient generation capacity in critical periods 
 
Markets provide an incentive for generators to be available when the system needs 
them, since prices in these situations to be higher than normal. However, these 
incentives may not suffice in some cases to ensure that enough generation capacity 
is able to produce when needed. Therefore, availability payments may be necessary 
in these situations. Unfortunately, in some systems like the German, the UK and the 
Danish ones, no availability payments have been implemented. These payments 
may be necessary when market incentives for firm capacity provision are not 
successful. 
 
Investment in new generation capacity 
 
Again, additional mechanisms beyond market prices may be needed to achieve an 
efficient expansion of the generation capacity in the system. However, in many 
systems, like the UK or the Netherlands, extra payments outside the market to 
achieve the installation new capacity are not allowed. As a consequence of this, 
periods of scarcity followed by other of excess capacity may occur. In the German 
system, and as a result of wrong incentive schemes, part of the conventional 
generation capacity installed is not thought to be well adapted to the role that this 
capacity may have to play in the future. Besides, capacity incentives in place in Spain 
have not been designed efficiently and capacity surges and scarcity may occur.  
 
Demand 
 
Use of variable market prices and efficient pricing rules 
 
Applying efficient prices that are in accordance with the value of energy at each time 
is central to achieving demand responsiveness. However, in some countries like 
Spain, electricity price regulation is not efficient (a night tariff existed that encourage 
many consumers to shift all their energy consumption to the same period of the day). 
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A very high excise tax is applied in Denmark that causes energy prices to be very 
high no matter the operation profile and location of consumers. Finally, variations in 
wholesale prices and in the cost of AASS in all the considered countries are 
transferred to electricity tariffs as a common mark-up to the annual energy price. 
Therefore, prices do not change according to system conditions.  
 
Deployment of metering and communication technology 
 
Development and installation of this technology is necessary for consumers to be 
able to react to market prices and other economic signals. However, in all the 
considered countries but Spain the roll out of hourly meters has been very modest. 
Additionally, the functionality of these meters has not been agreed and 
standardization has not taken place, which makes very difficult developing 
communication protocols that can be implemented country wide. Lack of 
standardization is remarkably clear in the German and Dutch systems. 
 
Use of heat or electricity storage 
 
Heat and electricity storage may allow consumers to shift part of their load from high 
price hours to low price ones. Therefore, its implementation should be considered in 
every system. However, in the Spanish and German systems, the use of these 
storage systems at household level is very limited. In the UK, he use of district 
heating has very low popularity among the population, which hinders its 
implementation despite its potential for cost reduction and increasing system 
flexibility. Finally, in the Danish system, electric resistance heating systems, which 
could contribute to flexible demand, have been banned over the last years. However, 
these systems have been replaced by other more responsive technologies, like heat 
pumps. 
 
Consumer acceptance of variable prices 
 
In order for consumers to react to prices they must be willing to do so. Unfortunately, 
in every country consumers exhibit very low responsiveness to variable energy prices 
in the short term. The potential for cost reduction in the long term is very high 
(avoided costly investments). However, consumers are not able to anticipate this. 
Besides, most consumers show a remarkable risk aversive behaviour. Thus, instead 
of reacting to variable prices that they cannot control, they prefer signing constant 
price supply contracts (fixed tariffs). 
 
Efficient management of system security in the short run 
 
In order to be able to guarantee the system security, the System Operator needs the 
help of consumers, who should adapt their consumption pattern to the requirements 
of the system. An efficient way to do so is AASS. The Danish market does not have 
AASS markets, which is an important obstacle to achieving system security. 
However, they have implemented zonal energy prices that can result in an efficient 
management of congestion. Also in the Danish system, few industries have proved to 
be suitable for signing interruptible contracts, which is a powerful tool in the hands of 
TSOs to solve emergency situation where available power supply is below existing 
demand. Finally, in all countries, households lack the required technology and 
institutional/legal settings for signing interruptible contracts and participating in 
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system services. This reduces significantly the responsiveness of a large fraction of 
total demand in a system. 
 
National energy and ancillary services markets 
 
Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
 
Existing barriers seem not to prevent the connection of RES/CHP and its 
participation in the energy market. However, there are some key aspects whose 
treatment could be modified. In particular, high trading fees might, in practice, 
represent an obstacle to market access, i.e. the case of the Netherlands and 
Denmark. Aggregation of units is an effective solution to overcome size limitation, for 
entering the market and is already taking place in several countries. The aggregation 
of units can also reduce transaction costs. However, it is not possible for micro-CHP 
and heat pumps to integrate in commercial aggregators in any of the considered 
countries. In addition, the possibility of being curtailed by the TSO for network 
security reasons can also prevent the participation of RES in markets. This may be 
the case in Spain and the UK. However, curtailing RES in Spain is only considered 
an option when the remaining resources have been depleted. Also related to this, the 
curtailment of DG/RES to provide negative reserve is regarded as an option in 
Germany. 
 
Regarding access to ancillary or system services (AS) markets, the main issue refers 
to the controllability of the RES/CHP. Assuming that, from a technical point of view, 
some RES generators (wind) will be controllable in the near future, their participation 
in AS requires that system operation practices are replaced by more modern (active) 
ones, as well as the implementation of an adequate remuneration scheme that 
effectively encourage RES to participate in these markets. 
 
Responsibility for production deviations, prediction of production and gate closures 
closer to real-time 
 
In most countries (Spain, UK, Denmark and Netherlands) RES are responsible for 
deviations, i.e. they must pay penalizations for the production deviations incurred, 
which in fact constitutes an incentive to develop better prediction tools. Only in 
Germany, RES producers are not held responsible for deviations. This may turn out 
to become an important barrier for further RES deployment, since predicting the 
output of these generators than becomes the responsibility of the grid operators for 
whom it is much more difficult.  
 
Country analysis indicates that gate closure times within energy markets range from 
a maximum of 8 hours ahead of real time (last intraday market for each day closes at 
4 p.m in Spain) to 1 hour ahead of real time (UK, Denmark, Netherlands). The 
division of responsibilities between the TSO and the MO in Spain, which does not 
allow merging markets, has been reported as the major barrier to further reducing 
gate closure times in this country. Even though implementing intraday markets result 
in gate closure times that are closer to real time, the liquidity of these markets is 
considered a problem in Germany and employing a balancing market is preferred. 
 
Regional markets 
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Increase of interconnection capacity 
 
Two of the most important barriers in Spain and the UK that hinder the construction 
of interconnection capacity are the existing concerns about the impact of new 
transmission lines on the environment and the lack of fairness of the method 
employed to determine which countries should pay the cost of these lines. Note that 
cross-border lines typically produce benefits that are very much widespread in a 
region, while costs/disadvantages caused by them are not. This is also a barrier for 
building these lines in Spain, the UK and the Netherlands. Moreover, the complexity 
of the process aimed to obtain the permits required to build these lines is much 
higher than for national lines. Agents from Spain, the UK and Germany have 
identified this as very significant barrier. Apart from this, the lack of harmonization of 
national market rules is also limiting the power exchanges taking place between 
countries, which has been identified as a barrier in Denmark. 
 
Integration of the operation of national markets 
 
The most important barriers to the integration of the operation of national markets 
include the fact that, short term implicit energy and capacity auctions are not applied 
yet in Spain (SP-F border) and Germany, though these countries are interconnected 
to others through a meshed grid. Moreover, in all surveyed countries there is a lack 
of coordination of the allocation of cross border capacity that is carried out in the long 
term. Finally some parties in Germany, due to security reasons, argue that some 
degree of discrimination between local and regional transactions should exist when 
providing long term generation capacity reserves.  
 
Transmission networks 
 
Locationally and temporally differentiated network charges 
 
A barrier to implement locationally differentiated and time varying tariffs, according to 
some parties in the Netherlands, is that locational marginal prices are too volatile, 
Besides, in the Netherlands and Germany these tariffs are also believed to be a 
source of unfair discrimination between agents in different parts of the grid, as well as 
between old and new generators. Other stakeholders in Spain are of the opinion that 
these tariffs may not affect investment decisions by agents due to the fact that 
payments resulting from support schemes to RES/CHP are so high in many systems 
that installing new RES generation will be profitable no matter which kind of 
generation it is or where it is installed. Finally, different stakeholders in the UK 
believe that implementing these charges makes regulation more difficult and 
therefore less attractive to policy makers. 
 
Construction of new transmission lines 
 
As for the construction of new lines, most stakeholders in all countries but the UK 
agree that concerns about their impact on the environment and health could 
represent a serious obstacle to these lines being built. Besides, parties in the UK 
have stated that the inefficiency in the allocation of the cost of these lines, the lack of 
efficiency of the use of transmission capacity that already is in operation, and doubts 
about the profitability of many of the transmission investment projects that are being 
considered now already result in a significant opposition to new lines. 
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Implementation of efficient congestion management schemes 
 
Finally, talking about the application of congestion management schemes, applying 
zonal or nodal prices (the most efficient solution under ideal conditions) is against the 
regulation in place in some countries, like Spain or the Netherlands. Besides, most, if 
not all, parties agree that implementing such scheme would result in an increase in 
the degree of the market power held by power producers in importing areas. Finally, 
parties in Spain and the Netherlands have stated that computing several energy 
prices within their territories would make the market clearing process more complex, 
and the coordination with neighbouring markets would be more difficult. Others in the 
Netherlands say that using nodal or zonal prices would require also changing 
computer applications and allocating the congestion rents. 
 
Distribution networks 
 
Use of locationally and temporally differentiated charges 
 
For the efficient integration of DG/RES in distribution networks the design of 
distribution charges, connection and use-of-system charges, paid by this type of 
generation is a relevant issue. Locationally and time varying distribution charges 
should be implemented. In those systems where locational distribution charges have 
not been implemented yet, main barriers identified by parties are legal (changing the 
tariff codes would be necessary in Netherlands). Additionally, allocating charges to 
generators in an efficient, cost-reflective, manner is also regarded as a challenge by 
authorities in Germany. For most parties consulted, volatility is not considered a 
problem when implementing this kind of charges. An exception to this rule is the 
Netherlands. 
 
Implementation of ANM techniques 
 
Active network management (ANM) is unanimously acknowledged as an effective 
measure to integrate variable distributed RES generation. In order to encourage 
DSOs to apply ANM, many countries have implemented efficiency incentives 
schemes that reward DSOs for reducing losses and increase service quality levels. 
However, the difficulty of computing an adequate level for these incentives, in the 
UK, and the fact that most systems are not taking into account the effect of DG-RES 
on losses and quality when computing the incentives, as explained by Dutch parties, 
is undermining their effectiveness. Finally, the incentives in place in some countries, 
like Spain, the Netherlands or Germany, to develop the technology required 
implementing these techniques are believed to be too weak. 
 
Incentives for DSOs to consider DG in network planning 
 
A potential benefit from DG RES is the cost reduction that can be achieved by 
integrating it in the process of planning the expansion of the grid. However, in those 
systems where incentive schemes for the efficient planning of the expansion of the 
grid by DSOs are applied, like in Spain and Netherlands, the reference remuneration 
level of the DSO and the efficiency factor ‘X’ are computed not taking into account 
the effect of DG. Other countries, like the UK and Germany, believe that 
implementing incentive schemes of this type is not necessary because incentives 
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already in place for efficient system operation (losses and quality) are strong enough. 
Also, some parties in Spain and the Netherlands believe that existing huge DG-RES 
support payments encourage variable DG RES not to follow DSO’s instructions, 
which renders the installation of variable DG RES as less beneficial, or even 
problematic, to operators. Related to the previous market response option, DSOs in 
the considered countries are not considering the possible future application of ANM 
when planning the expansion of their grids, which makes it more difficult for the 
system also to benefit from the presence of variable DG. 
 
Provision of AASS by DG 
 
DG of an intermittent nature may provide some system services that can be of help 
to the DSO. However, many of the existing generators do not comply with the 
technical requirements that must be met to provide these. Apart from this, the 
markets where variable DG could sell these services to the DSOs would probably not 
be liquid enough, since most of the potential generators that could provide a certain 
service would be owned by the same company. This has been identified as a barrier 
by parties in the UK and Germany. Even if competition could be established among 
potential providers of AS, generators may not find it profitable to offer them, since, 
according to parties in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain, the revenues resulting 
from the sale of their energy in the market may be much higher than those they 
would obtain by providing these services. Finally, parties in all countries have 
expressed their view that changing the network operation paradigm (from passive to 
active) is a very challenging and difficult to accomplish task that, nevertheless, needs 
to be carried out in order for DG to significantly contribute to the provision of some 
AASS.  
 
This document shows that important barriers are present in every segment of the 
electricity system. Some of them appear in several countries, while others are only 
occurring in one or a few countries. In the report tables 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 14 the 
main barriers per system segment, i.e. generation, demand, national markets, 
regional markets and transmission and distribution networks are summarized. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The RESPOND project aims particularly at identifying efficient market response 
options that actively contribute to an efficient integration of (intermittent) Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES) and Distributed Generation (DG) in the European electricity 
system. Furthermore, the project develops and formulates recommendations for 
improving the policy and regulation framework in five EU countries (UK, etc) for 
effectively support implementing these market response options. Other objectives 
are:  
 
• Evaluate the impacts of an increasing penetration of RES and DG on the 
integral electricity system;  
• Identify and analyse efficient response options of market participants that 
actively support an efficient integration of RES and DG in the electricity system;  
• Identify barriers and failures in market competition and regulation that hinder 
the response options to be developed and implemented by market participants. 
• Analyse, and assess improvements and changes of the policy and regulatory 
framework that facilitate the development and implementation of the 
recommended response options by market participants  
• Formulate recommendations and a roadmap for implementing these 
improvements 
 
RESPOND focuses the attention on the most important intermittent technologies, 
mainly micro-CHP and photovoltaic (PV) (on low voltage networks in both urban and 
rural areas.), off-shore wind generation (on extra high voltage networks) and on-
shore wind generation (on medium and high voltage networks in rural areas). In order 
to outline actual RES and DG development (with different penetrations of each 
technology) across Europe, five country blueprints (Spain, UK, Denmark, Germany, 
and Netherlands) have been selected as representative case studies within the 
project. 
 
WP2 of RESPOND project (deliverable D4) has explored the development of the 
power system and role of RES and DG in the five countries Spain, UK, Denmark, 
Germany, and Netherlands with a time horizon up to 2020. In addition, WP2 has 
carried out a detailed impact analysis of increasing (intermittent) RES and DG 
penetration on the overall electricity system, comprising generation, transmission and 
distribution networks, trade and demand. The most important impacts relate to the 
variability and the unpredictability of generation from intermittent energy sources. 
 
WP3 of the RESPOND project (deliverable D5) identified and classified a set of 
relevant technical and regulatory respond options in order to remove or mitigate the 
previously identified negative impacts of increasing DG/RES penetration on 
generation, demand, markets and transmission and distribution networks. A number 
of technical and organisational response options were defined, analysed and 
assessed. Important was the focus on unconventional response possibilities that 
arise in the dynamic electricity system including interaction between for example 
storage, demand response and market rules. The assessment included technical, 
economical and regulatory aspects. Response options (conventional as well as new 
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options) were mutually compared on the basis of maturity of technology, economic 
efficiency, potential and interaction with other options. The electricity system in 2020 
is the focus in the study of the options to address and mitigate the problems identified 
in D4. Therefore D5 focuses on the impacts that are most relevant in this time 
horizon. It should be noted that wind energy is the dominant contributor in this 
horizon. 
 
This deliverable D6 is the result of WP4 of the RESPOND project and builds on the 
results form WP2 and WP3. WP4 aims at identifying barriers to the implementation of 
the response options that have been identified in WP3. These barriers must be 
assessed both from a regulatory and from a market perspective. The evaluation of 
these barriers, shall enable the definition of regulatory and policy recommendations 
for the different segments of the electricity business. 
 
This chapter 1 has been organized as follows. Section 1.1 summarizes the impact 
assessment performed in WP2 of RESPOND project. The list of prioritized options of 
WP3 is presented in section 1.2. Finally, section 1.3 explains the further content and 
structure of this report. 
 
1.1 Impact Assessment of Intermittent energy sources 
Impacts of increasing (intermittent) RES and DG penetration in the overall electricity 
system are mainly due to two characteristics of intermittent generation – variability 
and unpredictability (or prediction error). Impacts (both positive and negative) due to 
variability and unpredictability were assessed in relation to generation, demand, 
transmission and distribution systems and markets & trade in D4. 
 
Concerning generation, lack of correlation between the evolution of demand and that 
of intermittent generation will probably result in the ratio of the peak to low net 
demand (demand – Intermittent generation) being very high. This fact increases the 
number of times that conventional power plants will need to start-up or shut-down, 
and speeds up the ageing process of these generators, some may not even be able 
to operate in this system. Apart from this, there will probably be a significant number 
of hours when RES/CHP generation will replace conventional generation. Thus, the 
latter type of plants will have to operate partly loaded for a large number of hours, 
which will result in reduced market revenues for them. The need for more flexible 
units will increase in order to compensate for variations in the output of intermittent 
generators. On the other hand, renewable generation will not be able to provide firm 
generation capacity (these technologies usually have low capacity credits). 
Therefore, conventional generation or other system resources will be needed to meet 
the system needs when RES/CHP generation is not available. 
 
The increase in the ratio of peak to low load, together with the possibility of 
intermittent generation exceeding the system demand may force the development of 
mechanisms to actively manage the level of load in the system. The system energy 
needs will have to be shifted, through different means, from the hour when it is 
scarce to those when there is an excess of it. Possible solutions in this regard are 
discussed in the following section. The correlation between the power output from 
certain intermittent generation technologies, like wind farms, and the need for 
electricity in the system may be increased if oil and gas heating systems are 
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transformed into electricity consuming ones. According to the research work carried 
out within the RESPOND project, there may be a correlation between heat needs in 
the system and the existence of strong winds. Thus, the composition of electricity 
demand in the system may need to be altered.  
 
Impact of RES generation integration on markets and trade are mainly associated 
with the effect that the existence of a large amount of this type of generation will have 
on spot market prices. In many systems like Germany, RES production has been 
given priority in the dispatch. Besides, RES has almost zero operational costs. 
Therefore, when this generation must participate in the market it tends to enter early 
in the merit order. In fact it results in intermittent generators being dispatched instead 
of conventional ones and market clearing prices decreasing. Fluctuations in the 
availability of the former produce price fluctuations. Hours with extremely low prices 
will be followed by other when prices will be extremely high although, on average, 
market prices will go down. Consequently, market revenues for existing conventional 
base load units will be reduced. This together with an increase in maintenance costs 
and a decrease in the useful life of these generators will be put much pressure on 
these generators, making it unattractive for them to keep the existing plants 
functioning or installing new ones of the same type. If RES generators participate in 
the market, prices earned by these generators may be especially low, since many of 
them will mainly be producing when prices are low due to expensive conventional 
units being replaced by RES/CHP ones. End consumer prices may be reduced as 
well if the cost of mechanisms to promote the installation of intermittent technologies 
is not paid through electricity tariffs.  
 
Variability makes the output of non-controllable generators less predictable. System 
unbalances resulting from prediction errors will significantly increase as a result of 
the installation of large numbers of intermittent generators. Thus, the need for 
balancing services will largely increase as well. Primary, secondary and tertiary 
reserve will be provided by generators with regulating capacity. The amount and cost 
of balancing power will increase, which will represent an incentive for flexible 
generation to participate in the balancing market. 
 
Unpredictability will make the output of intermittent generators less valuable for the 
system. Costs incurred by the system in order to solve the imbalances resulting from 
the prediction error corresponding to the estimation of the power production from 
intermittent generators will be large. Balancing costs that intermittent generators are 
responsible for should be internalized by these generators when bidding on the 
market. Thus, these generators should be made responsible for their balancing 
costs. 
 
The geographical location of new RES and CHP generation may depend on a 
number of different factors: availability of primary energy (natural resources) that 
electricity is produced from, level of subsidies from RES/CHP support schemes that 
are in place in each area or country, etc. In any case, distribution of power plants 
corresponding to certain RES generation technologies, such as off-shore wind 
generation, may probably differ significantly from that of conventional generation and 
demand. As a consequence of this, significant transmission grid reinforcements may 
have to be carried out to connect this generation to the grid and transport the power 
output from these generators to other parts of the grid, where it is consumed. 
Additionally, high variability in the output of some intermittent generators (such as on-
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shore wind mills) may result in some transmission lines being used only to a small 
extend. This, in turn, means that building these lines will be less economical for the 
system than other network reinforcements. However, this will depend on the degree 
to which the production profile of these generators and that of other types of 
intermittent or conventional generators located in the same area are complementary. 
 
The needs for network reinforcements to the distribution grid brought about by the 
installation of RES/DG generation at distribution level will depend on the amount of 
this generation built within each area in comparison to that of demand in the area. 
The correlation between the production profile of renewable and distributed 
generation and the consumption profile of demand in each area may also play a 
crucial role in this regard. For low to medium penetration levels of RES/DG 
generation, distribution grid investments, apart from connection facilities, are likely to 
decrease when compared to the present situation. On the other hand, in those areas 
where the amount of generation installed at distribution level is far larger than that of 
demand, investment needs may increase, especially if generation and demand 
profiles are not well correlated. New facilities would be needed to transport local 
power generation to other parts of the system. Increases in the network 
reinforcement needs would result in an increase in the level of distribution and 
transmission tariffs. 
 
At the same time, the existence of large shares of intermittent generation within 
distribution grids may have non-negligible effects on the operation of these networks. 
Thus, power through some lines may flow in both directions, making the operation of 
distribution grids more difficult. It may be necessary to put distributed generation 
under the control of the DSO. This may change the strategy used to operate 
distribution grids from passive to active network management. Besides, other 
technical problems, such as those related to the increase in the voltage level of 
certain nodes may arise. These will have to be handled by the DSO using the 
resources at its hand, such as the participation of some generators and demand in 
the provision of ancillary services. 
 
1.2 Analysis and prioritization of response options 
 
Deliverable D5 of the RESPOND project has focused on the identification of those 
technical, market and regulatory response options that would help counteract the 
negative effects of variability and unpredictability on the functioning of the system 
caused by the integration of large shares of intermittent generation. A number of 
technical and organisational response options, originating from the different 
segments (generation, demand, trade and transmission and distribution networks) 
were defined, analysed and assessed. The assessment included technical, 
economical and regulatory aspects. 
 
In identifying and analysing efficient market response options, the D6 report sought 
to look behind conventional options and also focused on innovative response 
possibilities and of comparing both types of options. Taking into account that since 
the electricity system in 2015 is the main focus of the study and wind energy is the 
dominant contributor in this horizon, the main options covered in the analysis were 
primarily related to increasing the penetration of wind resources. 
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Concerning generation, a number of options were selected, aimed at increasing 
flexibility and adaptation of the generation mix on the one hand, and mixing assets to 
reduce aggregate generation variations and unpredictability on the other. These 
options are related both to conventional generation and RES/CHP. Main issues in 
implementing these options are related to subsidy schemes that promote the 
installation of RES/CHP and conventional generation capacity. Increasing flexibility 
may be achieved by allowing the participation of renewable and distributed 
generation in the provision of system services and encouraging the provision of these 
services by conventional generators. 
 
Concerning demand, the main objective of the options relate to the increase in 
demand flexibility by allowing end-users to adjust to price signals through changes in 
tariff structure, regulation and technologies that either store or add to electricity 
demand. Mechanisms should be implemented in order to encourage the participation 
of demand in the market. These may include the introduction of locationally and 
temporally differentiated end consumer energy prices that reflect the true market 
value of energy. Two fundamental issues must be addressed when implementing 
demand issues. First, there must be both metering and billing of end-users according 
to market prices reflecting the intermittency problems. Secondly there must be 
organisational capabilities and technological possibilities for adjusting electricity 
demand.  
 
Concerning trade, a number of storage options that facilitate the trading 
opportunities were proposed as relevant options. Storage could include hydro plants, 
local heat storage and heat pumps used in combination with CHP units. The 
organization of both regional and national markets including energy and ancillary 
services must be analysed. Among fundamental topics that might result in barriers to 
implementing options: market access, gate closure time, subsidy schemes, size 
limitations and management of deviations. 
 
Concerning transmission networks, different options corresponding to both 
operation and planning were identified. The main transmission options that TSO may 
use consist on increasing the interconnection capacity by investing in new lines, 
better management of existing lines, improving existing day-ahead and intra-day 
markets, developing control centres and developing improved intermittent generation 
output prediction tools, among others. Building interconnection capacity would allow 
power exchanges between areas or countries where there is an excess of energy 
produced from RES and other areas where power output by renewable and 
distributed generation is small. Several markets have only few years of experience, 
so there is a great potential for improving existing markets and co-operation or 
mergers between markets in neighbouring countries. Control centres that monitor 
intermittent energy sources in real time allow TSO guarantee system security 
maximizing the penetration of RES directly connected to the transmission grid. 
Continuous improvement of the wind power forecasting tools developed by system 
operator is needed in order to reduce the uncertainty of the wind production in the 
daily scheduling and the need of reserve capacity. 
 
Concerning distribution networks, options concerning to an active network 
management of DSO and to an increasing participation of demand were shown as 
most effective. Active network management options such as real-time network 
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control, real time control of generation and demand or local system balancing and 
micro-grids were assessed. Demand response offers several advantages to network 
operators through lowering peak demand and postponement of investments. 
Demand response may be implemented by means of interruption contracts and real-
time pricing or by the use of storage options. At distribution level, it is also of utmost 
importance that DSOs adopt new procedures for the planning of the expansion of the 
grid that take into account the existence of renewable and distributed generators. For 
this purpose, geographically and temporally differentiated distribution tariffs would 
encourage agents to make efficient decisions from the point of view of the system. 
 
Response options (conventional as well as new options) were mutually compared 
and prioritized based on a set of criteria that included: 
 
• Maturity, availability and relevance of response option until/in 2015. It should 
be noted that the focus of the study is on the time frame from 2015-2020. 
Therefore, on the one hand the prioritized options must be mature in 2015 with 
regard to both the technical development and the required production facilities 
that will supply the market. On the second hand, for selecting options that are 
regulatory or organisationally related the appropriate regulation or market rules 
changes must be sufficiently simple to be implemented already from 2015 
• Economic viability and impact on the electricity market. 
• Potentials (to integrate large shares of intermittent generation, to eliminate 
several negative impacts, to contribute to improved performance of different 
segments of the electricity system). Potential is interpreted as the ability to 
mitigate the problems caused by intermittency and thereby increase the 
possible share of intermittent renewable energy sources within the EU. 
Therefore the potential criteria necessitates that the option is not only important 
in one country but in a number of countries that would constitute an important 
part of the EU renewable potential. 
• Interaction with other response options. 
 
According to these criteria, a list of prioritized options was assessed: 
 
• Interconnection capacity 
• Flexible demand (demand response) 
• Dispersion of intermittent generation in EU countries (in different price zones) 
for example by coordinating subsidy schemes 
• Cheap storage technologies (hydro, heat etc) 
• Flexible generation mix 
• Real time information on intermittent generation available to TSO 
• Control systems including intermittent generation that enables TSO to maintain 
system security with lowest costs 
• Active network management at the DSO level including flexible generation and 
demand response for distribution grid purposes 
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1.3 Report Structure and contents 
This document has been developed to detect actual and potential barriers that may 
hinder the implementation of the respond options (with emphasis on the prioritized 
response options) identified in WP3 of the RESPOND project. For this purpose a 
detailed questionnaire was developed in order to expand and collect additional 
information for the five country case studies (Spain, UK, Denmark, Germany, and 
Netherlands) regarding the national situation and the position of national regulators 
on the different key barriers (related to market and regulatory issues). In addition, 
results obtained by related finished European projects such as DG-GRID and SOLID-
DER have been also taken into account. The analysis of the results of the 
questionnaire, the related European projects, together with the information gathered 
in WP2 and WP3, should allow one to make policy and regulatory recommendations 
within WP5. 
 
The topics covered by this report have been classified into barriers related to 
generation (including both conventional generation and RES/CHP generation), 
barriers related to demand, barriers related to markets, and barriers related to 
transmission and distributions networks. 
 
Concerning RES and CHP generation, the main issues are: 
 
• Pricing mechanisms for energy and ancillary services 
• Support schemes for RES and DG. 
• Technical capabilities  
 
Main identified issues related to conventional generation are: 
 
• Incentives to provide reserves (primary, secondary, balancing) 
• Mechanisms to provide firmness in critical periods 
• Economic incentives to install new generation capacity 
 
Failure to overcome the outlined barriers related to conventional and RES and CHP 
generation will hinder the implementation of prioritized options outlined in WP3 such 
as dispersion of intermittent generation in EU countries, cheap storage technologies, 
or achieving a flexible generation mix. 
 
Concerning demand options, the topics identified are: 
 
• Metering and communication issues 
• Pricing rules and incentives 
• Technical possibilities 
 
As indicated by WP3, in order to implement flexible demand and demand response 
as effective prioritized options, both metering and billing of end-users according to 
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market prices on the one hand, and organisational capabilities and technological 
possibilities on the other, are essential to develop such strategies for overcoming 
variability and intermittency problems. Access to ancillary services markets could 
also provide additional incentives for demand to become flexible and controllable. 
 
Concerning national energy (daily/intradaily) and ancillary service markets, key 
issues are: 
 
• Market access, which is related to size limitations and the possibility of 
aggregation of units 
• Prediction of production, responsibility of deviations and gate closures closer to 
real-time 
 
RES positive incentives (possibility of aggregation of units, gate closures closer to 
real-time, flexible access rules, incentives to improve the prediction of production) as 
well as negative limitations such as size limitations in access to markets or 
penalizations associated with the responsibility of deviations must be addressed 
adequately in order to facilitate the penetration and dispersion of intermittent 
generation in EU countries. Aggregation of units, prediction of production and gate 
closures closer to real-time will also enhance the availability of information of 
intermittent sources or TSO that can be used and implement in control centres for the 
planning and operation of the system including intermittent sources.  
 
Concerning regional markets, key issues are: 
 
• Increase of interconnection capacity 
• Integration of national into regional markets (spot markets, sharing of reserves) 
 
The increase in transmission capacity could mitigate the variability impacts of 
intermittent generation if the two electricity systems are different, and also reduce the 
variation in prices. For an efficient use of the interconnection capacity, the 
harmonization of rules and procedures that better integrate the national markets into 
regional markets could also represent a non-negligible barrier in order to use the 
potentials of an increased grid. 
 
For transmission and distribution networks, it is important to analyse: 
 
• Time of use and locationally differentiated tariffs 
• DSOs incentives for active network management 
• DSOs incentives for efficient network planning taking into account DG  
• DSOs incentives for improving quality of service integrating DG 
• DG incentives to provide ancillary services to the DSO 
 
These barriers concerning distribution networks have been widely investigated by 
other projects such as DG-GRID and IMPROGRESS. 
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For each topic, the developed questionnaire contained a set of questions addressed 
to find out: 
 
• What is the current situation in the country and if this situation is in line with the 
recommendations that have been proposed at the EU level, 
• Which barriers should be removed in order to increase the penetration of 
RES/DG and comply with EU recommendations,  
• What specific proposals can be made in order to remove barriers and comply 
with EU recommendations. 
 
Opinions of different stakeholders were consulted by the partners in order to fill the 
questionnaires that have been used in this report. In the following the list of the 
countries and partners of RESPOND in charge of filling up the questionnaire are 
listed: 
 
• UK: Imperial College. Even though stakeholders were not directly consulted, 
publicly available documents from Ofgem and National Grid were used to fill up 
the questionnaire for UK 
• Germany: ISET and DENA. Stakeholders consulted included Federal Network 
Agency (BNetzA), German Wind Association (BWE), Electrabel Germany AG, 
Evonik New Energies GmbH, German Association of Energy and Water 
Industry (BDEW) 
• The Netherlands: ECN. Stakeholders consulted included TenneT (TSO) and 
distribution system operators Continuon and Essent 
• Denmark: RISOE. Stakeholders consulted included Energinek.dk and DONG 
Energy 
• Spain: Comillas University and REE. Opinions and views of stakeholders 
consulted included the Spanish TSO (Red Electrica de España), the National 
Spanish regulator (CNE) and generation and distribution companies (Iberdrola) 
Page 25/107 
2 Generation 
 
Various response options enabling RES/CHP deployment were selected in 
Deliverable D5. In terms of generation, these options are primarily aimed at 
increasing flexibility and adaptation of the current conventional generation mix on the 
one hand, and mixing assets to reduce RES aggregated generation variations and 
unpredictability on the other. The main issues regarding generation aspects identified 
in the surveyed countries are presented in this chapter, organized in terms of 
RES/CHP generation and conventional generation. In addition, the potential barriers 
to the implementation of the selected response options for efficient RES/CHP 
integration up to 2020 are synthesized, highlighted and discussed, and suitable 
actions to counteract the effects of such barriers are proposed. 
 
2.1 RES/CHP Generation 
RES/CHP generation shall take part in energy as well as ancillary services markets, 
since they will probably represent a significant fraction of the total amount of 
generation capacity in the system. Obstacles, amongst other, may be related to the 
remuneration perceived by RES/DG generators. This comprises the payments they 
receive according to the support schemes in place and the remuneration they obtain 
for the sale of energy and system services. Thus, for example, flexibility in the 
system can be increased by allowing the participation of renewable and distributed 
generation in the provision of system services, but the latter must be appropriately 
remunerated. One last barrier is related to the technical capabilities of RES/DG and 
whether these are compatible with the requirements made in order to get connected 
to the system. 
 
2.1.1 Pricing mechanisms for energy and ancillary services 
 
Energy markets 
 
As RES/DG technologies may exhibit high initial costs, competitiveness of such 
systems, at least at relatively early development stage, must be ensured by adequate 
support mechanisms. In this respect, support for RES (and in some countries also 
CHP) has been introduced in all EU27 member states. The main support schemes 
adopted in the European countries can be classified in: 
 
• Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and premiums 
• Quota obligations based on tradable green certificates (TGCs) 
• Tax incentives 
• Tendering systems 
 
Feed-in tariffs and premiums are generation-based price-driven incentives. They 
are usually regulated by the government, paying to operators of eligible domestic 
renewable electricity plants for the electricity they feed into the grid. Feed-in tariffs 
take the form of a total price per unit of electricity paid to the producers whereas the 
premiums are paid to the producer on top of the electricity market price. An important 
difference between the feed-in tariff and the premium payment is that the latter 
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introduces competition among producers in the electricity market. Thus, premiums 
are regarded as more efficient compared to feed in tariffs, which in turn can be 
improved by introducing a time-of-use structure. The cost for the grid operator is 
normally covered through the tariff structure.  
 
Feed-in-tariffs and premiums may be designed in % of average market price for 
consumers, in case depending on the RES technology and voltage level. In 
alternative, such mechanisms could be related to external damages avoided or 
external benefits achieved. The duration of the support may be valid for the lifetime of 
the installation or only for a predefined number of years, and may be regressive or 
held constant with the years. The guaranteed duration of the support represents a 
key issue: a strong long term degree of certainty lowers the market risk faced by 
investors. 
 
Quota obligations based on Tradable Green Certificates are generation-based 
quantity-driven instruments. The government defines targets for RES deployment 
and obliges any party of the electricity supply-chain (e.g. generator, wholesaler, or 
consumer) with their fulfilment. Once defined, a parallel market for renewable energy 
certificates is established and their price is set according to demand and supply 
conditions (forced by the obligation). Hence, for RES or CHP producers, financial 
support may arise from selling certificates in addition to the income from selling 
electricity on the power market. 
 
Tax incentives are generation-based price-driven mechanisms that work through 
payment exemptions from the electricity taxes applied to all producers. This type of 
instrument thus differs from premium feed-in tariffs solely in terms of the cash flow for 
RES producers: it represents an avoided cost rather than additional income. 
 
Tendering systems are quantity-driven mechanisms. The financial support can 
either be investment-focused or generation-based. In the first case, a fixed amount of 
capacity to be installed is announced and contracts are given following a predefined 
bidding process which offers winners a set of favourable investment conditions, 
including investment subsidies per installed kW. The generation-based tendering 
systems work in a similar way. However, instead of providing up-front support, they 
offer support in the size of the bid price per kWh for a guaranteed duration. 
 
According to these classes of incentives, in general, RES/CHPs may have three 
typical options to sell their production, namely, receiving a feed-in tariff, receiving a 
(feed-in) premium over the market price, or participating in TGC trading. The 
incentives may differ by type of technology and primary fuel used, size, and age of 
the installation. Currently, no differentiation per voltage level or location is provided, 
albeit size discrimination can be implicitly doing this. 
 
 
For instance, Table 1 shows the FIT and premiums structure used in Spain in 2007 
for the most common DG technologies. Only CHP and plants powered by means of 
biomass, biofuels or residues that chose the FIT alternative may opt for a ToU 
differentiation in peak hours and off-peak hours, with the year also divided in winter 
and summer days (on the basis of the date of time change). 
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Table 1 : Spanish FIT and premium structure for the year 2007. 
Technology Power Range Start year End Year FIT Premium Cap Floor
0 20 7,32 2,93 8,49 7,13
20 Onwards 6,12 0
0 25 44,04
25 Onwards 35,23
0 25 41,75
25 Onwards 33,40
0 25 22,98
25 Onwards 18,38
P≤0,5 12,04
0,5<P≤1 9,88
1<P≤10 7,72 2,78
10<P≤25 7,31 2,21
25<P≤50 6,92 1,91
After 10 years, an age 
correction is applied 
that depends on the 
installed capacity
N/A
CHP (Natural Gas)
Windpower (on-shore) No differentiation
PV
P≤100 kW
100 kW<P≤10 MW
10<P≤50 MW
 
 
In the UK, most RES and CHP are not exposed to market prices differentiated by 
time (or location) because they are engaged in PPA (power purchase agreements) 
with larger market participants (typically energy suppliers) who pay a fixed rate for all 
energy produced regardless of time of output or location. Certain renewable 
technologies will receive Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs), that is, TGCs, 
traded on a separate ROC market. However, the ROCs are not applied according to 
time or location, but just to MWh output and to the generation technology. Similarly, 
certified “good quality” CHP schemes are exempted from the Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) – an additional charge on fossil fuelled generation sources, but again this is 
not related to either location or time output, and is only dependent on the CHP 
scheme meeting certain minimum standards in operating efficiency. 
 
In the Netherlands, energy production is remunerated according to the time when it is 
produced, but not to location, except for two regions where temporarily congestion 
management will be applied in the future (planning: from 3rd quarter of 2009, in one 
region with the highest problems a simplified congestion management scheme as 
from October 2008). 
 
Ancillary services markets 
 
In addition to energy, ancillary services are essential for power systems to allow 
stable, secure and efficient operation. However, not all European countries have 
developed separate energy and ancillary services markets, and different pricing 
arrangements exist. 
 
In general, without adequate support mechanisms in place, RES/CHP generators are 
not encouraged to provide the system with those services that are most valuable. 
This is mainly related to the fact that services are not priced according to the value 
they have from the system’s perspective. In particular, if the feed-in tariff, market 
premium or green certificate price offered on energy production is too high, 
generators are driven towards providing all their production on the energy production 
market and not to provide ancillary services. 
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For instance, in the UK an availability payment will be made for several type of AS, 
plus an additional payment if the service is called out. Depending on the system 
service, the payment will be related to location and time. RES/DG can provide some 
system services through an aggregator. Whether they are remunerated exactly by 
time of output and location will be dependent on the contractual agreement with the 
aggregator and the profit sharing arrangement. 
 
In Spain, RES/DG units which choose to integrate their production through the spot 
market or contracts can participate in all the ancillary services markets if they are 
controllable. Their bids must be over 10MW, which can be obtained by aggregation. 
The ancillary services in which they can participate are congestion management, 
secondary reserve, and balancing market. However, RES/DG units under a constant 
feed-in tariff do not participate in ancillary services markets. Concerning voltage 
control, RES/DG receive incentives or penalties (in % of a fixed value of €/kWh) to 
keep their power factor (cosφ, ratio of active power to apparent power) between 
certain limits, depending on on-peak, off-peak and valley hour, and leading or lagging 
power factor, see figure 1 below. 
Peak Inter
Off-
Peak
< 0,95 -4 -4 8
< 0,96 y ≥ 0,95 -3 0 6
< 0,97 y ≥ 0,96 -2 0 4
< 0,98 y ≥ 0,97 -1 0 2
< 1 y ≥ 0,98 0 2 0
1 0 4 0
< 1 y ≥ 0,98 0 2 0
< 0,98 y ≥ 0,97 2 0 -1
< 0,97 y ≥ 0,96 4 0 -2
< 0,96 y ≥ 0,95 6 0 -3
< 0,95 8 -4 -4
Inductive
Capacitive
Power Factor
Reactive Power Bonus
Type of
Bonus (%)
 
Figure 1: Reactive power bonus for DG/RES generators in the Spanish market 
 
There has been some complains by the system operator due this reactive support 
mechanism. In some buses there is sudden big voltage variation (up to 18 kV –which 
represents 0.05 pu in the 400 kV network-) due to the connection or disconnection of 
capacitor banks in order to receive the reactive bonus. This case highlights how 
significant is to develop right incentives or pricing mechanisms. 
 
Another interesting case is related to the Danish experience, which witnesses a large 
number of small-scale CHP units with heat storage installed in the 1990s for medium 
and small-scale district heating systems. Originally, they faced a three-level feed-in 
tariff that encouraged electricity generation at peak load only. From 2005, the small-
scale CHP generators are facing the wholesale market price with some add-on, so 
they will not generate electricity when wind generation is abundant and prices very 
low. In addition, a ban on electric boilers to supply district heating systems was only 
temporarily lifted, so that investment in electric boilers is in case discouraged. There 
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are no similar restrictions for heat pumps, which will require a much longer utilisation 
time to be profitable. 
 
In Denmark, balancing is maintained within the framework of the joint Nordic 
regulating power market together with national balancing responsible parties, and 
rules and regulations set by the TSO. However, the institutional setup is available in 
the form of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool. 
 
In Germany, balancing power is tendered centrally for all four balancing zones in 
Germany. In these balancing zones there is no locational differentiation. If a 
balancing zone is short on balancing power and another one is long there should be 
an exchange. However, in the past this has not been the case and costs were higher 
than they could have been. 
 
In the Netherlands, for regulating and reserve power, different prices are available for 
each PTU for regulating up and down. For relieving transmission constraints, prices 
vary also to location as producers at some locations are offered higher prices. In 
terms of voltage control and black start, each year the TSO asks all market parties to 
offer reactive power and/or black start services and then contracts the relevant 
generators. 
 
2.1.2 Revision of RES/DG support schemes 
 
In terms of efficient system (network) integration, which is the objective of this 
project, and with reference to the incentive mechanisms illustrated above, it can be 
generally stated that premiums on top of the market price are more efficient than 
constant FITs. In fact, generators receive the market price signal as a good indicator 
of the value for the system of the energy they are generating in each hour of the day. 
Likewise, suitable TGC market design can result in pushing towards energy provision 
when the system needs it most. Utilization of FIT schemes as opposed to the other 
mechanisms could thus result in impediment of further effective RES/CHP 
integration. Detailed discussions on these aspects are illustrated below, also 
considering alternative viewpoints. 
 
Considering the investor’s point of view and the overall energy generated from 
RES/CHP, the performance of the support scheme can be benchmarked among 
different countries based on effectiveness and efficiency factors. Effectiveness 
means the ability to deliver an increase of the share of renewable electricity 
consumed, while efficiency represents a comparison of the total amount of support 
received and the generation cost. However, sometimes comparison in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency may be difficult since several schemes may be in place 
for a limited number of years and the countries are continuously fine-tuning existing 
support measures. The experience has shown that investors in RES usually prefer a 
system that is stable for a large number of years. The credible continuation of policy 
and the abatement of administrative barriers are important to create a stable growth 
in renewable energy sources and bring about lower societal costs as a result of a 
lower risk premium (of investors).  
 
When simply looking at the growth of renewable energy in recent years, we could 
then conclude that countries with strong feed-in tariff systems like Germany and 
Spain experienced enormous growth of RES capacity. Countries like the UK, with a 
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quota obligation and a tendering system, experienced far less growth of renewable 
energy capacity. In fact, from the investor’s point of view a feed-in tariff system 
provides more security than a green certificate system where the revenues per MWh 
are dependent on the demand for green certificates. 
 
However, with respect to the generation-related definition of efficiency given above, a 
more comprehensive definition of efficiency should be put forward, taking into 
account additional costs for the overall system, such as balancing costs. Accordingly, 
the point of view of the investor should be regarded as only one of the possible, since 
overlooking the point of view of the network operator and of the society in general will 
hamper further efficient integration due to initial biased support mechanisms. 
 
As a follow-up, effectiveness in terms of large RES/DG penetration or generation-
based efficiency cannot be the only driver indices to formulate suitable incentive 
mechanisms. Indeed, the RESPOND project main focus is on efficient integration of 
renewables and DG in the electricity system when their production increases. Hence, 
rather than merely promoting the highest share of renewables in the system, suitable 
support mechanisms should aim at efficiently integrating RES/DG in the system, so 
that the system/society perspectives are to be regarded with prominent role.  
 
Therefore, from the point of view of network operators and balancing responsible 
parties, it is crucial that support mechanisms take into account the actual system 
needs. Differentiated time-of-use tariffs/incentives and premiums on top of the market 
price, as mentioned earlier on, instead of fixed-feed-in tariffs, are capable to provide 
efficient market signal. Hence, the DG operator can know when power is mostly 
required and when not, and subsequently adjust (when possible) its power 
production so as to meet its economic requirements (by producing energy when 
prices are higher) and at the same time the network requirements (when generation 
is needed). Furthermore, support mechanisms should be combined with obligation to 
provide forecasts on the scheduled production in order to simplify the system burden 
in terms of ancillary needs. If these forecasts are not provided, or the deviation from 
the expected production is too high, adequate penalties should also be implemented. 
Alternatively, DG operators can be made balancing responsible for their own 
imbalance, giving them an incentive to provide reliable forecasts on scheduled 
production. 
 
Similarly, quota obligation mechanisms could be quite effective in inducing 
competition among technologies and send market-based signals for the network 
sake. However, in order to ensure that all technologies can benefit of such kind of 
incentive, it is important that enough liquidity is available on the market, where not 
only low-cost options are realised. Hence, convenient performance of TGCs requires 
that targets for RES production or purchase are set high enough to ensure growth of 
capacity and fines for not meeting obligations are introduced and set high enough to 
provide an incentive to sell or purchase TGCs. In order to stabilize the TGC market, 
cost effective quota systems could include some financial/banking elements so as to 
limit the potential variations in certificate prices so feared by investors. At the same 
time, such limitations should still be able to allow the certificate price to increase, so 
as to guarantee certificate trade increase and thus enough market liquidity and RES 
investment on the long run. 
 
From the point of view of the whole power system and society, RES/DG penetration 
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could be increasingly expensive for the system, so that support schemes should be 
such that in the long run they do not hamper further deployment due to initially wrong 
incentives. In addition, wrong mechanisms might also lead to higher average market 
prices. Hence, again incentive mechanisms should be more market-oriented, avoid 
favouring certain technologies as opposed to other ones, and take into account the 
network needs. 
 
It should be noted that all points of investors, networks, and society should be taken 
into account when analysing support systems. Hence, it is concluded that owing to 
the system point of view FITs should be rejected, while feed-in premiums and TGCs 
are both good candidates (with no specific choice between them) for support scheme 
implementation. Nowadays, both the feed-in tariff and premium schemes, as well as 
TGC schemes, are established in a number of European countries. Therefore, 
barriers and policy recommendations should be assessed for both systems. 
 
2.1.3 Technical capabilities  
 
RES/DG generation units built some years ago used to trip whenever a voltage dip or 
any other small system contingency occurred. This prevented the System Operator 
(SO) or Market Operator (MO) from relying on the power output of these units. 
Besides, most of these generators were not able to adjust their output according to 
the system needs, i.e. they were not capable of providing system reserves. All this 
together made it very difficult for RES generators to get connection to the grid, not to 
talk about the possibility of participating in markets. Today, most of these technical 
problems have been solved. 
 
In the Netherlands, RES/CHP generation units are required to comply with certain 
technical requirements.  These requirements depend on the voltage level at the 
connection point1 and apply to all generators irrespective of the primary energy 
source (paragraphs 2.4. and 2.5. of the Network Code). Some of the technical 
requirements are stated below: 
 
• Power factor of units must be within limits (e.g. for generators in low-voltage 
networks, the power factor must be between 0.9 lagging and 0.9 leading); 
• The electrical installation must be equipped with protection systems designed 
to meet certain specifications (e.g. under-voltage and over-voltage protection). 
For example, synchronous generators connected to low-voltage must be 
equipped with a device that disconnects the generator within 0.2 seconds when 
voltage level drops to 70% of the nominal level (section 2.4.2.4 of the Network 
Code). However, these specifications (which apply to all generators) do not 
seem to be restrictive for the development of RES/DG. 
• The operation of the generator should not affect the state of the network and 
the connected parties (e.g. when the generator is synchronized with the 
network). The SO can instruct generators to increase/reduce their output or 
turn on/off their units in case of emergency. This measure applies to all 
                                             
 
1Two voltage levels are defined by the Dutch Regulator for this reason; low-voltage, for voltage level of 
1 kV and lower, and high-voltage, for voltage level higher than 1 kV. 
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generation units with an installed capacity of more than 5 MW and with 
available capacity at their disposal. No compensation is provided to the 
generators in this case. 
 
The Network Code does not discriminate among power generation units 
(conventional and RES/DG), apart from the section that refers to the provision of 
primary and balancing services. Specifically, generation units that cannot be 
regulated, or in other words, that are solely dependent on one or more uncontrollable 
energy sources, are exempted from the obligation of providing primary response and 
reserve power services (par. 2.5.1.4 of the Network Code and 2.1.3 of the System 
Code)1. Therefore, these units are not obliged to meet the respective technical 
requirements about frequency response and reactive power provision.  
 
In Germany, the grid codes defined the technical requirements that need to be met 
by RES/CHP connected to transmission. Main requirements are reactive power 
provision and fault ride through capability. There are already now in effect some 
technical rules of FGW (http://www.wind-fgw.de/) to be complied with, in addition to 
grid access rules produced by the TSO/DSO, for example E.ON Netz, for wind 
plants. This concerns, for instance, the reaction to frequency deviations in the grid, 
namely, obligatory grid disconnection to regulate the frequency.  
 
Beginning in January 2009 the EEG has included a regulation for system services 
bonus. This law will be formulated in detail in a secondary legislation. It will include 
regulations for: 
 
• behaviour of plants in failure situations 
• voltage control and reactive power 
• frequency control 
• verification procedure 
• behaviour in black start situations 
 
The secondary legislation will also include: a) financial incentives to provide steady 
output, demand-driven, as well as improved grid and market integration of RES-E 
generation and b) qualification criteria to participate in balancing markets. However, 
95% of RES-E is connected to the distribution system. Therefore, they do not 
necessarily have to comply with the grid codes and often do not do so.  
 
In Spain, wind farms are mandated to be able to ride voltage dips of certain 
characteristics defined by the operational procedures of the SO. The following figure 
shows the threshold values for voltage dip duration and amount that wind generators 
have to ride through. No generator can disconnect from the network within the 
shadowed area during a single-phase, two-phase or three-phase short circuit.  
                                             
 
1 It should be also noted that units with capacity smaller than 5 MW do not qualify for primary response 
anyway. 
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Figure 2: Requirements for voltage dip through ride in Spain 
 
As long as the voltage is below 85% of the rated one, no consumption of active or 
reactive power is permitted at the connection point. During the fault and the recovery 
period, wind generators must be providing maximum current (never below nominal 
values). The reactive current component must be within the shadowed area of the 
following figure. By doing this, it is expected to keep an active power production as 
close to normal conditions as possible. Protections that trip the wind farm may have a 
response delay of 40 ms. 
 
 
Figure 3: Reactive power component thresholds during fault and recovery period in Spain 
 
Wind generators also have to contribute to primary frequency control. They must 
have the ability to reduce power output in case of over-frequency and raise it in case 
of under-frequency. In the latter situation, wind generators are only obliged to do so if 
wind speed is higher than the one corresponding to nominal capacity (maximum of 
5% during 5 minutes). 
 
Additionally, every unit or aggregation of units larger than 10MW must be connected 
to a control centre. Missing to fulfil any of these requirements would imply losing the 
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rights to be remunerated under the conditions of the “Special Regime”, i.e. losing the 
rights to perceive the RES/DG support mechanisms and other incentives. Finally, 
controllability is required to access AS markets.  
 
Wind farms that were functioning after January 1st 2008 are mandated to comply 
with the voltage dips riding requirements. Installations that started producing before 
this date must be adapted to do so before January 1st 2010 unless it is technically 
impossible for them to fulfil these requirements. In this case, they must communicate 
and justify this to the authorities before January 1st 2009. 
 
In the UK, small RES (wind) is not required to comply with technical constraints and 
in most instances is required to trip off the system in the case of system faults. CHP 
units that are sufficiently large to require compliance (>100MW for a single unit) with 
the CUSC (Connection and use of system code) will need to meet the same technical 
constraints as conventional generation. However the number of RES/CHP systems 
that meet the requirements for mandatory sign-up to the CUSC is exceptionally 
small. Few RES/DG have anything to do with these requirements, and as yet there 
are no other regulations or special regimes that regulate the output of these 
generators. 
 
2.2 Conventional generation 
Achieving the level of flexibility that is required to integrate large shares of 
intermittent generation in power systems may only be possible if conventional 
generators have the ability and will to adapt their behaviour to the new system needs 
that will arise (or have already arisen) because of the installation of RES/DG power 
plants. The aggregated output of these generators will have to absorb a significant 
fraction of the variable and unpredicted changes in the output of other non-
controllable generators both in the short and the long term. For this to happen, 
enough flexible conventional generation capacity will have to be in place in the 
system. This generation capacity will have to be available and producing when the 
system needs it to supply demand. Generators will have to quickly adapt their 
behaviour according to sudden unpredicted changes in net demand (demand – 
uncontrollable generation). In the following, we aim to identify market and regulatory 
barriers that may undermine the successful application of measures to achieve the 
aforementioned objectives. 
 
2.2.1 Incentives to provide regulation reserves for conventional generation 
 
Conventional generation can increase the flexibility of the power system through 
provision of primary, secondary and tertiary regulation reserves. Participation of 
these generators in the balancing service is compulsory in some cases (primary 
reserve), though the characteristics of the compulsory regulation service provided by 
generators may vary from one system to another (response speed, conditions for the 
response of generators to be triggered, etc). Participation in other balancing services 
is voluntary and, therefore, must be achieved through the use of economic 
incentives. Hence, unless the prices earned are attractive enough, generators will 
sell their energy in other markets. 
 
The following section describes different mechanisms existing across a number of 
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European countries (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and UK). 
 
As for the Danish system there is no particular mechanism for provision of regulating 
power and energy. The current system is based on legal vertical unbundling, with a 
matured organised market, balancing responsible parties, rules and regulations set 
by the TSO, and an – apparently well-designed – system of fees and tariffs. The 
success of this arrangement is a result of tradition, political agreements, a strong 
institutional organisation of the market, and abundant generation and transmission 
capacity. 
 
The key mechanism for load-frequency regulation is the joint Nordic regulating power 
market, which covers East but not West Denmark. The key principle for this market is 
that the balance responsible parties submit bids for upward or downward regulation 
to the local system operator stating the offered quantity energy payment. The system 
operators send the regulating power bids to a ‘coordinator’ (Statnett in Norway), who 
compiles a joint list of all regulating power bids in the Nordic countries, sorted by 
price. If regulation of the frequency in the joint Nordic synchronic system is needed, 
the most advantageous regulating power bids on the joint list are activated taking grid 
congestions into consideration.  
 
There is an expectation that the needs for load-frequency regulation services will 
increase in the foreseeable future along with the expectation of significant increase in 
wind installed capacity over the next decades. This may require new solutions – both 
technical and institutional – such as DC transmission lines between the UCTE and 
Nordel synchronised systems (planned or under construction) and more distributed 
CHP systems. 
 
Participation in the balancing market through a tender is the customary procedure in 
place in Germany in order for the conventional generators to participate in the 
provision of primary, secondary and tertiary regulating power and energy. The 
participation of generators in these services is voluntary, and this has brought 
problems associated with the existing mechanisms. They have failed to achieve 
enough participation (liquidity) in those markets because the prices might be lower 
than anticipated and the prequalification criteria are very complex, only a small 
amount of capacity can qualify for these services. The needs for load-frequency 
regulation services in Germany are also expected to increase in the foreseeable 
future due to increased wind installed capacity.  
 
Regarding the Dutch system, there is a secondary legislation in the form of grid and 
system codes (based on provisions in the Electricity Law 1998), which is aimed at 
promoting the participation of generators in balancing markets. Provision of primary 
reaction is compulsory for large generators (>60 MW). No financial compensation is 
provided. Furthermore, connected parties with contracted and provided capacity of 
more than 60 MW are obliged to offer all the available capacity that they can produce 
more or less and consume less to TenneT as Regulating and Reserve Power (RRP) 
by means of bids; other connected parties are allowed to do so (NMa/DTe, 2007a).1 
There is a bid ladder which contains bids of Regulating and Reserve Power with a 
dispatch time smaller than or equal to a Programme Time Unit (PTU), equal to 15 
                                             
 
1 NMa/DTe, Grid code September 2007 version. 
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minutes. 
 
For (small) CHP units with heat storage (in horticulture), the existing mechanisms 
which facilitate the Dutch generators to participate in the balancing market through 
aggregators are quite successful. This is due to the higher revenues of the balancing 
market compared to other markets which attracts CHP units to provide these 
services. 
 
The increase of intermittent generation (onshore and offshore wind, CHP, PV) will 
increase the demand for regulation services. However, it seems that the current 
mechanism is still adequate to deal with these changes. 
 
In Spain, contributing to the primary regulation service is mandatory (no 
remuneration considered). The required equipment must be installed at every 
generating unit. Generating units that don’t comply may contract the service.  
 
Secondary regulation has been established as a competitive market. The service is 
provided by several regulation zones (sets of generating units belonging to a 
generating company). The control is automatic and hierarchical: the SO sends 
signals to each company central dispatch, which in turn sends signals to its own 
units. The units participating in the service must react to the signals in 5 minutes. Up 
and down regulating capacity is not separated. The remuneration is comprised of a 
capacity payment (€/MW) for the total band provided (up and down), and an energy 
payment (€/MWh) corresponding to the price of the substitution regulation energy. 
The provision of this service is supervised, and a penalization of 150% of the 
capacity payment is applied if the units do not comply with the technical requirements 
of the service. The following table contains the mean annual prices obtained for the 
band and regulating energy in the secondary regulation market 
 
Table 2 : Mean annual information for secondary regulation market in Spain in the last years 
mean hourly Economic Mean Energy Economic Mean price Mean price
band Volume price used Volume up energy down energy
year MW k€ €/MW GWh k€ cent/kWh cent/kWh
2007 1240 208986 19.220 2137 68775 4.100 2.600
2006 1242 249996 25.041 2175 104758 5.700 4.000
2005 1217 326819 30.624 1985 105728 6.518 3.890
2004 1234 131403 12.143 2035 58027 3.599 2.013
2003 1205 168414 15.938 1967 50011 3.451 1.672
MEAN 1228 217124 20.593 2060 77460 4.674 2.835
SECONDARY RESERVE MARKET
CAPACITY TERM  ENERGY TERM
 
 
Tertiary regulation in Spain is also established as a voluntary competitive market. 
This market is only cleared by the SO if secondary reserve is exhausted. Units that 
can be on before 15 minutes can participate in the tertiary regulation market. An 
energy payment (c€/kWh) is defined for this market. Usually, tertiary energy prices 
are very favourable compared to daily market prices. The following table contains the 
mean annual prices for the up and down energy prices in comparison to the mean 
annual daily market prices 
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Table 3 : Mean annual information for up and down regulation prices with respect to daily enery prices 
in Spain in the last years 
Energy Economic Mean price Mean price Mean price
used Volume up energy down energy daily market
year GWh k€ cent/kWh cent/kWh c€/kWh
2007 4998 228875 6.900 2.200 3.935
2006 6587 403077 7.200 2.600 5.376
2005 5064 306680 8.543 2.840 5.573
2004 4699 161951 5.531 1.361 2.874
2003 4323 142055 5.689 1.077 3.026
MEAN 5134 248528 6.773 2.016 4.157
TERTIARY REGULATION
 
 
In those cases where provision of the regulation service is voluntary, the 
mechanisms that exist in Spain have been quite successful at encouraging 
generation capacity to participate in the service provision. This is due to high prices 
for providing secondary reserve and tertiary reserves. This encourages the 
participation of conventional generators in these markets.The hourly contracted 
secondary reserve has not varied in the last years in Spain, even though a high 
increase in wind generation capacity has been experienced (which should have 
increased the need for regulating capacity). One possible explanation of this fact 
consists of the improvement of the wind power production forecast that is taking 
place. Figure 4 shows the daily contracted up band and down band in the past years, 
indicating that the needs have not increased even though the increase in intermittent 
generation capacity such as wind. 
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Daily contracted down band 
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Figure 4: Daily contracted down and  up band in Spain in the last years 
 
The mean hourly up band is around 700 MW with a maximum of 900 MW, and the 
mean down band is around 500 MW, with values in the range [400-600 MW]. Figure 
6 and Figure 7 show the mean hourly contracted up and down band. 
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Figure 5: Mean hourly down band in Spain in the last years 
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Mean Hourly up band in the period 2004-2007
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Figure 6: Mean hourly up band in Spain in the last years 
 
Even though the band contracted in the Spanish secondary reserve market has not 
varied significantly, a mechanism of contracting supplementary reserve has been 
implemented in case the system operator decides that the hourly band contracted in 
the secondary reserve market is not enough to guarantee the load-frequency 
regulation.  
 
In the UK, primary regulation is mandatory as part of the Connection and Use of 
System Code (CUSC) – the grid code that all eligible generators must comply with. 
Exempt generators are typically those under 100MW. Generators complying with the 
CUSC must have primary regulation services installed at every generating unit. 
There is no remuneration for this activity. 
 
Tertiary and Secondary regulation in the UK are established as a voluntary 
competitive market. Services are tendered on an annual basis. Depending on the 
service provided, payment will be on the basis of a call-out charge (£/MWh) and in 
some instances will include a standing payment for availability (£/MW). The SO has 
developed a number of reserve products to allow a range of reserve service 
providers to participate in these markets. 
 
Conditions for provision of secondary and tertiary services vary with the service. 
Some allow aggregated provision, others do not. Most have minimum response 
capacity allowable and time conditions for sustaining response; this varies according 
to the service. The SO sends signals to each company central dispatch and it sends 
signals to its own units. Figure 8 shows the reserve services timescales that exist in 
the UK. 
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Figure 7: Reserve services timescales in the UK (Source: National Grid) 
 
Fast Reserve is used in the UK to provide rapid and reliable delivery of active power 
through an increased output from generation or a reduction in consumption from 
demand sources, following receipt of an electronic despatch instruction from TSO. 
Providers of the Optional Service will receive an Enhanced Rate Availability Fee (£/h) 
payment for periods of time where they provide TO (following dispatch) with 
enhanced MW run-up and run-down rates.  The Enhanced Rate Availability Fee is 
defined by the provider in the framework agreement. Providers of the Firm Service 
will receive an Availability Fee (£/h) for each hour in a Tendered Service Period 
where the service is available. TO will notify ‘windows’ during which it requires the 
service to be provided, for which a Window Initiation Payment will be made. During a 
window, Providers may also specify a Positional Fee (the cost of putting plant in a 
position where fast reserve may be provided).  All fees for the Firm Service are 
submitted by the provider as part of the tender. An utilisation fee (£/MW/h) is payable 
for the energy delivered in both services (for Balancing Market Unit participants via a 
bid/offer acceptance).  For the firm service this utilisation fee will be capped by the 
tender parameter submitted. 
 
As an example, the following table contains the utilisation made of Fast Reserve in 
the UK in August 2007. Total reserve used was 12.3 GWh, which can be broken 
down into several price bands, see Table 4. 
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Table 4 : Fast Reserve Market Information (August 2007) 
 
 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
In those cases where provision of the regulation service is voluntary, the 
mechanisms that exist in the UK have been successful at encouraging generation 
capacity to participate in the service provision. Again, this is due to prices for 
secondary reserve and tertiary reserve which are high enough to encourage the 
participation of conventional generators in these markets 
 
In the UK there is some concern that the need for reserve may increase with greater 
penetration of on and offshore wind generation. However, penetration to date has not 
been sufficient to indicate any serious changes. There are currently no additional 
mechanisms in place to facilitate an increase in demand for frequency regulation 
services. 
 
2.2.2 Mechanisms for sufficient generation capacity in critical periods 
 
Conventional generators must provide the system with the power it needs at times 
when demand is high and intermittent generators output is far from being able to 
supply it. Mechanisms to deal with this problem vary across EU-countries. Some 
systems have developed a system of payments and penalties so as to guarantee that 
capacity of the conventional generators is firm (capacity payments are an example of 
this). Other systems rely on market forces to encourage generators to be available 
when the system needs them. According to those backing this option, the prospect of 
earning high energy prices should lure conventional generators into selling their 
energy at times when demand is much larger than production by intermittent 
generators. 
 
In Germany, the merit order system is the mechanism in place to balance the 
electricity production and demand, and there is no specific mechanism to guarantee 
enough generation is available at critical times. Hence, generators will always 
participate as long as their marginal costs are covered. However, due to the volatility 
in energy markets, if it is not expected that capital costs can be recovered, new 
capacity will not be built and older less efficient capacity will run, posing threaten to 
the overall system efficiency. 
 
In the Netherlands, in order to ensure that there is adequate capacity and regulating 
capability to supply demand, the system operator contracts a certain amount of 
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Regulating and reserve power (275 MW) and emergency power (300 MW) on a 
yearly basis. Both are contracted outside the market, to prevent balancing power 
from competing with power in trade markets and therefore from not being available 
for securing supply during times of peak demand. Consequently, less supply is made 
available on trade markets and market prices will increase giving rise to investments 
in new generation capacity. The system has been able to cover all demand, no large-
scale black-outs did occur during the last decades due to lack of generation capacity. 
 
The necessity of contracting Regulating and reserve power and emergency power 
can be motivated by the possibility of two kinds of market failures. The first one is 
due to imperfect information: if the market does not take into account the effects of 
individual dispatch decisions on the system as a whole during times of peak demand, 
the market outcome might be not optimal. The second one is related to shortage of 
reserve capacity: reserve capacity has public good characteristics, as for technical 
and economic reasons it is not possible to curtail all customers individually from 
using it, even when they are not paying for the services delivered by that reserve 
capacity. This follows from the non-excludability nature of reserve capacity1. In many 
cases, free-riding of electricity consumers on reserve capacity may occur. For both 
reasons, institutional arrangements like the contracting of additional regulating, 
reserve, and emergency power are necessary. 
 
In Spain, there is a mechanism of availability payments, or availability service, in 
place whereby the system operator is allowed to enter into bilateral contracts (no 
longer than one year) with peaking units. The generators commit themselves to be 
available when needed by the system, in return for earning the availability payments 
established in the contract. This mechanism has been successful in getting the 
commitment of generators to provide the amount of firm capacity required by the 
system. 
 
In addition to the system of availability payments and the daily energy market, there 
are other mechanisms in the Spanish system aimed at committing generators to 
produce power whenever the system needs it. These are the tertiary energy, the 
deviations management, and the congestion management markets. Prices in these 
markets are attractive enough to encourage the participation of generators. The 
following table compares mean annual energy prices in the deviation management 
market to average market prices. 
                                             
 
1 We here call a good non-excludable if it is either physically impossible or prohibitively expensive to 
prevent users from consuming it. Devices to curtail customers at a distance from consuming electricity 
are still quite costly to apply on households. 
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Table 5 : Mean annual information deviation management market and average market prices in Spain 
in the last years 
Energy Economic Mean price Mean price Mean price
used Volume up energy down energy daily market
YEAR GWh k€ cent/kWh cent/kWh c€/kWh
2007 2157 76189 5.200 2.500 3.935
2005 1350 81256 7.876 3.480 5.573
2004 1777 55758 4.517 1.888 2.874
2003 2018 52549 4.595 1.521 3.026
mean 1826 66438 5.547 2.347 4.157
DEVIATIONS MANAGEMENT MARKET
 
 
In principle, base units have a natural incentive to be available when the system 
needs them, since energy prices at these times are much higher than average ones. 
However, peaking units are the ones setting the marginal price when the reserve 
margin is tightest or there is no margin at all. Therefore, market forces may not 
provide a strong enough incentive for them to be available. Thus, a system of 
payments corresponding to the firm capacity they offer has been put in place. 
 
The UK operates an approach based on market forces to encourage generators to 
be available at times of peak demand. There are no capacity payments, and the SO 
does not contract directly with generators to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to 
meet peak demand. Generation and demand contract in the wholesale energy 
market and a system of imbalance payments/charges penalises participants that do 
not reconcile their contracted and metered positions. 
 
The SO also publishes the “Winter Outlook” on an annual basis containing the latest 
information on demand and generation forecasts for the coming peak (winter) period. 
This market information is used by generation to make decisions regarding 
availability of plant and contracting with suppliers in the wholesale market to cover 
the peak periods. Whilst the SO does not have any explicit authority to maintain a 
generation capacity margin, this approach manages to maintain a margin of close to 
20%. There are also reserve markets that the SO can call on to provide additional 
generation in times of system shortage. 
 
Under the current arrangements and in a system dominated by conventional 
generation the existing capacity has sufficient incentive to be available at peak times 
as prices are highest during these periods. However, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether these arrangements will continue to be suitable in a system with high 
penetration of intermittent renewables. Under these conditions the generation 
capacity margin will increase significantly (as intermittent generation displaces 
energy but not the generation capacity of incumbent conventional plant). This is likely 
to result in reduced load factors of operation for conventional plant, particularly base-
load – and will increase the requirement for peaking generation. Current indications 
of new generation coming on stream in the UK system over the next 7 years do not 
indicate any appreciation of this scenario as most new capacity is base-load. 
Although there are no explicit barriers that discourage participation when the system 
is stressed – in the longer term the lack of a capacity payment may mean that there 
are not sufficient signals for investment in appropriate generation capacity to support 
a system with high penetration of intermittent renewables. 
  
Further analysis is needed as the UK system develops. Reconsideration of the 
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decision to move to a market only system without capacity payment should be 
reviewed, and alternatives considered. 
 
2.2.3 Economic incentives to install new generation capacity 
 
Due to the integration of large shares of RES/CHP, revenues for conventional 
generators in the market might probably decrease. This is related to the fact that the 
amount of energy sales will decrease, since available RES/CHP come first in the 
merit order. Besides this, many conventional generators will have to operate far from 
their nominal functioning regime and they will have to cycle. Therefore, their 
operating costs will increase. As a consequence of this, investment in conventional 
generation may become less attractive. 
 
In Denmark, as the market has operated so far with some overcapacity, there is no 
real experience of this issue. However, it has been an issue considered in several 
research projects under national and Nordic programmes. There is a school of 
thought that excessive market revenue in short periods will not be a reliable source 
for financing new investments. Some kind of extra payment may be necessary. This 
is currently the mechanism used for financing research in new technologies. 
 
In Germany, there are no other incentives to power plant operators, besides market 
revenues, to install new generation capacity. However, alternatives such as capacity 
payments are considered to be further investigated, in the outlook of high amount of 
RES capacity installed and lesser runtime/revenues for new conventional capacities, 
although there is an expectation that market forces could solve these problems too. 
Nonetheless, as a matter of fact today much more new conventional capacity than is 
expected to be able to run economically is planned or is in the licensing procedure. 
 
Similarly, in the Netherlands there are no direct incentives to encourage new 
capacity. The mechanism of contracting generation capacity outside the energy 
market as mentioned before, increases the prices for generation capacity (less 
supply available) and therefore gives an incentive to increase generation capacity or 
to import more electricity. The existence of harbours (makes transport of fuels for 
electricity generation cheaper, especially coal), enough cooling-water due to the sea 
and rivers, and many interconnections with neighbouring countries favours 
installation of more generation capacity. 
 
An alternative scheme, such as extra payments apart from market revenues is 
deemed inappropriate since it will distort the playing field level with neighbouring 
countries, as The Netherlands did experience in the past. At the moment there is an 
investment boom in new generation capacity in the country, without extra payments. 
 
In Spain, in order to secure a sufficient amount of generation capacity to cope with 
load increases, authorities have decided to implement a system of capacity 
payments, also called the investment service. If these capacity payments were not 
implemented, systems might be prone to go through periods of time when reserve 
margins have been completely eroded and, consequently, energy price spikes and 
load sheds would take place. Generators that are larger than 50 MW in size receive a 
capacity payment expressed in euros per installed megawatt and year during their 
first 10 years of operation. Installations need an administrative authorization issued 
by the General Direction for Energy Policy and Mines in order to benefit from this 
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payment. The investment incentive depends on the system reserve margin, also 
called IC (the ratio of the installed firm generation capacity to the peak load), which is 
computed by the SO. If the reserve margin index falls below 1.1, or in order to 
accomplish security of supply objectives, the Spanish government may implement 
auctions aimed at setting the level of the investment incentive to be paid to 
generation companies in order for them to install new generation capacity.  
 
The following figures shows the annual evolution of the peak demand compared to 
the total conventional generation capacity (excluding special regime) and the total 
generation capacity (including all special regime). The next one shows the ratio of the 
peak demand to the total and conventional generation capacity. 
 
Implementing an investment incentive that depends on the level of the system 
reserve margin that exists when the investment takes place encourages agents to 
postpone investments in new generation capacity until the reserve margin is very 
tight, so as to earn the maximum capacity payment. These may be appropriate for 
values of the IC index that are above a certain level that is considered to be too high 
(1.3, 1.4). However, whenever the index gets below this level the investment 
incentive should be kept constant. Considering the possibility of organizing auctions 
in case the investment incentive has not been set at the right level is also sensible.  
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Figure 8: Evolution of peak demand and generation capacity in Spain in the last years 
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Figure 9: Evolution of the generation adequacy index in Spain in the last years 
 
In the UK, there are no additional incentives apart from market revenues for the 
installation of new generation capacity. Historically the SO approach of publishing the 
winter outlook and the “Seven Year Statement” has been sufficient to ensure 
development of an appropriate generation background to support demand. Further 
incentives may be necessary to support a system with high penetration of 
renewables (with the problems outlined earlier) but further analysis is required to 
determine whether this should be some form of capacity payment external to the 
market. In any case, the UK is committed to a market based approach to system 
operation and investment, so investigation of whether the existing UK electricity 
market can provide appropriate signals for investment is essential. 
 
2.2.4 Conclusions 
 
RES/CHP: Pricing of energy and ancillary services 
 
In terms of pricing mechanisms relevant to energy provision, in general premiums 
attached to market prices and TGCs are more efficient than FITs, as generators are 
pushed towards selling energy when it is more needed, providing suitable support to 
the overall grid performance. FIT coupled to ToU could be a solution to push 
generation to follow the grid requirements. In addition, location-based charges or 
incentives could help improve the overall network operation. 
 
With respect to ancillary services pricing, RES/CHP systems do not in general 
receive incentives adherent to the real value of such services. In particular, market 
premiums much higher than AS prices would mean no DG participation in system 
services support. This highlights the need for integrated design of energy and 
ancillary services markets or pricing mechanisms. In addition, incentive/penalty 
mechanisms should be designed so as not to unbalance the “normal” grid operation. 
Similarly, as for instance pointed out by the Danish experience about CHP pricing 
system in the presence of increasing wind power, pricing mechanisms need to be 
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updated quickly. In fact, in a fast changing scenario, excessive delays in providing 
adequate policy/regulation updates might cause distorted participants’ behaviour and 
hurdle investments or market access for new high efficiency generation. 
 
Controllability is a prerequisite to AS market participation. However, generators that 
in theory could be controllable such as CHP do not provide system services because 
they do not receive enough incentive for it. A mechanism based upon availability 
payments plus additional contribution in case the service is actually called out might 
help increasing the share of controllable RES/CHP providing AS.  
 
RES/CHP: Support schemes 
 
Most RES/DG generation technologies would not be profitable for the power plant 
developer without support. On the other hand, support schemes need to be fitted to 
the system requirements, so that TGC and feed-in premiums are to be preferred to 
FITs, otherwise further penetration of RES will be hampered. 
 
Considering the diversification of the generation mix as one of the prioritized options 
analysed within the RESPOND project, in order to prevent that only low-cost options 
are realised within TGC mechanisms, gradually increasing targets should help move 
towards adoption of other DG options. Meanwhile, the higher initial-cost technologies 
might be supported by FIT-ToU or premium schemes, to help boost generation 
diversity and efficient system integration of further renewables. In addition, incentives 
should decrease with time, as typically production costs from technologies such as 
PV, wind, or even CHP, decrease with learning experience.  
 
If energy prices/tariffs are too high and do not depend on system conditions (FIT-ToU 
or premiums), RES generators will not be encouraged to participate in ancillary 
services markets or any other market apart from the energy one, whereas this will be 
central to the correct operation of the power system.  
 
It is also recommended that compulsory schedules of the expected production are 
provided to the SO, and that consistent deviations from these schedules are 
effectively penalized. 
 
RES/CHP: Technical capabilities 
 
In general, there seem not to be major technical hurdles to prevent RES/CHP access 
to markets, also owing to improvements in the capacity of riding through faults or 
voltage dips, for instance, which were main issues in the past. Whether or not non-
controllable units have obligation for frequency response, reserve, and so on, 
depends on the regulation of the specific country, with most severe requirements 
applied to larger units, in case connected at a transmission level.  
 
If the generation units cannot be controlled, they will be prevented from AS market 
participation. Technical availability of cheap enabling technologies such as heat 
storage or electric heaters/heat pumps can increase the deployment of RES/CHP in 
AS markets.  
 
Conventional generation: Provision of regulation reserves 
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Provision of regulation reserve from conventional generators is a key issue not to 
hurdle the diffusion of RES/CHP technologies with their characteristics of (partial) 
variability and unpredictability. 
 
When provision of primary, secondary and tertiary regulation services is voluntary, 
failure in achieving enough participation may occur if markets or equivalent 
mechanisms are not backed by adequate prices, and if too complex prequalification 
criteria are required. On the other hand, market mechanisms (above all for secondary 
and tertiary regulation), when correctly in place, appear to work very well, for both 
single large units and equivalent aggregated units. The main reason is the possibility 
to accrue high revenues on the balancing markets.  
 
In most countries primary regulation is compulsory, at least for the larger systems, 
with no compensation. If specific units are not able to provide the service, contracting 
the service from other units may be an interesting option helping overcome possible 
technical barriers. 
 
Forecasting techniques prove to be an enabling technology to increase the flexibility 
of the balancing system and allow more effective RES/CHP penetration and 
operation. A further point to highlight is that availability of interconnection with 
neighbour countries enables RES/CHP units to better handle their production, even 
in the presence of relatively bad forecasts. 
 
Conventional generation: Provision of sufficient generation capacity 
 
Luring conventional generators into guaranteeing the firmness needed by the system 
in the most critical times (demand high and intermittent generators output not able to 
supply it) is a delicate issue. 
 
When market approaches are followed, due to high volatility in energy prices it might 
happen that capital costs are not recovered by generators. If this is the case, new 
capacity will not be built and older less efficient units will keep on running. On the 
other hand, if prices in the relevant markets are attractive enough, participation of 
generation to provide the needed firmness can be achieved. However, also the 
capacity type plays a key role. Indeed, capacity firmness should be guaranteed in 
terms of both base-load and flexible/peaking units, in order to guarantee enough 
flexibility.  
 
Also, systems of imbalance payment/charges with respect to the positions contracted 
on the wholesale market, which applies in the UK, have been successfully put in 
place. However, this is enabled by a considerable amount of detailed information that 
is made available by the SO, so that generators can optimally planning their capacity 
utilization and contracts. However, further penetration of renewables will increase the 
requirements for peaking capacity with lower load factor, and the economic feasibility 
of such units based only on market forces might be at stakes. 
 
In the case market forces were not sufficient to provide incentives to peaking units for 
firmness provision, system based upon capacity/availability payments or equivalent 
bilateral contracts between SO and generators prove to be quite effective. Utilization 
of such non-market tools seems also justified by possible market failures due to 
incomplete information for the SO dispatching and possibility of consumers to free-
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ride on reserve capacity.  
 
Conventional generation: Investment in new generation capacity 
 
Availability of and new investment in conventional generators in the presence of 
consistent penetration of RES/CHP might be endangered, as their overall revenues 
might decrease, and no additional capacity might be installed, although highly 
needed. Similarly, installation of base-load capacity rather than peaking plants might 
not be anyway sufficient to provide the degree of security and reliability needed by 
future systems. 
 
Capacity payments outside the market aimed at providing system firmness implicitly 
push towards additional capacity. Indeed, on average such mechanisms increase the 
price for generation capacity and thus give incentive to new investment. However, 
mechanisms such as in Spain, where the payments are a function of the system 
reserve margin, could push investors to postpone investment too far away, in order to 
earn the maximum possible capacity payments. 
 
In general, it is advised that further market studies are run to address the potential of 
only market forces (as it is envisaged for the UK) to push towards additional 
conventional generation investment in the case of large CHP/RES penetration. 
 
The table below shows a summary of the main generation-related barriers to efficient 
RES/CHP integration emerged for the different countries surveyed. Columns indicate 
the classes of response options identified for efficient RES/CHP network integration, 
while rows indicate the relevant potential barriers to their implementation, as 
illustrated in the Chapter. However, most of these barriers can be overcome by 2020 
by following the indications in this work and other current research activities at the 
European level. More specifically, only long-term and quasi-irreversible decisions 
taken now might represent a serious hurdle in the future, such as investments into 
non-suitable conventional generation capacity as it might be for Germany. Similarly, 
large deployment of long-term flat FIT support schemes (as in Germany or Spain) 
rather than (possibly ToU- and location-based) market premium or TGC incentives 
could lead to future system-related problems.  
 
Table 6 : Generation-relevant barriers to efficient penetration of RES/CHP systems (per country) 
 Pricing 
mechanisms 
for 
RES/CHP 
Subsidy 
schemes 
for 
RES/CHP
Incentives 
schemes for 
conventional 
generation 
General 
means to 
increase 
flexibility 
No location-based 
charges/incentives for RES/CHP 
SP, UK, NL    
No ancillary service participation 
for FIT-based RES/CHP units 
SP    
No compensation for 
load/frequency support for 
RES/CHP 
NL, SP    
No ToU-based FIT for RES/CHP  SP, D   
No ToU-based TGC for  UK   
Page 50/107 
RES/CHP 
Wrongly designed support 
mechanisms for RES/CHP 
 SP, DK, 
D 
  
Low market prices or complex 
criteria for regulation reserve 
participation from conventional 
generation 
  D  
No remuneration for primary 
regulation service from 
conventional generation 
(mandatory) 
  SP, UK  
No capacity payments as 
potential means to overcome 
market failures for firm capacity 
provision/investment (2020 
perspective) 
  D, UK, DK  
Installation of expected non-
economical conventional 
capacity 
  D  
Extra payments outside the 
market not allowed not to alter 
the playing field with 
neighbouring countries 
  NL  
Potentially wrong capacity 
investment incentives based on 
reserve margin 
  SP  
Market-oriented approach that 
could prevent outside-of-market 
conventional capacity drivers 
  UK  
Electric resistance heating 
banned 
   DK 
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3 Demand 
 
Active demand may prove to be central to achieving the integration of a significant 
amount of renewable generation in the system. Despite the fact that technical 
capabilities of these generators have improved substantially since they were first 
installed, the overall flexibility of generation has decreased due to the existence of 
large shares of intermittent generation. Thus, in order for the system to adapt to 
changing conditions demand will have to take a more active role. 
 
3.1 Market prices and demand response 
Demand response imply getting demand to partly compensate for variations in 
supply, reducing demand when capacity is limited and marginal production costs high 
and increase demand when abundant capacity is available and marginal costs of 
production is low.  
 
In order for demand to react to changes in system conditions, load facilities and 
communications infrastructure must be updated to allow:  
 
the real time metering of demand;  
exchange of information between consumers and the system operator (either at 
transmission or at distribution level); 
the direct control of at least part of the consumption facilities by the market or system 
operator either via discretionary instructions or through a set of predetermined rules, 
and 
improved access to wholesale markets and exposure of demand customers to real 
time electricity prices.  
 
Apart from this, new demand technologies should be developed, probably in 
combination with heat or electricity storage ones, so that consumers can shift part of 
their load from those hours when energy is more valuable, and therefore expensive, 
to others where it is less. 
 
In all the countries there are initiatives or research programs to study the possible 
impact of implementing advanced load control techniques. 
 
3.1.1 Volatile market prices 
 
Looking at the electricity market in general, over time demand and supply changes 
continually, introducing variations in the marginal cost of producing electricity. Taking 
the NordPool price region Western Denmark as a case, Figure 11, left, shows an 
average daily variation in demand and Figure 11, right, shows the variation in 
electricity production from wind power the second half of January 2007. Assuming a 
liberalized electricity market and perfect competition, the price of electricity equals 
the marginal production cost, and the variations in the demand and supply of 
electricity may be analysed in standard micro-economic supply- and demand-curve 
set-up. Figure 12, left, shows the effects on the price/production cost of changes in 
demand and Figure 12, right, shows the effect of changes in production capacity. 
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Figure 10: Average hourly consumption curve in Denmark, 2007, and the variation in wind power 
production the in second half of January 2007. 
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Figure 11 Effects of changes in the demand and supply of electricity. 
 
Variations in demand change the position of the demand curve and imply a positive 
and systematic variation in the demand and the price/marginal cost of producing 
electricity, that is, a large demand implies a high marginal production cost and price. 
The supply curve changes position due to changes in available supply capacity, e.g. 
changes in the supply of wind power, and this generates an unsystematic negative 
correlation between the price and quantity consumed. That is, in periods with a large 
wind production the cost of producing the marginal kWh is low and so is the price. An 
increase in the amount of intermittent RES and DG production will increase the 
variation of the supply curve, increasing the variation in the electricity price/marginal 
cost of producing electricity. 
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Figure 12: Hourly Nord Pool prices, consumption, and wind power production in West Denmark in the 
second half of January 2007. 
 
Combining demand and supply changes and looking at an extreme period in West 
Denmark, Figure 13 shows the hourly variation in demand, wind production and 
prices at the day a head Nord Pool market the last two weeks of January 2007. 
 
From this figure three important observations are: 
 
• a systematic daily and weekly variation in the demand and price of electricity 
• peak prices that are unsystematic in time and often related to limited wind 
power production 
• low or even zero prices that are unsystematic in time and often related to a 
large production from wind power 
 
Demand response imply getting demand to partly compensate for variations in 
supply, reducing demand when capacity is limited and marginal production costs high 
and increase demand when abundant capacity is available and marginal costs of 
production is low. Consequently, the variation in the price/marginal cost of producing 
electricity is reduced. Increasing demand response or flexibility of demand is one way 
to allow for more fluctuating/intermittent production in the system without the 
price/cost of production becoming very fluctuating. In a liberalised market an 
instrument for doing this is the price of electricity. However, the three “observations” 
reveal problems with different barriers requiring different technical solutions and 
different designs of incentives. Other dimensions of demand response are the 
response time needed and the type of customers targeted, e.g. response within 
minutes or day a head and large industrial customers or households. Again, this 
defines different barriers requiring different incentives and technical solutions. In this 
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section, the main focus will be on demand response within the day a head market. 
However, a few issues related to shorter response times will be included. 
 
Looking at the chain from the electricity market to customers, for customers to react 
to the cost of producing electricity three requirements are 
 
• metering at the relevant level of time-intervals 
• pricing/billing according to the varying costs of producing electricity or other 
incentives for changing consumption 
• technical possibilities for customers to change consumption – includes 
automatic response on signals from the system operator. 
For each of these requirements a number of barriers for demand response exist, 
which are addressed in the following 
 
3.1.2 Interval metering and communication technology 
 
Today many customers have quarterly or annual metering of their electricity 
consumption and therefore face an average price for their consumption. To have 
incentives for changing consumption pattern interval metering and a corresponding 
pricing is required. That is, a first barrier for increasing demand flexibility is the 
introduction of interval meters. 
 
Current programmes for smart meters 
 
The present status and plans for the introduction of interval meters differ 
considerably between countries. 
 
In Italy around 30 million old electricity meters is being replaced by new interactive 
digital meters that record hourly consumption. In 2004 about half of the meters were 
replaced. Due to the large number of meters and the systematic replacement of old 
meters, the cost of new meters is reduced. In Italy a main argument for the 
replacement of meters is the automatic reading of meters and an increased security 
of correct metering. 
 
In Spain, an implementation plan for the replacement of old meters with smart meters 
before December 2018 has been decided. For each DSO 30% of the meters should 
be replaced before December 2010, In 2012 additional 20% should be replaced and 
in 2015 further 20% should be replaced. Finally the remaining 30% should be 
replaced before December 2018, and demand response mechanisms should be fully 
operational by January 2014. 
 
In Denmark, all customers with an annual consumption above 200,000 kWh had 
hourly metering of their consumption in 2004. In 2005 all customers with an annual 
consumption above 100,000 kWh had hourly metering. For small customers the 
situation is somewhat diffuse. Some of the DSOs have started replacing meters for 
private customers and have plans for all meters to be replaced, but other DSOs 
appear to wait. The Ministry encourage DSOs to introduce smart meters. However, it 
is the responsibility of DSOs to replace the meters, and the cost of metering should 
be reduced. The main purpose of interactive smart meters for DSOs is reduced costs 
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for collecting information on consumption and that the new meters opens the 
possibility for billing actual monthly consumption instead of on account billing and a 
later adjustment. Also a faster accounting in relation to moving address is one of the 
advantages of the new meters. Hourly metering of consumption of small customers is 
at present not very common, the meters are able to record hourly consumption. 
However, the collection of data on hourly consumption requires additional it-
resources. Whether advantages of hourly recording are able to pay for the additional 
investments and operational costs remain to be seen from present projects. 
 
In the Netherlands connections with a transport capacity of 0.1 MW and network 
connections larger than 3*80 A (equivalent to some 500,000 kWh per year) are 
obliged to use smart meters. For small customers, a large scale roll-out of smart 
meters was scheduled for the period 2009-2015. However, this schedule has been 
suspended for fine-tuning of the functional requirements of the meters. For now, only 
demonstration projects involving smart meters are carried out. 
 
In Germany the situation is quite different. The legislation on metering has been 
liberalized, implying that customers may choose to install smart meters. That is, there 
is not a general scheme for replacing existing meters, and smart meters will be 
installed mainly in relation to new installations or by customers that evaluate they 
may gain form hourly metering and prices. However, in six regions a demonstration 
project, called E-Energy, with smart meters showing the hourly electricity price has 
started giving customers incentives to change consumption according to costs of 
generation. 
 
In the UK industrial and large consumers will typically have half hourly meters, and 
will be billed by their energy supplier accordingly. These meters are not explicitly 
“smart” but will be linked to an Energy Management System of some sort. The main 
obstacle to speedy adoption of this type of technology is the separation of meter 
ownership away from the network operator. Energy suppliers have responsibility for 
the metering system and mandating suppliers (operating in a liberalised competitive 
marketplace) to undertake wholesale replacement of all metering technologies 
against some kind of prescribed scheme is likely to be a long and complex process. 
 
In general, the main barriers for smart metering are associated with the lack of 
experience in large scale deployment of these equipments. Moreover, some 
technological difficulties still exist regarding equipment and communication protocol 
standardization and solutions to manage such large volumes of information 
 
Arguments and counterarguments for widespread use of smart meters 
 
The status and plans in the different countries mirror a number of pros and cons of 
smart metering. In countries with a general roll-out of new meters, main arguments 
are automatic reading of meters, increased security of correct metering, billing of 
actual consumption and avoiding on account payments and faster accounting in 
relation to moving address. These advantages of new meters are related to billing of 
customers, and actually require monthly or quarterly readings, only. Finally, to 
prepare for future flexibility of demand requiring hourly readings is another major 
argument for replacing existing meters. However, this implies increased costs of data 
handling and quality control of measurements. 
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Looking at countries that hesitate to replace old meters, a number of barriers may be 
listed. The cost of replacing a meter is evaluated to between 100 and 200 Euro/meter 
(depending on the new meter and the scheme of replacement; a general roll-out is 
cheaper than a more diffuse replacement), and this may not be covered by potential 
savings. Other barriers implying that the replacement of meters may be postponed 
are that a number of standards and technical issues remain to be decided. What is 
required for the meter to be adequate, shall the meter just measure consumption, 
should it be measured hourly or within shorter time-intervals (15 minutes is required if 
customers are to be engaged in the regulating market), should it include the 
possibility of receiving a price-signal, should it include controlling individual 
appliances, or should the additional functionalities be handled by other technical 
solutions? That is, what is the present requirement, what is the future requirement, 
what should be included in the meter, and what is best solved by other technologies? 
What communication technology is preferred, power-line communication, sms-
communication, optical fibre communication, or some other communication 
technology? Finally, software for communication and the handling of hourly readings 
exist, but experience with full scale implementation covering millions of customers is 
limited, and routines for updating and maintenance of software and meters are also 
limited. A completely different issue that may postpone a decision to replace old 
meters is who pays for the meters and who gains what from changing meters? 
 
Summing up, the introduction of smart meters is one of the technologies that can be 
used for the demand to become flexible. In the future, technologies facilitating even 
small customers to become flexible are expected in the marked. However, replacing 
existing meters now is expensive, and in the future requirements to the functionality 
of meters may change. That is, replacing existing meters is a preparation for future 
developments, but at present future requirements are recognised partly, only. On the 
other hand, if everybody postponed the introduction of smart meters, experience with 
hourly metering systems, recognition of problems, future requirements and 
possibilities is postponed, too. 
 
A supplement or alternative to smart meters would be electric appliances that can 
respond automatically to signals from the system operator. 
 
3.1.3 Heat or electricity storages 
 
Electricity and heat storages are key technologies to enable consumers to react on 
TOU pricing. Many countries have a long tradition for time-of-use pricing with low 
prices during night time. A key technology has been electric storage heating with 
ceramic heat storage, which was charged during the night and discharged during the 
day. Heat storages are often used by CHP generators to allow flexibility in electricity, 
, and thus benefit from variations in electricity market prices. Vehicles using electricity 
also have the potential for flexible electricity demand at the diurnal level. The basic 
technologies have existed for many years, but little market penetration has yet been 
experienced. 
 
However, the use of heat or electricity storage devices is limited in consumption 
facilities in most of the five countries. 
 
In Denmark and Spain there are no storages in consumption facilities. Electric 
storage heating has never been used in Denmark, and direct electricity resistance 
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heating, which has some short-term flexibility, is limited. In addition electric heating is 
discouraged by programmes for conversion to other types of heating, preferably 
district heating, where available.  
 
In Germany cold and heat storage do not play a major role, yet. Electricity storage is 
mainly investigated in form of pumped hydro storage, batteries for mobility and fuel 
cells. Also the possibility of adiabatic compressed air storage is investigated. 
 
In the Netherlands agriculture and horticulture CHP units (1840 MW in 2006) are 
primarily used for heating of greenhouses and producing CO2 to enhance growth. 
These units usually dispose of heat storage and may be considered as consumption 
facilities. Besides, micro CHP units with Stirling motor will be installed in the future 
(developers expect 10.000 units are placed for field tests before the end of 2010). 
Typically units have a size of 1 kWe and 5 kWth. There are also some tests with 
micro CHP units with heat storage in boilers, which improves the possibilities of micro 
CHP for electricity production. The Smart Power Foundation is a Dutch network of 
companies and organisations involved in developing intelligent control, primarily of 
micro-cogeneration units, but also focussing at other sources of flexibility. ECN is 
working on a concept for an electronic market to integrate distributed generation and 
load control into energy and system services markets. Both SPF and ECN are in a 
stage of pilot projects. 
 
In the UK some storage facilities are being explored as part of the IFI / RPZ 
programme of R&D. The historic Teles-witching programme made use of electric 
heat storage capabilities in UK homes. There are no current plans for widespread roll 
out of heat / electricity storage facilities. Although a recent government consultation 
on the treatment of heat did address this area, and a publication from a prominent 
UK campaigning organisation (Greenpeace1) highlighted the potential for CHP and 
heat network in the UK. The most important obstacle to electricity storage is clearly 
the cost of such devices. Heat storage although more feasible in terms of cost does 
not fare much better because of the limited interest in heat networks in the UK 
(traditionally community heating schemes reliant on CHP and heat networks have 
had very bad public approval rating).  
 
3.1.4 Pricing rules and incentives. 
 
Demand must receive information on the market value of energy and system 
services at all times and places in order to change according to system conditions. 
Therefore, energy and ancillary services prices should vary according to their value 
at each moment in time and in each part of the system.  
 
Pricing rules 
 
Having interval metering, for customers to react to the varying costs of producing 
electricity the price customers pay for their consumption has to reflect the varying 
costs. Aiming at different types of variation in the marginal costs of production a 
number of pricing rules have been developed. 
                                             
 
1 The summary of the report is available at 
www.greenpeace.org.uk/files/pdfs/climate/industrialCHP_summary.pdf 
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Time-of-Use tariffs 
 
Focusing at the systematic daily/weekly variation in costs (reflecting shifts in the 
demand curve) Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs is developed. According to TOU-tariffs the 
day/week is divided into pre-determined periods with different tariffs. Typically, three 
periods are defined, peak hours with a relative high price for electricity, a medium 
priced period and hours with low demand (night hours) and a low price. Knowing the 
price in advance, customers have an incentive to change behaviour and postpone 
consumption till periods with a lower price, thereby increasing demand in periods with 
low prices and decrease consumption in periods with high prices.  
 
Barriers for shifting demand are mainly barriers for shifting behaviour, and that not all 
consumption may be shifted in time. For households, some of the consumption 
related to heating, hot water, washing, dish-washing may be shifted, but consumption 
related to lighting and many household appliances is difficult to postpone without 
significant loses of welfare. For companies and industrial customers, shifting demand 
in time may be very costly, but examples do exist e.g. cold stores may postpone 
some of their consumption to periods with low prices. An advantage of TOU tariffs is 
the low information costs related to the tariff, and in principle it may be applied to all 
customers. 
 
In Denmark there is no tradition for TOU pricing for households. Billing for most 
customers is based on single annual readings of the meters by the customers 
themselves. Smart meters are being tested in some parts of the country, but mainly 
for other purposes that the introduction of TOU pricing. 
 
In Germany some distributers offer a special night tariff. 
 
In the Netherlands a simple peak/off-peak tariff is available mainly for households 
(peak periods are working days from 07 to 23 h.). Analysing the effect of TOU on 
shifts in demand, in general price-elasticities are reasonable high that is customers 
change their demand pattern.  
 
In Spain TOU tariffs is used intensively and differentiated among customers 
according to their contracted capacity, i.e. the maximum active power consumption at 
a certain period. Very large customers with a contracted capacity of 20MW and over 
5MW in all periods may choose a seven period tariff. Industrial customers have 
several possibilities depending of their size. For large industries a five period tariff is 
available, for small and medium sized companies two different three-period tariffs are 
available, and for small companies two additional two-period tariffs are available 
(between 15 kW and 50 kW of contracted capacity). Low voltage customers with a 
contracted capacity below or equal to 15 kW and households may choose a two 
period tariff.  
 
Final consumers in Spain that do not buy their energy at the market, that is to say 
excluding large industrial consumers, pay regulated “integral” tariffs. These charges 
included Use-of-System costs, energy price and other services (market operation, 
stranded costs, RES support mechanisms…). These regulated prices are published 
periodically. Although due to political reasons of inflation control, during the last years 
these tariffs have been set below the real energy prices thus creating a tariff deficit. 
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However, at the beginning of 2009 regulated tariffs will disappear, except for low 
voltage consumers. For these consumers, a last resource supplier will be created. 
 
Time-of-Use (ToU) tariffs exist in the UK, although mainly for large consumers. 
Because of the liberalised and competitive environment in the UK there are a variety 
of tariffs that industrial consumers in particular can sign up to, ranging from exposure 
to wholesale prices, to TOU differentiated products based on usage during peak 
periods. The most common tariff encourages large customers to avoid consumption 
during the “triad” period – which is the peak period during winter (typically between 
17.30 and 19.30). In addition to this there are TOU meters linked to an old domestic 
tariff known as Economy 71, for customers with electric storage water heating. These 
customers were controlled through radio tele-switching. For the bulk of domestic 
customers there is no temporal differentiation. Those with tele-switch meters and on 
Economy 7 tariffs will have cheaper power during the night. 
 
Final (domestic) consumers do not buy their energy in the wholesale market, but 
through energy suppliers operating in the retail market space. The final charge they 
pay is inclusive of use of system tariffs and network charges plus additional charges 
from the supplier (for metering and customer services etc). However energy supply is 
part of a liberalised competitive market, so these are not “regulated” prices. 
Customers are free to move to an alternative supplier that offers a more favourable 
tariff. Price comparison websites (and the industry watchdog) publish up to date 
information on all domestic pricing tariffs. Recently the Energy Supply industry has 
undergone investigation by the regulator, accused of artificially inflating prices and 
restricting the competitive market. If successful the regulator could force supply 
companies to surrender a proportion of these profits – the current situation is 
inconclusive. 
 
A survey of empirical analyses of price-elasticities of short-tern varying electricity 
prices may be found in U.S. Department of Energy (2006)2 Related to the integration 
of fluctuating electricity production, TOU tariffs facilitate additional production by 
shifting demand from normal peak to off-peak periods. However, the demand shifting 
does not reflect the un-systematic fluctuations/shifts in the production curve, and this 
limits the ability of TOU tariffs to integrate additional fluctuating production. 
 
Reflecting some of the shifts in the production curve, examples where the TOU tariff 
is supplemented by a Critical Peak Price (CPP) exist. In France the Tempo tariff 
defines a day and night tariff that varies with three types of days; normal, expensive, 
and critical days where the price at critical days is about 10 times the normal day. 
The type of day is announced the day before. Another example is the GoodSent 
Select system used by Gulf Power in Florida. This tariff defines four levels where the 
most expensive hour is 6 times the low tariff and where the most expensive hour may 
                                             
 
1 Economy 7 is a cheaper night time electricity tariff operating in the UK. The tariff operates typically 
from midnight and lasts for 7 hours, hence the name. During this period electricity costs less than the 
standard daytime rate, normally about a third of the cost. Appliances such as electric heaters and 
boilers are configured to operate and store heat during the cheaper period. Any electric appliance can 
make use of the cheaper electricity, such as washing machines and dishwashers 
2 “Benefits of Demand Response in Electricity Markets and Recommendations for Achieving Them“, 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/congress-1252d.pdf. 
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occur 1% of the year. This tariff is supplemented with a communication system that is 
able to disconnect certain appliances (e.g. air conditioners) when the price peaks. 
 
Wholesale market prices 
 
In a liberalized market expected demand and supply is normally cleared in a day-
ahead market generating a production plan for the next day and forming day a head 
prices of electricity. These prices reflect expected systematic and un-systematic 
variations in demand and supply. Exposing customers to day-ahead prices gives an 
incentive to reduce demand when capacity is constrained and the price high and 
increase demand in periods with free capacity and a low price. In several countries 
(e.g. Denmark and Norway) at least large customers are offered a tariff reflecting the 
day a head market price. However, some reluctance to choose and react to hourly 
price variations is observed. Two major barriers for customers to react to hourly day 
a head prices are 1) costs of information and 2) costs of short term adjustments in 
consumption. 
 
In addition, the day-ahead wholesale price does not fully reflect the variations of the 
costs for the system to deliver electricity to small customers. 
 
Customer behaviour and welfare 
 
Exposed to hourly prices, the customer has to obtain information about the 
development of prices. To react to the price a change in planed behaviour is 
required. For small residential customers costs of information may appear quite high 
relative to the potential saving. However, a number of technical solutions reducing 
information costs are available. For large industrial customers changing consumption 
pattern may have considerable consequences for production planning. Still, for some 
large customers some of their consumption may be moved in time without severe 
consequences.  
 
Other barriers mentioned in the literature are volatility of bills and transformation of 
welfare between customers. Concerning volatility of bills, a flat rate is just an 
agreement on how the bill is settled. If the flat rate is calculated ex-post (the average 
price of electricity over the last period of consumption) on average for all customers, 
volatility of bills will be the same as under an hourly pricing. A flat rate agreed prior to 
delivery obviously reduces the uncertainty and volatility of the bill. However, this 
includes an insurance premium comparable to the difference between ex-post and 
ex-ante flat rates.  
 
Concerning transfer of welfare between customers more than half of the customers 
may be worse off with an hourly pricing than with a flat rate (Borenstein 2007). This is 
a barrier for getting customers to choose an hourly pricing. However, the transfer of 
welfare between customers is actually what is wanted. Customers with a large 
demand when prices are high will pay more and vice versa. This gives customers 
with a high demand in periods with high prices an incentive to reduce consumption.  
 
Another type of barriers is risk adverse behaviour at the company level – who gets 
blamed when prices and costs are high, and who is rewarded when prices are low 
and costs reduced. Often managers decide to do what they always have done or 
what competitors do. 
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That is, giving customers a free choice between an hourly and a flat rate may not be 
an optimal solution if it is evaluated that demand response in the day-ahead market 
is profitable in the long run or needed for the integration of additional intermittent 
production. 
 
Customer preferences 
 
For many customers major barriers for increasing demand response are a limited 
total gain from shifting demand and that, due to fixed price additives, variations in 
prices seen by the customers are dampened relative to the marginal costs of 
producing electricity.  
 
Looking at Denmark, the average annual consumption by households is 
approximately 3600 kWh per household. With an average Nord Pool price around 
0.035 EUR/kWh and the price variations seen at the Nord Pool market today, the 
maximum saving from shifting demand between hours is fairly low. In Norway and 
Sweden, where household demand is larger and the share of electricity used for 
heating is larger, potential savings from shifting demand is larger. Still, savings are 
quite limited and investments in metering and automatic control of consumption 
should be related to these savings. 
 
Looking at what customers pay for electricity, in addition to the variable price at the 
market (for Danish customers the Nord Pool price) customers pay for subscription, 
transmission/distribution and taxes. In Denmark these additions to the market price 
vary between customer categories, and are (except for VAT) fixed payments per 
kWh. For households the fixed additives is approximately 80% of the electricity bill, 
for large companies the fixed additive is less than 50% of the bill. Fixed price 
additives dampen the relative price fluctuations that customers see. Therefore, an 
option for increasing the incentive for customer flexibility is to reduce the share of 
fixed additives; transmission/distribution payments may vary with loses in the grid, 
and taxes may be changed from fixed additives to a VAT type. However, increased 
volatility of bills also increases uncertainty in income to distributors and the 
government. Also, welfare changes between customer categories may be a barrier 
for shifting from fixed to VAT-type taxes/additives.  
 
3.2 Managing system security 
As the time of reaction gets very short, incentives based on a market price become 
inefficient and incentive based programs with predetermined actions or centrally 
controlled reactions become more effective. In incentive based programs a 
reservation payment or a discount on the price is agreed between the customer and 
the TSO, and the customer has to reduce demand from the grid when asked to do so 
by the TSO. In these programs focus is on security of supply and reaction times are 
from seconds up till 15 minutes where after fast reserves may be started. Incentive 
based programs are elaborated in many ways; direct load programs like mass market 
direct load control programs, curtailable load programs and  interruptible programs 
and frequency controlled demand response programs. Mass market direct control 
programs targets residential and small commercial customers with equipment that 
may be turned off for a limited period of time. Examples are water heaters, electric 
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heating, refrigerators, and swimming pool pumps. Switches and communication lines 
are installed and controlled directly by the party calling for load reductions. In most 
programs customers agree to a limited number of events per season and earn a 
credit or a payment for participating. In some cases also a payment per incident is 
given.  
 
Looking at real-time pricing (or more precisely near real time pricing), customers are 
asked to react to market problems and high marginal production costs within an hour 
or 15 minutes. This requires that customers have a special flexibility, and very few 
customers are able to react with this short notice. In most cases these customers are 
characterised as being able to act as reserve capacity in the regulating power 
market; they may cut off demand for a shorter time-period when called upon. 
Examples are cold stores, greenhouses and customers with back-up capacity 
producing their own electricity when needed and therefore reducing the demand from 
the grid. Often, in addition to saving costs when prices are high, customers that are 
able to react within this short notice are given an additional payment for providing 
reserve capacity or regulating power market services. 
 
3.2.1 Interruptibility of contracts 
 
Curtailable load – and interruptible programs targets large commercial and industrial 
customers that are able to reduce their load with 100 to 1000 kW, and given a 
notification time the customers are asked to reduce consumption. Communication 
may include telephone, fax, and email or direct control. If the customer control the 
reduction, metering enabling the calculation of load reduction relative to baseline 
consumption is required.  
 
Selective load shedding is the last measure any SO resorts to in order to avoid major 
safety problems in the operation of the system. Consumers with elastic demand may 
be willing to accept certain limitations to the supply service in exchange for discounts 
or other type of benefits. Signing interruptibility contracts may be useful to 
discriminate among consumers according to their demand elasticity and thus 
incrementing the social welfare of the system 
 
In Denmark, only very few large consumers made use of this possibility of 
interruptibility contracts.. For small consumers the technology is available, but it is yet 
to be seen, how it should be implemented. It has been the topic for some studies and 
discussions a few years ago. A Danish example of interruptible contracts is the Flex 
demonstration project, where a brewery, a cold store, an ice skating ring, a 
supermarket, and a water supply plant plus a number of back-up generators have 
agreed to reduce demand from the grid when called upon by the TSO. In the 
management of the system the TSO uses these resources as regulating power. 
 
In Germany industrial consumers have sometimes special interruptible contracts with 
generators in response for lower prices. The technology for interruptible contracts is 
being studied within a major three year demonstration programme on load 
management called E-Energy has started. In six model regions the load 
management will be investigated, mainly with the help of smart meters which will 
show energy prices and thus incentivise to follow consumption according to the 
generation. 
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In the Netherlands demand response is mainly applied by the industrial sector and 
horticulture sector (switching-off assimilation lighting). Large industrial interruptible 
demand participates in the market for reserve power. The TSO is currently 
contracting 300 MW of wholesale demand response reserves as so-called 
emergency reserves. The minimum desirable contract size for emergency power is 
20-25 MW. Also aggregators/pools may provide emergency power, each pool 
participant should have at least 5 MW interruptible load available, and 100 MW as a 
maximum. Households and small businesses cannot participate in the emergency 
reserves due to lack of technological infrastructure (e.g. smart metering) and 
communication infrastructure to deal with the large amounts of data resulting from 
smart metering. 
 
Suppliers of emergency power are remunerated according to the measured energy 
supplied. As a rule the remuneration is set on Imbalance settlement price for positive 
power + 10% (or minimum contract price) for each programme time unit (PTU) during 
the disconnection period (TenneT, 2008). Furthermore, business customers can sell 
interruptible demand to the supplier in exchange for a payment before interruption as 
well as a payment after real curtailment. As a supplier is part of a Program 
Responsible Party (PRP) in that way the imbalance of the PRP is reduced. 
Consequently, the TSO has to deal with less imbalance and system security is 
promoted (Deloitte, 2004). 
 
In Spain currently, large consumers connected to high voltage networks with a 
contracted capacity of over 5 MW can sign interruptibility contracts. In exchange for a 
discount in their electricity bills, they commit to reduce their active power 
consumption in system emergency situations as a request from the System Operator 
or Distribution companies. From next 1st July 2008, when tariffs for large customers 
are disappearing, a new interruptibility service has been defined for large customers 
into the market. In this new service there is a new type of interruption with 0 min 
warning time and 1 hour interruption time. This makes a total of five types of 
interruptions possible depending on the interruption time and the warning time. In 
2007, 211 large consumers consuming a total of 36,496 GWh in 2007, offered an 
estimated interruptible load of 2,800 MW in peak hours.  
 
Consumers under an interruptibility contract receive a discount on their total annual 
electricity bill. This discount is proportional to the total load they are willing to reduce 
related to their real consumption. They may also receive a large penalty if the terms 
of the contract are not satisfied, which may be up to 120% of the discount already 
received. However, discounts are not geographically or time differentiated, and a 
market mechanisms to assign interruptibility contracts may be useful. As an example, 
last 19 November 2007, two interruption orders were sent to all customers in the 
Iberian Peninsula in two groups. The first order was sent from 17:40h to 20:40h to 
more less half the interruptible customers in the Peninsula and the second one from 
19:00h to 22:00h was sent to the other half. A total estimated load of 2.400 MWh was 
interrupted during 19:00h and 20:40h. 
 
The barriers to the development of DSM, the Spanish implementation plan for smart 
meters and related research initiatives have been previously described are section 
4.1. The System Operator may not address directly to small customers so it is 
important to define the role of an agent having the commercial relation with small 
customers, such as an aggregator or a retailer. 
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In the UK large consumers connected to the transmission system can sign 
interruptibility contracts. They can also participate in the balancing mechanism (the 
real time system balancing market) with Bids (amount they will pay to increase 
demand) or Offers (amount they want to be paid to decrease demand). Any large 
demand customer that is a signatory to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) 
can participate in the balancing mechanism in this way. Very few loads do this – most 
which can offer interruptible load services will opt for a bilateral contract with the SO. 
 
Consumers will typically get an availability payment, and a call out fee if the load is 
interrupted. If consumers participate in the balancing mechanism they will be paid 
according to their offer in the market. For small customers this would require 
advanced metering infrastructure that is not currently available in the UK  – see 
comments on the smart metering pilots in the UK and the lack of interaction of the 
network operators. 
 
In general, the technology for interruptibility for small customers will be similar to 
demand response technologies in general. These are likely to become widely 
available in a few years from now. The main problem is not lack of availability of 
technology, but willingness of customers to accept interruptions. Furthermore there is 
a tendency to overrule interruptions in current experiments with interruptibility 
contracts for small users. Since the interruption of a service will actually affect 
comfort levels of customers, it is likely that those forms of demand response in which 
the service levels are not affected will be preferred by small customers (for example: 
shifts in the timing of the operation of an electric heater or airconditioner, while the 
room temperature remains within the temperature settings).  
 
As smart meters and advanced demand response mechanisms are developed, new 
possibilities may arise for small consumers. Partial load shedding of domestic 
consumers would require that these technologies become fully developed and 
consumers have realized the benefits they can obtain from them. In the future, home 
automation networks together with smart meters would create an Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure. AMI is characterized by two-way communication between the 
equipment at the consumer’s side and the SO. Needless to say, consumers have to 
perceive enough incentives in this regard, being these economical or environmental. 
An additional issue that must be addressed is the role of the retailer regarding these 
contracts.  
 
Finally, in frequency controlled demand response programs, specific electric 
appliances are automatic disconnected for a shorter time during system 
contingencies and drops in the net-frequency. In Britain and Finland examples where 
industrial technologies are used as frequency controlled demand response include 
industrial ovens, pumping systems and metal works. Considering household 
appliances freezers, refrigerators and water heaters may without problems be 
disconnected for a shorter time. Frequency controlled disconnection has the 
advantage of giving a very quick response (within seconds) and may be used until 
other reserve capacity can be started. That is, frequency controlled disconnection is 
related to system contingencies and has a limited duration per incident. Increased 
intermittent production does not necessarily increase the need for frequency 
controlled demand response, but the need for demand response with a short time of 
notice may increase with capacity restrictions becoming tighter e.g. in periods when 
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intermittent capacity is not producing.  
 
3.2.2 Access to ancillary service markets 
 
Electricity load may provide ancillary services, especially if it is combined with some 
form of energy storage. In fact, consumers in many countries must comply with 
certain requirements regarding, for example, their load factor, while they are 
remunerated for performing better than the required level. Using energy storage may 
help consumers provide regulation reserves while installing capacitors could allow 
them to contribute to voltage regulation. 
 
In Denmark specific markets for ancillary services are not yet developed. However, 
most reserve balancing requirements may be solved by the regulating power market, 
which is a part of the integrated Nordic market, and the national balancing 
responsible parties. 
 
In Germany industrial consumers, depending on their contract with the distributer, 
have to adapt their consumption profile. Also, they can have contracts for their 
reactive power consumption. Household consumers are not forced to comply with 
certain technical requirements regarding their consumption profile or their active to 
reactive load ratio. 
 
In the Netherlands connected parties to the network (without generating units) shall 
satisfy specific requirements with regard to their active to reactive load ratio; 
specifically the power factor of a connected party shall vary between 0.85 (lagging) 
and 1.0 at any time (Paragraph 2.1.5. of the Network Code). Large consumers (with 
capacity of 60 MW or more) connected to the HV network are obliged to inform the 
TSO, through bids a day in advance, of their capacity to reduce their consumption 
(size of demand reduction and respective price). The bids (size and price) can be 
adjusted up to an hour before the PTU the adjustments concern (paragraph 5.1 of 
the Network Code). For consumers connected to the HV network and with capacity 
less than 60 MW, their involvement in the balancing market is voluntary. Upon 
voluntary participation, the same process shall be followed as for larger consumers. 
 
The main obstacle in the realization of demand response services in the Netherlands 
presumably will be the lack of the required communication infrastructure between 
consumers and SO, the high amount of metering data and associated costs, and the 
high transaction costs of contracting small consumers for demand response services.  
 
In Spain only large consumers connected to high voltage networks with a contracted 
capacity of over 15 MW are obliged to fulfil certain voltage requirements: for peak 
hours the should not consume more reactive power than 33% of the active power 
(keeping a power factor greater than 0.95 lagging), in valley hours they cannot 
produce reactive power into the high voltage network (leading power factor not 
allowed), and in plateau hours their power factor should be greater than 0.95 lagging 
while the leading power factor is not allowed. Small consumers are not allowed to 
participate, only generators belonging to a control area. For this reason, and the 
investment it requires, at the moment no consumer is participating in the secondary 
reserve market. Concerning the tertiary reserve market, it would be more plausible 
that the consumers participate in this service since for this service it is only 
necessary to modify consumption profile in 15 minutes time. However, only pumping 
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units are allowed to participate in the market.  
 
For consumers in the UK, there is no certain technical requirement to the 
consumption profile, ,but in terms of power factor, large customers should operate 
within 0.95 p.f lag to unity power factor. Reactive power charges will be levied if the 
operating power factor exceeds the limits. Small consumers are allowed to 
participate in the provision of secondary reserve. Typically they would participate 
through an aggregator. Several such commercial aggregation companied exist in the 
UK (e.g. flexitricity1 and Gaz de France). The conditions that they must fulfil to 
participate are the same as for generators wishing to provide these services. There 
seems to be little interest from the part of medium to larger scale demand in offering 
these services (aside from those that are already offering high value interruptibility 
services). The SO has initiatited a number of schemes to try and make offering AS 
more attractive to demand with little success despite good engagement with demand 
customer through working groups. On the domestic customer side the lack of 
widespread half hourly metering or AMI (advanced metering infrastructure) makes 
this activity impossible at present. 
 
In general, the main obstacle is the investment for the AGC control system that is 
required between the system operator and the consumer plants and processes. It 
would also imply technical challenges of the remotely controlled disconnection-
reconnection devices. Thus, consumers can provide negative reserve to the ancillary 
service market. However, participation by consumers are not prepared from a 
technical point of view, lack of communication infrastructure. 
 
3.2.3 Direct control of consumer equipment 
 
As mentioned earlier consumers may not react on the information from smart meters 
or incentives from price signals depending time-of-use or wholesale market prices. In 
particular for small consumer technology for automatic control will be needed. 
However, the use of such equipment may not necessarily require smart meters or 
time-of-use price incentives. 
 
Modern electric equipment for households is often equipped with a computer chip 
that directly and indirectly control electricity consumption using various algorithms. If 
there algorithms can be updated automatically by the electricity system operator 
(firmware update process) the equipment may add to demand flexibility. The relevant 
technologies are electric heating and cooling, water heating, cooking, washing 
machines, dish washers, and tumble dryers. Lighting is less suitable, while home 
computers in the form of laptops are equipped with batteries that will allow 
disconnection from the grid for 1-2 hours. 
 
In the future, mass implementation of frequency controlled switches in household 
appliances, which may be turned off for shorter periods without significant losses for 
the customer, may increase the potential for short term demand response. However, 
the implementation of this technology in millions of small-scale appliances requires 
international standards for communication that must be used by producers of electric 
equipment as well as DSOs.  
                                             
 
1 www.flexitricity.co.uk  
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The US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is conducting a project “Enabling 
DR-Ready Appliances”1 focusing on demand response (DR) for large end uses that 
contribute to peak demand. Other projects from EPRI, e.g. “Power Supplies for 
Consumer Electronics” are focusing on specific equipment, standards and software 
development. 
 
A key issue is that experience suggests that customer reluctance to have unknown 
controls installed in their homes or businesses represents a barrier to more 
widespread participation in utility DR programs. However, these barriers would be 
overcome if major energy consuming appliances came ready to participate in DR 
programs out-of-the-box (“DR-ready”). 
 
Even with public acceptance of this control equipment a significant barrier for their 
use will be the limited operational experience by system operators in their 
communication with all types of customers, and the development of international 
standards for this type of communication will take time. 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
Metering and communication  
 
Hourly meters are a precondition for exposing customers to the varying costs of 
producing electricity and new meters are being introduced in many countries. In most 
countries the main argument for changing meters is savings related to the billing of 
customers. Other arguments relate to future possibilities for automatic response and 
increasing demand flexibility. Still, communication standards and the functionality of 
meters is an issue, and handling of hourly metering for all customers is a challenge.  
 
Pricing rules and incentives 
 
For customers to react to the varying costs of producing electricity, prices have to 
reflect the variations. A number of pricing rules has been developed TOU, CPP, Day 
ahead market prices. Reflecting both systematic and un-systematic variations in the 
cost of production from a theoretical point of view day ahead prices are preferable. 
However, information cost of following hourly market prices is not negligible. Given 
hourly metering customers should be exposed to hourly market prices even if they do 
not react to the hourly variations. Customers with a high consumption in expensive 
hours will pay more than the average customer and therefore have an incentive for 
reducing consumption, mainly in expensive hours. That is, there will be a transfer 
between customers that from a theoretical point is preferable. 
 
Calculations of short term gains from shifting consumption in time reveal that at 
present gains are quite limited. That is, in order to get customers to react on hourly 
prices, additional incentives are required. Market prices alone are not a sufficient 
incentive for customers to become flexible. An issue is fixed price-additives like grid-
payments and fixed taxes that reduce the relative variation in the prices customers 
                                             
 
1 http://portfolio.epri.com/ProgramTab.aspx?sId=PDU&rId=117&pId=4246&pjId=4254. 
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pay. Getting these additives to follow system conditions will increase the incentive for 
customers to become flexible.     
 
With a very short response time, prices become an inefficient instrument and 
incentive based programs like interruptible contracts and automatic or centrally 
controlled disconnections are being  developed, but years of operational experience 
will be needed as well as development of industrial standards.  
 
Table 7 summarises the main barrier that has been reported for the five countries. 
Table 7  : Barriers reported by country studies concerning demand response 
Barrier Technology/ 
Investment 
Legislation/ 
Regulation 
Consumer 
behaviour/ 
Acceptance 
Limited roll out of hourly 
meters 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, UK
  
Liberalised market for hourly 
meters with no standardisation 
 Germany  
Disputes about standardised 
metering functionalities without 
increasing costs too much 
  Netherlands 
Electricity price regulation  Spain  
High excise tax per kWh for 
households 
 Denmark  
Limited response by 
consumers to price signals 
  All countries 
Consumers are risk averse, 
and prefer a tariff known in 
advance 
 . All countries 
Variations in wholesale market 
price and costs of ancillary 
services as a mark-up to an 
annual calculated price per 
kWh 
 All countries  
Very limited heat and 
electricity storages in 
consumer facilities 
Spain, Germany   
Electric heating replaced by 
district heating, natural gas or 
renewables 
 Denmark  
District heating has low public 
acceptance 
  UK 
No specific market for ancillary 
services 
 Denmark  
Only few industries suitable for 
interruptible contracts 
Denmark   
Lack of available technology 
for interuptibility contracts and 
participation in ancillary 
service markets for small 
All countries   
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4 National markets 
 
During the last years the generation and market parts of a high number of electrical 
power systems have evolved from a regulated business into national markets 
experiencing a number of policy changes in order to improve the economic efficiency 
of the electricity business. Due to the special features of the electricity product, 
competitive electricity markets are classified in energy markets and ancillary services 
markets. Energy markets include day-ahead markets and intraday markets. The most 
important ancillary services markets, defined as the markets that negotiate additional 
products necessary to guarantee system security, include balancing markets (which 
may include different time-scales such as the secondary reserve and the tertiary 
reserve) and voltage control. In order to increase the efficiency of the electricity 
business, a careful organization and design of the market must be proposed, 
guaranteeing a fair treatment to each of the agents participating. 
 
This chapter analyses the main potential barriers found in order to encourage the 
investment and participation of generation (both conventional and RES) in national 
energy (daily/intraday) and ancillary service markets. Fair rules enabling market 
access and enough remuneration in fact provides the necessary incentive in order to 
achieve a flexible generation mix (including conventional generation, RES generation 
sources and storage options) and more dispersed intermittent generation that 
diminish variability and unpredictability of this type of generation sources.  
 
Main potential barriers identified in designing energy and ancillary energy markets 
are: 
 
• Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units.  
• Responsibility of deviations, prediction of production and gate closures closer 
to real-time 
 
It should be noted that market access issues related to the connection to networks 
were assessed in subsection 2.1.3. In this chapter market access is treated from the 
point of view of market design. 
 
4.1 Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
Currently, renewable and distributed generators are not allowed to sell their energy 
on some markets because they do not comply with minimum size requirements. 
Different mechanisms have been proposed and implemented to overcome this 
obstacle. Generation companies have created virtual power plants (VPPs) which 
comprise the power production from several (sometimes many) of these small RES 
and DG units. Aggregate production of RES and DG units is passed on to the market 
as if a single generation unit existed. Analogously, independent entities have been 
created to act as market aggregators. These entities sell the aggregate power 
production of several to many RES and DG units to the market. This power 
production is far more stable, and therefore far more predictable as well, than that of 
each individual unit when considered separately. However, designing an allocation 
procedure that allows one to compute the contribution of each of the generators 
within a virtual power plant to the provision of energy and certain ancillary services 
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(such as the provision of regulation reserves) is not easy. This would require closely 
monitoring the dynamic performance of each of these generators. The allocation 
should be market based in order to maintain the economic efficiency of the system 
operation and facilitate competition among generators. Transparency of the process, 
which is central to the participation of RES/DG generators in markets, can be 
achieved by making relevant market information available to all parties. 
 
Energy Markets 
 
In general, RES/CHP generation is not directly prevented to access the energy 
market. Indeed, in most countries the Regulation has been updated in the last years 
to facilitate small generators to gain this access. 
 
In Spain, no size limitations exist for RES producers to participate in the energy 
markets. However, actual technical requirements discussed in subsection (such as 
the inability of some of these generators to cope with small system disturbances and 
the obligation to install a control centre with direct communication with the network 
system operator for units above 10MW) must be taken into account.  
 
In the UK, any generator which signs up to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC 
– essentially a code of conduct for use of the wholesale and balancing markets and a 
commitment to pay related charges) can participate in the energy markets directly. 
Generators under 100MW are not obliged to sign up to the BSC. Generators above 
100 MW are registered as Balancing Mechanism Units. Those that do not sign the 
BSC will typically form a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with another larger entity 
already trading in the energy market. For small generation connected in distribution 
networks the PPA will be formed with an Energy Supplier. The Energy Supplier will 
net the total output from distributed generators from their demand requirements in a 
particular area. The generator will be paid feed-in tariffs. Typically, RES/DG units will 
choose to take a long term PPA with an Energy Supplier to hedge risk of imbalance 
in the wholesale markets. Generators above 1 MW cannot sell their energy output at 
the energy markets directly. Concerning communication of RES to TSO/DSO, small 
scale generators are treated as negative loads and not centrally dispatched.  
 
In the Netherlands, there are no size limits applied to the capacity of the units, but 
there are minimum trading volumes. DG is allowed to sell their energy through an 
independent aggregator or incumbent energy supplier. They receive benefits from 
reduced imbalance when they are part of a VPP compared to standalone functioning. 
This portfolio effect usually is shared between the aggregator and the client. An 
important barrier in the Dutch market, especially for small DG, is the substantial costs 
for trading on markets operated by APX (day-ahead and intraday markets) and 
ENDEX (forward and futures markets). The required AMR facilities have relatively 
high costs. 
 
In Denmark, no size limitation has been reported. The transaction costs for small 
generators on the wholesale market could be too high, representing a barrier. In this 
way, virtual power plants are a priority area for the call for proposals for 2009 for the 
electricity research programme. Small generators can waive the annual participation 
fee they would otherwise have to pay on Nord Pool (15,000 EUR). Instead, they can 
opt for a higher variable fee per unit traded (0.13 EUR/MWh). This is of great help as 
in some other Member States, high market participation fees can be a hindrance to 
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obtain market access for small generators (see e.g. 
http://www.npspot.com/trading/Trading-fees/).It should be noted that most wind and 
CHP capacity are owned by the major generators. Apart from transaction costs, no 
other significant barriers have been reported for Denmark. 
 
In Germany, generators have to sell at least 100 kWh per hour in order to participate 
in energy markets. Technical constraints are imposed concerning ride through 
capability, but this does not prevent the participation of the generators in the energy 
markets. 
 
Balancing markets 
 
Access to ancillary or system services (AS/SS) markets is commonly restricted to 
those generators that comply with certain requirements. Their production must be 
observable and, in order for them to provide AS/SS, it also has to be controllable. 
Controllability is more a technical than a regulatory or policy problem. The regulating 
capacity of generators depends on their technical characteristics. Regarding the 
observability of RES/CHP, only the production of those generators that are large 
enough can be directly measured by the system or market operator. 
 
Participating in the provision of some ancillary services is not possible for some types 
of renewable and distributed generators unless they are able to modify their active or 
reactive power output according to the system requirements. Thus, selling upward or 
downward regulation reserves is not possible for a generator if it cannot increase or 
decrease its output following instructions by the SO. Analogously, keeping the 
voltage level at a certain node within certain limits requires increasing or decreasing 
the reactive power output. 
 
Presently, many renewable and distributed generators are not controllable and thus 
cannot participate in AS/SS markets. However, big efforts are being done by wind 
promoters to research the adaptation of wind farms to provide load following services 
and voltage control. Assuming that from a technical point of view wind generators will 
be mature in the near future, the participation of intermittent generators requires that 
present system operation practices are replaced by more modern ones. In fact, some 
prioritized options outlined by the RESPOND project (real time information on 
intermittent generation available to TSO/DSO, control systems including intermittent 
generation and active network management at the DSO level) are related to 
changing operational practices by system operators. Providing the DSO with the 
ability to monitor the behaviour of small individual generators could make many 
RES/DG generators useful for the provision of some AS/SS. Another option to enable 
RES/DG generators in general, and small ones in particular, to participate in AS/SS 
markets could be aggregating RES/DG units into larger ones. However, some AS/SS 
such as voltage control are of a local nature. Therefore, small RES/DG generators 
willing to provide these services would have to join others located within the same 
area, which may be difficult.  
 
CHP or micro-CHP might be considered as “intermittent” when run under heat-
following control strategy. However, as also discussed in the Demand chapter, CHP 
systems could be potentially used as controllable if enough incentives were available 
in order to provide grid services, so as to increase the system flexibility, which is one 
of the key options identified in the RESPOND project. In order to do so, suitable 
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incentives or price signals should be designed, which would also require adequate 
communication infrastructure. In the case that communication costs were to be paid 
by the DG units, cheap communication structures should be available, above all for 
micro systems. In general, aggregation and control of several units from a centralized 
system at the distribution level would also help to select the most suitable units to 
provide grid support.  
 
In Spain, RES/DG generators that may access the AS markets are those that sell 
their output at the energy market or through contracts, are controllable, and have a 
size of at least 10MW. The maximum wind energy output that the Spanish system 
can allow under safety conditions is calculated in real time at the TSO control centre 
for the “Special Regime” (CECRE). If the actual production is higher than this value 
any unit connected to it can be curtailed. A TSO can also curtail the production of any 
RES to solve grid congestions as a last resource. In the case of the DSO, the 
contracts signed with the owners of the units are taken in account to establish the 
priority to curtail production. Wind generators, as any conventional generator, are 
given 15% of the spot price in case of real time curtailment (they loose the premium 
for the curtailed energy). This must be regarded as a compensation for the 
generators, since if the curtailment takes place during the process of constraint’s 
solution after the daily market, no compensation is given. In order to participate in AS 
markets it is mandatory to be able to follow the orders of the system operator 
(controllability). Every generator contracted to provide ancillary services must be 
connected to a generation control centre which will be in communication with the 
TSO control centre. All costs derived from this must be paid by the RES/DG unit. 
There are penalizations associated with deviations with respect to the established 
programs and, in the case of wind power, for non-compliance with the requirements 
concerning voltage dips riding.  
 
At the moment, intermittent energy sources are not able to participate in the Spanish 
secondary reserve market. Big efforts are being done by wind promoters to research 
and adapt wind farms so that they can provide load following services. Even though 
from a technical point of view it seems feasible in the near future, actual premiums 
over market price do not encourage wind farms to reserve part of their generation 
capacity to offer it as regulating capacity in the secondary reserve market. 
 
Talking now about the UK, RES/DG systems that are smaller than 100MW are able 
to offer a few selected reserve/response services as part of an aggregated group 
(where the minimum group size is 3MW). Therefore, in order for small generators to 
take part in the AASS markets, they have to join into a large enough commercial (or 
virtual) unit. This can be achieved through an energy broker or managing the 
production of several units within a company from a control centre acting as the 
interface between these units and the market (for instance Gaz de France, 
Flexitricity, npower Cogen).  
 
The System Operator in the British system can modify the scheduled output of 
RES/DG resulting from the dispatch by buying the bids and offers they submitted to 
the BM market in order to maintain supply and demand balance and also the overall 
integrity of the system. TSO or DSO can curtail the production of any RES if system 
security is at risk. In the Balancing Mechanism Market, this is obtained by accepting 
the bids and offers submitted by BM units. This provides compensation if the RES is 
being curtailed. At distribution level, DSO and DG have bilateral connection 
Page 74/107 
agreement which allows DG to be curtailed for a relatively short period of time if it 
leads to significant saving in the cost of upgrading the network to facilitate the 
connection. This also benefits the DG since the connection cost / network charges 
will also be less.  
 
In the Netherlands, only units larger than 5 MW and connected to the 1 kV voltage 
network or higher are permitted to provide ancillary services. Bids of positive or 
negative power to the regulating and reserve power market have a minimum size of 5 
MW. VPPs in the Netherlands provide flexible horticulture CHP units access to the 
balancing market as well as possibilities for reducing imbalances after gate closure of 
the day-ahead market. Some RES/DG units may even provide emergency power 
through VPPs, on the precondition that exclusivity of power supply is guaranteed by 
providing the TSO insight to the contracts between the aggregator and the VPP. 
However, commercial aggregators are not yet available for electricity generation or 
demand sources that dispose of potential flexibility, such as residential heating 
through micro-CHP installations or heat pumps. 
 
In the Danish market, like in the rest of the Nordic markets, there is no particular 
Ancillary Services market. However, the price mechanism of day-ahead market 
divide the NordPool area into price areas, which reflects bottlenecks among the 
regions (Finland, Sweden, Norway divided into three or more regions, Denmark East 
and West, and the KONTEK link between Denmark and Germany). These area 
prices are the starting point for the intraday market, Elbas. Any company controlling a 
portfolio of electricity generation or demand may become a participant on the Elbas 
and/or the Elspot market. The responsibility for the company’s balance must be taken 
care of directly or indirectly through a balance agreement with the TSO, in the area in 
which trading takes place. 
 
Wind power in Germany can be curtailed providing negative reserve, especially when 
grids are congested. From a technical point of view RES/DG can provide ancillary 
services, but some stakeholders argue that it is not sensible to curtail or let RES take 
part in balancing (except controllable units such as biomass) in order to reach the 
ambitious RES generation target. In order to improve the participation of RES 
generators in the operation and control of the system, better observability and remote 
controllability must be achieved. 
Table 8 : Main country features concerning market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
Country Market Access, size limitations, aggregation of units 
Energy Markets 
-no size limitations 
-voltage dip through 
capability required and 
connection to a RES 
control centre of units > 10 
MW 
-can be curtailed by TSO 
in real time losing 85% of 
market price and the 
premium 
Spain 
Balancing markets -Intermittent energy sources not able to 
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participate. 
Energy Markets 
-size limitations: 
generators < 1MW not 
able to participate 
-Generators above 100 
MW are registered as 
Balancing Mechanism 
Units 
-Aggregation allowed 
-Curtailment by TSO 
UK 
Balancing market 
-Generators greater than 
100 MW registered as 
Balancing Mechanism 
units. 
Energy Markets 
- No size limits, but 
minimum trading volumes 
 
Netherlands 
Balancing Markets 
-only units larger than 5 
MW and connected to the 
1 kV voltage network or 
higher could provide 
ancillary services 
-Minimum bid size: 5MW 
-Implicit obligation for 
small units to provide 
balancing power/AS 
through an aggregator 
Energy Markets - no size limitation 
Denmark Balancing Market 
-No particular Ancillary 
Services market in 
Nordpool 
Energy Markets Minimum 100 kWh per hour in order to participate 
Germany 
Balancing Market 
Wind power can be 
curtailed, thus providing 
negative reserve 
 
Table 9 : Barriers reported by country studies concerning market access, size limitations and 
aggregation of units 
Barrier Country 
Possibility of being curtailed Spain, UK 
High Transaction Costs for trading in 
markets 
Netherlands, Denmark 
Commercial aggregators do net yet 
aggregate E production originating from 
micro-CHPs and heat pumps 
All countries 
Curtailing RES as negative reserve is a 
barrier to reach RES generation targets 
Germany 
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4.2 Responsibility of deviations, prediction of production and gate 
closures closer to real-time 
In order for RES/DG generators to internalize the costs they make the system incur, 
these generators should be held responsible for the balancing costs they cause. 
Otherwise, they will not be operated efficiently, thus increasing the costs for the 
system of integrating large shares of DG/RES. What is more, if RES generators are 
not responsible for the deviations from their power output schedule, owners of these 
generators will not care about developing better prediction tools and providing the SO 
with a better estimation of their power output. However, making generators 
responsible for balancing costs may be a significant barrier since it decreases the 
profitability of investment projects to build these generators. A possible solution 
where RES/DG generators have to pay for these costs is to add a bonus to the 
subsidy they are paying these generators. This bonus is an amount equal to the 
balancing costs caused by an efficient generator of this type. In the end, a balance 
must be struck between the incentives for the efficient operation of RES/DG 
generators and those incentives aimed at promoting their installation. 
 
Improving the accuracy of the prediction of the power output of intermittent 
generators is critical in order to reduce the balancing costs for the system of power 
imbalances caused by intermittent generators. According to some estimates by 
power companies and TSOs, no breakthrough in the development of prediction 
techniques is envisaged in the short to medium term future. However, the accuracy 
of the prediction of the aggregate production of these generators at system level may 
largely depend on the number of them that exists and their geographical distribution. 
If the production of a certain type of generators in each area is poorly correlated with 
that of generators of the same type in other areas of the system, and generators are 
evenly distributed across the system, their aggregate output is likely to be far less 
variable, and, thus, far more predictable, than the output of the generators located 
within each area. Apart from this, the lack of incentives for generation promoters to 
develop sophisticated prediction tools may be another important barrier to the 
improvement in the prediction of the output by these generators. 
 
The accuracy of the prediction of the power production by the most important 
intermittent generation technologies (those that are not controllable) improves 
substantially with the proximity of this prediction to real time operation. Thus, 
regulation reserves would decrease notably if intermittent generators (and others) 
could balance their program in liquid markets that run until short time in advance of 
the real time. Gate closure times for day and intraday markets in the blueprint 
countries we are investigating range from 8 hours ahead of the operation in the 
Spanish market (last intraday market for each day closes at 4 p.m.) to 1 hour ahead 
of real time in the Danish and British markets. Forecast errors for time horizons 
below 7 hours are nowadays less than 8%.  
 
DG/RES generators in Spain are responsible for the deviations they incur. Thus, they 
must pay imbalance costs that are proportional to their contribution to the total 
system deviation. This fact has encouraged them to develop better power output 
prediction tools. However, it should be noted that the support payments for RES/DG 
in Spain are far larger than the balancing costs they incur. Thus, being responsible 
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for deviations does not represent a major barrier in the development of RES/DG. 
 
In the Spanish system, every generator can adjust its production in the intraday 
market where there are six sessions, (one every four or five hours, approximately). If 
an imbalance between generation and demand still exists after intraday markets, the 
tertiary energy market and the deviation management market are used to re-
establish the equilibrium. 
 
According to the Spanish TSO experience, it could be feasible to join the intraday 
energy market sessions and the Spanish TSO deviation management mechanism in 
a single continuous balancing mechanism to bring continuous re-scheduling 
opportunities to program units. Maybe, the main barrier to carry out this is the current 
division of responsibilities between the Spanish pole of Iberian market, OMEL, which 
runs intraday energy markets, and the Spanish TSO, which s responsible for the 
deviation management process. This hypothetic future continuous balancing 
mechanism would have to be managed by the Spanish TSO since the TSO manages 
the operation of the network. Another barrier to further reducing the gate-closure time 
is the time required to carry out the security’s studies and guarantee the technical 
viability of the scheduled production. 
 
In Germany, RES/DG generators are not made responsible for the imbalances they 
cause in the system. On the contrary, grid operators are responsible for forecasting 
the production from intermittent energy sources connected to the grid they manage. 
Big research is being done in order to improve forecasting tools. In the German case, 
it is believed that making RES/DG responsible for the deviations they incur would 
create a barrier to the installation of RES/DG, which would have a negative impact on 
the amount of CO2 emissions. 
 
Even though the reduction of the gate closure time would decrease the balancing 
cost, empirical analyses in Germany have shown that the utilization of the intraday 
market instead of the balancing market does not decrease the overall costs. 
Switching from minutes reserve to intraday markets becomes only economically 
efficient if the liquidity on the intraday market is increased. Thus, liquidity of intraday 
markets can represent a barrier to reducing imbalance problems. 
 
Renewable and distributed generators are responsible for the imbalances they cause 
in the British system. Improving the accuracy of the existing prediction tools is 
necessary to reduce the amount of reserves required and the associated system 
balancing costs. In the balancing market, BMUs are especially encouraged to 
improve the accuracy of their output estimations so as to reduce the imbalance cost 
they need to pay. In addition, the gate closure time has been reduced from 3 hours to 
1 hour ahead of real time.  
 
Generators in Denmark are responsible for the deviations they incur. In addition, 
generators may contract the services of a Balance Responsible Party (BRP). A BRP 
can be balance responsible for production, consumption and/or trade. The balancing 
costs – as well as the market prices – are considered, when computing the subsidies 
to be earn by RES/DG. Thus, they do not represent a significant barrier to the entry 
of these generators in the market. The gate closure at Nord Pool is one hour ahead 
of delivery. 
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In the Netherlands, every generator or demand connected to the grid (including 
DG/RES) has program responsibility and consequently balancing responsibility. 
Deviations from the scheduled program are determined for each programme time 
unit (PTU, 15 minutes) and settled with the TSO on the balancing market. In practice, 
the program responsibility of most agents has been transferred to a small number of 
program responsible parties, which usually have large portfolios with a combination 
of generation and demand. This program responsible parties benefit from 
improvements in predictions of load and wind power production. Furthermore, 
program responsible parties are allowed to trade with other PRPs in order to reduce 
their imbalance. The gate closure time is 1 hour ahead of operation for the balancing 
responsible parties. The reduction of the gate closure time is not very realistic; 
limitations in start-up times and ramp rates in combination with the need to use 
regulating power for congestion management requires gate closure times that are 
long enough to conduct a load flow analysis and allow for rescheduling. 
Table 10 : Main country features concerning responsibility of deviations, prediction of production and 
gate closures 
 Responsibility for 
deviations 
Prediction of 
production 
Gate closures 
Spain - RES responsible 
for deviations, 
penalty in 
proportion to their 
contribution to the 
total deviation 
- support scheme 
is high enough to 
bear deviation 
costs 
- Both TSO and 
RES make 
prediction of 
production 
 
 
-Six intraday 
markets 
-Gate closure 
between 3 and 8 
hours depending 
on intraday market 
-RES monitored in 
real time by TSO 
 
Germany -RES not 
responsible for 
deviations 
- making RES/DG 
responsible for the 
deviations they 
incur would pose a 
negative barrier 
 
-net operators are 
responsible for the 
forecasting of 
intermittent energy 
sources 
- Switching from 
minutes reserve to 
intraday markets 
only efficient if 
liquidity of intraday 
markets is assured.
UK -RES responsible 
for deviations 
 1 hour 
Denmark - RES responsible 
for deviations 
Generators may 
contract 
management of 
deviations with a 
Balance 
responsible party 
(BRP)  
1 hour 
Netherlands - RES responsible 
for deviations 
-program 
responsibility 
transferred to a 
small number of 
1 hour 
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program 
responsible parties 
 
Table 11 : Barriers reported by country studies concerning of responsibility of deviations, prediction of 
production and gate closures 
Barrier Country 
RES responsibility for deviations Germany 
Time required for security studies Spain, Netherlands  
Liquidity of intradaily markets Germany 
Division of responsibilities between 
market operator and system operator 
Spain 
 
4.3 Conclusions 
Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
 
Regarding access to energy markets, although direct barriers seem actually not 
present in any of the surveyed countries, there are some key points that could be 
highlighted. In particular, high trading fees might in practice represent an obstacle to 
market access. Hence, a possible solution could be to reduce the direct trading fee or 
transform it into an equivalent one with different structure, more suitable to RES/CHP 
characteristics, as done in Denmark, for instance. Size could also be an issue for 
market access, as it is not practical to monitor several dispersed units at a 
distribution level. However, aggregation of units, which may be carried out through 
contracts with energy suppliers or trading agents, is an effective solution to overcome 
this problem, and is already taking place in several countries. The aggregation of 
units can also diminish the high transaction costs that is reported as an important 
barrier in Netherlands and Denmark. In fact, virtual power plants are a priority area 
for the call for proposals for 2009 for the electricity research programme in Denmark. 
In addition, the possibility of being curtailed by TSO for network security reasons can 
also prevent the participation of RES within markets. 
 
Regarding access to ancillary or system services markets, the main issue found 
refers to controllability of the RES/CHP unit (or, in case, an equivalent aggregation of 
units, in order to overcome minimum-size threshold, as for the energy market). 
Controllability is a technical issue that is typically technology specific, and, in a way, 
also refers to the capability of riding through various fault situations. In this way, big 
efforts are being done by RES promoters to research the adaptation of units farms in 
the ability of load following services and voltage control. Assuming that from a 
technical point of view RES generators will be mature in the near future, the 
participation of intermittent generators require that system operation practices are 
replaced by more modern ones. Consequently, adequate remuneration schemes 
have to be designed in order to incentivise the participation of RES generators in 
ancillary or system services markets. 
 
Responsibility of deviations, prediction of production and gate closures closer to real-
time 
 
In most countries (Spain, UK, Denmark and Netherlands) RES are responsible for 
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deviations, i.e. they must pay penalizations for the deviations incurred, which in fact 
constitute an incentive to develop better prediction tools. In this respect, aggregation 
of different RES generation units spread over a relatively large territory rather than 
clustered within smaller areas could help minimize the overall forecast deviations.  
Assigning balancing responsibility to RES has not been reported as a major 
investment barrier due to the fact that the support schemes compensate these costs. 
In addition, balancing responsibility can be transferred to program responsible parties 
(Denmark, Netherlands) that can reduce deviations by managing a large portfolio of 
generation and demand. Only in Germany, RES producers are not responsible for 
deviations. In this case, the prediction of production is transferred to the grid 
operators. This is considered as a barrier for RES deployment. Whether RES are 
made responsible for deviations or not, big efforts have been made in the 
improvement in the predictions: forecast errors for time horizons below 7 hours are 
nowadays less than 8% 
 
Different energy markets are available to market players. Country analysis indicates 
that gate closure times within these markets range from a maximum of 8 hours 
ahead  of real time (last intraday market for each day closes at 4 p.m in Spain) to 1 
hour ahead of real time (UK, Denmark, Netherlands). Limitations due to start-up 
times and ramp rates, together with the time required to carry out the security’s 
studies and guarantee the technical viability of the scheduled production, have been 
reported as the major barriers to further reducing gate closure times. Gate closure 
time in Spain could be closer to real time by implementing more intraday markets or 
even merging the intraday market with the deviation management market. However, 
the division of responsibilities between the market operator (which is responsible of 
intraday markets) and the system operator (which is responsible for the deviation 
management market) is regarded as a major obstacle to implement the latter 
measure. Even though intraday markets reduce gate closures times, in Germany the 
liquidity of these markets is considered a problem and employing a balancing market 
is preferred. 
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5 Regional markets 
 
Regional markets like the Internal Electricity Market (IEM) of the EU are aimed at 
strengthening the level of integration among the different national markets in a 
region. Generators and consumers in a regional market should be free to contract 
their energy with any other counterpart within the region, no matter where it is 
located. Thus, RES/DG generators within a certain country should be able to sell 
their energy in other countries. 
 
Given that primary energy sources are not evenly distributed across Europe, and 
taking into account the fact that distances between some European countries are 
large, the production of RES/DG generators in one country may probably not be 
highly correlated to that in some others. Thus, some countries in the region may 
export the excess of renewable energy that they have available to other countries 
where the amount of renewable energy produced is smaller. The same would apply 
to regulation reserves. Regional markets allow regulation reserves to be shared 
among countries in the region. Thus, the amount of regulation reserves needed is 
smaller. 
 
5.1 Increase of interconnection capacity 
Interconnection capacity is needed for the existence of renewable energy exchanges 
between countries. However, the construction of interconnection capacity has long 
been a pending task in the IEM. The move to reinforce the most important congestion 
corridors in the region has faced many obstacles. Thus, for example, social and 
political opposition to the construction of electricity transmission lines is ever growing 
stronger. Many consider these lines as damaging for the environment while not 
bringing any benefit to the areas it crosses. 
 
Also related to this, the allocation of the cost of regional grid reinforcements may be a 
matter of concern for promoters of these projects and policymakers. The cost of 
transmission lines in general (and therefore that of congested corridors in particular) 
is allocated to member states in the IEM using an inter-TSO compensation scheme 
whose results cannot be considered indisputable. They argue that beneficiaries of a 
certain line are not necessarily the ones who end-up paying for it. This, of course, 
may cause them to oppose the construction of this line. 
 
Stakeholders and institutions in most of the considered countries are of the opinion 
that increasing the interconnection capacity between countries, according to the 
guidelines provided by the Ten-E study, would result in an increase not only of the 
power exchanges between countries but also of the share of regulating reserves that 
would be provided regionally, i.e. the share of these reserves that would be provided 
by agents in other countries different from those where the reserves are needed. 
Only Denmark believes interconnection capacity between the Danish system and 
others is already more than enough to allow power exchanges to happen. 
 
Main obstacles to the construction of regional reinforcements include environmental 
concerns and concerns about the fairness of the allocation to countries of the cost of 
these reinforcements (UK and SP). Other barrier, related to the previous one, is the 
fact that benefits yielded by regional lines are many times wide spread and some 
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countries may oppose the construction of lines that cross their territory without them 
benefiting significantly from them (SP, UK and NL). The complexity of the permit 
process, where every country involved must accept the construction of the line is also 
regarded as a major obstacle (SP, UK and D). Finally, lack of harmonization of 
market rules, which prevents agents from some countries from accessing other 
national markets, renders the construction of new cross-border lines among these 
countries less important (UK). 
 
Most parties agree that, in order to overcome the aforementioned obstacles, 
providing executive powers to some sort of European wide body (regulatory agency), 
and promoting the coordination between TSOs (in order to identify those lines that 
are needed at regional level), will be necessary. Apart from this, some parties state 
that compensations among TSOs should be made compulsory, whether they are 
fixed, as advocated by some (DK), or determined on an annual basis, as advocated 
by others (NL). Another important factor may be the harmonization of market rules 
that would encourage agents to seek more power exchanges. Finally, using 
congestion rents to finance new network investments, instead of reducing 
transmission tariffs, may be an alternative as well. 
 
5.2 Integration of national markets into regional ones 
Benefits brought about by the integration of national markets into regional ones have 
been discussed extensively. Barriers to achieving this integration may be of two 
types. First, one can think of all those difficulties faced when aiming to achieve an 
integrated functioning of regional markets from an operational point of view. National 
market rules in different parts of the existing regional markets differ widely in many 
cases. Besides, harmonizing them is very difficult. Among other things, this is due to 
the fact that countries want to have some control over the energy dispatch within 
their systems rather than dealing with this issue at European level (and this is in 
accordance with the subsidiarity principle). It is clear that reaching an agreement at 
least on some basic rules, such as those concerning national markets gate closure 
times, is necessary. 
 
Other obstacles are related to the lack of willingness by countries to promote power 
exchanges. In the view of many countries, national generation capacity should be 
devoted first to guarantee the supply of local load. Only the excess of generation 
over demand in each country could be exported to others. These countries may be 
worried that allowing limitless regional power exchanges could pose a threat to the 
supply of local load at times when excess capacity is tight. 
 
The level of harmonization of market rules between the main European countries 
with significant RES generation and their neighbours varies widely from one case to 
another. Thus, in the long term, coordinated explicit auctions take place in most 
cases (SP, NL, UK). In the short term, coordination of gate closure time has been 
implemented in some cases (D), while, in most cases, some short of coordinated 
implicit auction has been implemented (SP-P, DK, NL). There are other cases where 
explicit auctions are held also in the short run (SP-F, UK). 
 
Those systems whose level of integration with others is high have normally 
implemented implicit auctions, mainly Market Coupling, like NL, E-P or DK (also with 
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D). However, there are also cases, like that between UK and F, where implementing 
explicit auctions has been enough to allow significant power exchanges to take 
place.  
 
From the answers by stakeholders and institutions, it seems clear that, in order to 
achieve a high level of integration between systems that are part of a meshed 
network, implementing some short of implicit auctions seems highly advisable 
(Market Coupling). Explicit auctions may allow the integration of two neighbouring 
systems if their connection is radial (like that between F and the UK). No single 
example of coordinated explicit auction scheme comprising several countries has 
been reported. 
 
There is not a general perception that national security of supply concerns should 
result in a reduction of power exchanges between countries, since each country 
could benefit from the existing of generation resources in others. The integration of 
system services at regional level should benefit each of the different countries in the 
region. However, some entities have expressed their view that generation capacity in 
a country should not be reserved, in the long term, for the provision of regulating 
reserves to other countries. Only capacity available in the short term should be 
devoted to this (D). 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
Table 12 summarizes the main findings within this section. Columns correspond to 
the market response options that have been identified in this and previous sections, 
while rows correspond to the different barriers that may hinder the implementation of 
these response options. For each combination of a certain barrier and a certain 
option, the table provides the identity of the countries where the corresponding 
barrier is preventing the application of this response option. 
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Table 12 : Summary of the main barriers affecting the creation of regional markets  
 
Increase of interconnection 
capacity
Integration of the operation 
of national markets
Environmental concerns SP, UK
Lack of fairness of the inter-
TSO payment scheme SP, UK
Widespread benefits yielded
by cross-border lines SP, UK, NL
Complexity of the process
aimed at obtaining permits SP, UK, D
Lack of harmonization of
market rules DK
Short term implicit auctions
not applied if needed SP-F, D
Lack of multi-country coor-
dination of long term cross-
border capacity allocation
SP, NL, UK, D, DK
Integration perceived as a
threat to security of supply
D (reserves provided to other 
countries must not be 
provisioned in the long term)
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6 Networks 
 
6.1 Transmission networks 
The transmission activity is certainly affected by the installation of large shares of 
variable RES connected to the transmission grids and variable RES/DG to the 
distribution grids, since transmission power flows in the system depend on the 
balance between generation and demand in each part of the system. RES and 
RES/DG changes the geographical distribution of generation in the system, which, in 
turn, changes the balance between generation and demand within each area as well 
as power flows between areas. 
 
Installing large shares of RES/DG generation may change the level of transmission 
network investments that are needed. Thus, appropriate measures should be taken 
for promoters to take into account the cost of these reinforcements. Considering the 
efficiency of required grid reinforcements is even more relevant due to the fact that 
transmission network planners are having great difficulties getting new lines built. 
Finally, the pattern of congestion in the grid is likely to change as a result of the 
installation of these generators. This may require the use of new efficient congestion 
management schemes. 
 
6.1.1  Locationally differentiated and time varying tariffs 
 
Promoters of RES and DG generators should take into account the transmission grid 
costs that the system will incur as a result of their decision to install a new plant in a 
certain node. This cost may vary greatly from one point of the grid to another. Thus, 
transmission tariffs paid by generators or loads could exhibit some sort of locational 
differentiation. Otherwise, transmission costs may increase significantly as a result of 
the installation of this type of generators even if it is not necessary for them to do so 
at this place. However, implementing locationally differentiated charges may be 
against the regulation in place in some countries, which may state that generators of 
each type in a system must pay the same level of charges no matter where they are 
located. What is more, changing from a system of charges that does not depend on 
the location of each agent to another one whereby generators pay according to their 
location requires designing a transition period and discriminating between old and 
new generators. This may pose a serious challenge to the adoption of this kind of 
tariffs. 
 
The cost of installing a new plant may clearly depend on the operation profile of this 
plant. Thus, if this plant produces power when local demand is maximum it may be 
able to reduce the amount of new import transmission capacity into the area to be 
built in the future. On the other hand, if its peak production takes place when local 
demand is minimum, additional transmission capacity may be needed to transport 
this power to other parts of the system. Hence, one can conclude that the level of the 
transmission tariff to be paid by a generator should depend on the production profile 
that the generator is deemed to have. Implementing such a tarification scheme may, 
again, face a series of obstacles, though it should be easier to implement than 
locationally differentiated tariffs. 
 
RES generators (like any other generator) in most of the considered systems do not 
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pay transmission use-of-system charges (TNUoS charges). Only generators in the 
Netherlands and some generators in the UK have to pay transmission TNUoS 
charges. Generators in the Netherlands only pay these charges for the amount of 
energy they withdraw from the grid. In the UK, generators connected to the 
transmission grid, or those connected to the distribution grid that are larger than 
100MW, must pay TNUoS charges, though small generators connected to the 
transmission grid can get a discount. Regarding connection charges, DG/RES 
normally has to pay them but these are shallow in some cases (NL, UK) and deep in 
others (SP, D). Shallow connection charges may be regulated or depending on the 
type of generator i.e. voltage level (NL).  
 
Transmission use-of-the-system charges paid by generators in most considered 
countries do not exhibit any form of temporal or locational differentiation (D, DK, NL, 
SP). In some cases, this is due to the fact that generators do not pay any charge for 
the use they make of the transmission grid (SP, DK). In others it is due to the fact 
that no locational/temporal differentiation has been introduced in transmission 
charges in general (NL, D). An exception to this general trend is the UK, where 
generators pay use-of-the-system charges that exhibit some form of locational 
(application of the LRIC methodology) and temporal (use of peak day pricing) 
differentiation. The latter charges are aimed at charging network users according to 
the cost they cause. 
 
Regarding connection charges, one could say that those systems where these 
charges are not regulated but negotiated exhibit some sort of temporal/locational 
differentiation, since they are computed on a case by case basis according to the 
particular characteristics of the considered generator. These include all those 
systems where connection charges are deep (SP, D) and, in some specific cases, 
shallow charges (NL for those generators up to 150 kV). 
 
All parties agree that transmission owners’ (TOs) attitude toward the connection of 
DG/RES does not depend on whether these generators pay the costs they cause but 
on whether these costs are approved by the regulator (acknowledged as regulated 
costs). In some countries (SP, NL), the TSO/TOs are forced to accept any 
connection requested as long as it is technically feasible. Furthermore, there are 
parties which believe that it is impossible to allocate grid costs on a cost causality 
basis and, therefore, that these should be socialized to network users (D, Electrabel). 
 
Parties tend to agree that, if transmission charges were differentiated by time and 
space, differences among charges paid in different nodes/areas and by different 
types of generators could be significant, thus affecting investment decisions by 
agents (NL, UK). Others explain that, despite differences between charges may be 
large, prices and subsidies earned by RES are so big that investments in new RES 
capacity are unlikely to be influenced by transmission tariffs (SP). Some countries do 
not consider the possibility of introducing locational/temporal differentiation in tariffs. 
 
The most important barriers to the implementation of locationally / time varying 
transmission tariffs that have been identified by parties in the considered countries 
include the following: 
 
• Charges resulting from the application of these tariffs may turn out to be too 
volatile. Even differences in tariffs between nodes or points in time that are 
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close could be significant (NL). 
• Applying different charges to different generators based on their type or 
operation profile and their location is seen by some as a source of unfair 
discrimination (NL, D). Discrimination between old and new generators is also 
seen as unfair in some cases (NL). 
• According to others, the large size of the feed-in tariffs that are presently being 
applied to RES generation may discourage RES operators from taking into 
account grid locational signals when deciding on the location of their plants, 
since these plants would turn out to be very profitable no matter where they are 
installed (SP). 
• Finally, there is also the concern that implementing a system of nodal/zonal 
transmission tariffs may substantially increase the complexity of the system 
regulation and that of the monitoring of the system functioning, thus making it 
less attractive in policy makers view (UK). 
 
6.1.2  Political and administrative barriers to grid reinforcement 
 
As mentioned above, installing new RES generators may require reinforcing the 
transmission grid. However, political and social opposition to the construction of new 
lines has been growing significantly. Besides, delays in the process to be followed to 
obtain the required permits may represent another important obstacle. 
 
Significant socio-political opposition is faced nowadays by promoters of new 
transmission lines in most European countries. This has resulted in a significant 
delay in the construction of some lines. Average time for the construction of new lines 
ranges from 3 years (Spain, UK’s best case) to 10 years (NL, D, UK’s worst case). 
 
Main concerns raised by local/regional governments and associations of 
consumers/network users about new transmission lines are environmental and those 
related to the effect of lines on health (NL, SP, D). In order to overcome them, many 
new lines have had to be buried, which significantly increases the cost and the 
technical complexity of the investment projects. This, in turn, becomes a major 
barrier to the construction of new lines (DK). Other concerns are related to the 
allocation of the cost of new network investments and the efficient utilization of 
existing assets (UK). Finally, the profitability of the investment projects in the current 
conditions is also under scrutiny. 
 
In order to overcome opposition to the construction of lines, some believe that 
explaining better the benefits produced by these projects may be useful (D) but the 
majority of parties do not think so. Paying compensations to communities that are 
crossed by new lines for the environmental cost of these installations may be another 
option (SP). Giving national governments more competences related to the 
authorization process at the expense of regional/local governments may also be 
helpful (NL). 
 
6.1.3  Efficient and fair congestion management schemes 
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The installation of RES generation in far remote areas (for example wind farms both 
off-shore and on-shore) may produce congestion in the system. Apart from this, if the 
amount of new generation located within an area is significantly larger than demand 
and/or the pattern of power production by this generation is poorly correlated with 
that of demand in the area, additional congestion may arise because of the 
installation of DG. Under these circumstances, efficiently allocating the scarce 
transmission capacity may become even more urgent. Otherwise, welfare losses 
may occur. 
 
Congestion management schemes that provide efficient price signals may be 
incompatible with national regulation in place in some countries, which may require 
computing a single energy price for the whole system. Besides, some regulators 
have expressed their concerns about the possibility of local generation increasing the 
market power they hold if locationally differentiated prices are computed. Lastly, 
implementing an efficient congestion management scheme could result in an 
increase in the complexity of the process leading to the computation of the final 
program of power units, especially if some level of coordination between the energy 
dispatch in different countries or market areas is required. 
 
With the exception of Denmark (prices for the two separate areas that have been 
defined in this system are computed through implicit auctions that take place at 
regional level in the Nord Pool day-ahead market, as described above), no system 
within the ones analysed is applying nodal/zonal pricing to solve congestion within 
their systems. The congestion management mechanism currently used in most 
systems is redispatch. Even Denmark is applying redispatch to solve specific grid 
congestion problems which do not occur systematically. The same holds for the 
Netherlands, which is applying a priority congestion management mechanism for 
new generators that want to be connected in congested areas (last generator 
connected is the first one that is constrained off if congestion arises), but is likely to 
implement a more advanced redispatch algorithm in the short term future. 
 
Different variants of redispatch are applied in different countries. Thus, the redispatch 
algorithm applied in Spain does not result in an efficient energy dispatch in some 
situations. Generators in a congested region who must reduce their output are not 
chosen according to an efficiency index. In this case, the functioning of the 
redispatch algorithm could certainly be improved without having to introduce 
significant changes to the national regulation. 
 
Most parties agree that introducing some market based method to solve congestion 
is highly advisable. Thus, authorities in the Dutch system are seriously considering 
the possibility of implementing a redispatch algorithm. However, no party or 
institution, but the Danish ones, sees the need to apply congestion management 
mechanisms that are more ambitious than redispatch. Reasons for regarding 
redispatch as a satisfactory option include the belief that grid congestion can be 
efficiently managed through the use of redispatch within their system (D), or the 
belief that applying some sort of nodal or zonal pricing would create significant 
problems, and would significantly increase the complexity of the congestion 
management process, while not delivering major efficiency increases (SP, UK, NL). 
Problems that are generally regarded as related to the implementation of nozal/zonal 
pricing are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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Main barriers to the implementation of nodal/zonal pricing in the considered countries 
are the incompatibility with existing national regulation; the acknowledgement that 
significant market power problems may arise as a consequence of the application of 
locationally differentiated prices and the increase in complexity of the energy 
dispatch resulting from the use of this kind of solutions. 
 
The regulation in place in several countries does not allow different energy prices to 
be charged to consumers based on their location. This is the case of Spain, where 
prices earned by generators are allowed to be different, nevertheless, and that of the 
Netherlands, where the grid code and the system code would have to be significantly 
changed to apply nodal/zonal prices. In contrast, other countries’ market rules, like 
those in the UK and Denmark, allow for energy prices to be different, since locational 
price differences in energy bought by consumers in these countries are already 
taking place. The regulation in place is Germany states that, if significant internal 
congestion exists sometime, a market based, non-discriminatory congestion 
management method should be applied. However, grid congestion that exists 
nowadays is deemed to be efficiently dealt with by means of redispatch. 
 
According to most of the consulted parties (DK, UK, NL, SP and some in D), market 
power exercise would be exacerbated if energy prices within congested areas were 
computed separately from those of the rest of the system. This is true even for the 
parties in those systems where zonal pricing is already in place, like Denmark. This is 
related to the fact that generators able to solve most of the existing grid congestion 
belong to one or very few companies, as a result of the decrease in the size of the 
relevant market when nodal/zonal pricing is applied. 
 
Last, but not least, the complexity of the process of computing zonal/nodal prices is 
also cited by some parties as an important difficulty to be overcome in the process of 
implementation of these methods. For some countries, like Spain, the process of 
coordination of the market dispatch at regional level would be much more difficult if 
several prices would have to be computed at national level. For some others, like 
Dutch ones, splitting up the imbalance settlement according to price areas and 
changing computer systems represent non-negligible challenges. Finally, there are 
other systems, like the UK or Denmark, which think implementing these methods is 
perfectly possible, since, either they have already implemented them (DK), or they 
have already dealt with the problem of applying a different price to each consumer, 
although in a decentralized way (UK). 
 
6.1.4  Conclusions 
 
Table 13 summarizes the main findings within this section. Columns correspond to 
the market response options that have been identified in this and previous sections, 
while rows correspond to the different barriers that may hinder the implementation of 
these response options. For each combination of a certain barrier and a certain 
option, the table provides the identity of the countries where the corresponding 
barrier is preventing the application of this response option. 
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Table 13 : Summary of the main barriers related to the transmission of electricity 
Locationally differentiated 
and time varying tariffs Grid reinforcements
Efficient and fair congestion 
management schemes
Volatility of charges NL
Source of unfair discrimination NL (also between old and new), D
Weakening of incentives from 
charges due to high level of FITs SP
Increase in the complexity of the 
regulation resulting from their 
application
UK (less attractive for policy 
makers)
Environmental impact and effects on 
health
NL, SP, D, DK (burying 
them is necessary)
Lack of efficiency of the allocation of 
the cost of new lines UK
Lack of efficiency of the use of 
existng transmission capacity UK
Disputed profitability of proposed 
projects UK
Measure contrary to national 
regulation
SP (there must be a single L 
price), NL (significant changes 
would be needed)  
Increase in the exercise of MP 
resulting from their application SP, NL, UK, DK, D (some)
Increase in the complexity of the 
market clearing process
SP (coordination of the regional 
dispatch), NL (imbalance 
settlement and computer 
programs)  
 
6.2 Distribution networks 
DG/RES generators of a intermittent nature should not be discriminated against 
when requesting access to the distribution grid. In order for this not to happen, DSOs 
should reap some of the benefits that the system obtains from the installation of DG. 
These benefits may be of different types: decrease in infrastructure investment 
needs, decrease in losses, increases in the quality of service brought about by these 
generators, etc. At the same time, DSOs remuneration should take into account the 
extra costs they incur because of the installation of these generators. Thus, 
distribution tariffs paid by generators should depend on their location and their output 
profile. 
 
On the other hand, RES/DG promoters should be encouraged to install new 
generation at distribution level. Thus, they should profit from the benefits for the 
system caused by the generators they install. RES/DG should be allowed to sell 
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ancillary services if they are capable of providing them. Additionally, their charges 
and revenues should depend on the incremental costs (either positive or negative) 
that they make the system incur.  
 
6.2.1  Locationally differentiated and time varying tariffs 
 
The SOLID-DER project has investigated the structure of distribution charges paid by 
DG/RES generators (both connection and UoS charges). These charges should be 
representative of the distribution grid costs that these generators make the system 
incur. In order for this to be true, charges to be paid by a generator may need to 
depend on the location and operation profile of this generator (time when it is 
expected to produce energy). However, some obstacles may lie in the way of the 
process of implementing locationally differentiated or time (profile) varying charges. 
For example, some studies have concluded that locationally dependent distribution 
charges may turn out to be too volatile. Other obstacles analogous to the ones 
hindering the application of locationally differentiated and time-profile varying 
transmission charges may apply as well (legislation/regulation and transition 
problems). 
 
In most of the considered systems, DG only has to pay connection charges at 
distribution level. An exception to this is the UK, where these generators have to pay 
also use-of-the-system charges. These are being reviewed to allocate costs in a cost 
reflective manner. 
 
Regarding connection charges, they are shallow in some cases (UK, NL for small 
generators, D) and deep in others (SP, NL for large generators). Deep connection 
charges are location and generation profile dependent since, theoretically, they 
represent the cost of the reinforcements that each new generator causes. Shallow 
connection charges may have some locational content as well. Thus, these charges 
can be made dependent on the distance to the grid of the generator to be connected 
to it (NL). 
 
Therefore, distribution charges faced by DG in part of the considered countries 
exhibit some form of temporal or spatial differentiation. Deep connection charges, as 
those applied in Spain and Holland allow the DSO to charge generators according to 
the expected costs they will cause. These charges may have a significant locational 
content. Shallow connection charges (D, UK, NL small generators) can only have a 
small locational content, since they only concern a small fraction of total network 
costs. However, in some systems, differences exist among shallow connection 
charges paid by different generators. These differences may depend on several 
factors, like the distance from the generator to the grid. Use-of-the-system charges 
paid by distributed generators in some systems may be locationally and temporally 
differentiated. This is the case of the UK, where Long Run Incremental Charging 
(LRIC) is applied to compute the charges to be paid by those generators connected 
to the EHV network, while distribution use of the system charges paid by generators 
connected to the HV/MV/LV levels are computed according to a Distribution 
Reinforcement Model (DRM). 
    
Revenues of DSOs do usually not depend on whether DG pays the costs it causes. 
Instead, they depend on the methodology applied to compute allowed revenues. 
These methodologies are normally based on the use of yardstick competition and the 
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computation of a revenue cap. In some systems, the impact of the connection and 
operation of DG on DSOs’ reasonable costs are considered (UK). In others, they are 
not explicitly taken into account (SP, D, NL).   
 
Parties agree that deep connection charges, like those applied in SP or Holland for 
large generators, may drive investment decisions by DG promoters. Shallow charges 
are less likely to drive investment decisions, even when they have some locational 
content (as those in NL for smaller generators). When distribution use-of-the-system 
charges have locational/temporal differentiation (UK), parties agree they may affect 
investment decisions by agents.  
 
In those systems where locational distribution charges have not been implemented 
yet, main barriers identified by parties are legal (changing the tariff codes would be 
necessary in NL). Additionaly, allocating charges to generators in an efficient, cost-
reflective, manner is also regarded as a challenge by authorities in some countries 
(D). For most parties consulted, volatility is not considered a problem when 
implementing this kind of charges. An exception to this rule is the Netherlands. 
  
6.2.2 DSOs incentives for active network management 
 
Real time monitoring and control of DG/RES generation is far from achievable 
nowadays in most systems, since DSOs’ management of the network is not active 
but passive. However, DG may contribute to reduce system losses and improve 
quality of service through the reduction of the net amount of energy to be transported 
by higher voltage networks and the provision of ancillary services. If DSOs could 
cash in on these benefits, they would probably promote the connection of DG/RES 
generation to their grids and would implement active network management 
techniques. These techniques would be aimed at taking advantage of the potential of 
DG/RES generators for operation cost reduction and service quality improvement. 
Active network management includes dynamically changing the grid configuration, 
real time monitoring of DG operation and communication with these generators so as 
to control them. 
 
Barriers to the adoption of innovative management schemes may have to do with the 
lack of incentives for DSOs to change their operating practices or to technological 
challenges of the implementation of these schemes. We shall focus on barriers of the 
first type. 
 
Active network management (ANM) has not been implemented yet in any of the 
considered systems. However, most parties acknowledge that applying ANM 
techniques would probably result in an improvement of both distribution losses and 
service quality levels.  
 
In some countries (mainly UK, but also DK) research initiatives have been launched 
to develop active network management solutions. Besides this, research grants and 
tax cuts are being used in the UK to promote the development of the technology and 
operation processes required to implement ANM. The Netherlands is also 
considering employing this kind of incentives to trigger a change in the paradigm of 
operation of distribution networks. 
 
Most of the countries are already applying some sort of incentive regulation 
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associated to the reduction of losses and the increase in service quality. An 
exception to this is Germany, where incentives to reduce losses will be applied from 
2009 on, and an incentive scheme to increase service quality is also planned. 
Mechanisms presently applied involve, in most cases, defining reference levels for 
losses and service quality and penalising (respectively rewarding) those DSOs 
whose losses and quality levels are worse (respectively better) than these reference 
levels (SP, UK, NL for service quality). In order to apply this type of schemes, it is 
necessary to define both the target or reference performance level and the size of the 
incentive provided to DSOs for improving their performance. Some of the entities 
consulted agree that the most difficult part of it is determining the incentive size (UK). 
Others (NL) point out that DSOs remuneration should take into account the effect 
that DG has on both losses and service quality, which is not common practice 
nowadays.     
 
As explained above, agents consider that the most important obstacles to the 
implementation of incentive schemes are the difficulty of computing an adequate 
level for efficiency incentives (UK) as well as computing the impact of DG on losses 
and service quality (NL). 
 
Besides, it is generally agreed (UK, NL, SP) that incentives schemes on their own 
are not enough to trigger a radical change in the operation of distribution grids. 
Therefore, other mechanisms should be used to complement efficiency incentives. 
These may be the launch of research projects aimed at developing technical and 
operational procedures for ANM where both public and private institutions participate 
(UK, DK, planned in NL). Other possibilities are research grants and tax cuts of the 
type currently used in the UK.  
 
6.2.3  DSOs incentives for efficient network planning, incl. DG 
 
Taking into account DG/RES when planning the expansion of the distribution grid 
may have a significant influence on the level of costs incurred. The SOLID-DER 
project favoured the adoption of revenue- or price cap remuneration schemes instead 
of cost of service ones, since the former can provide incentives to the DSO to 
develop the distribution grid that is optimally adapted to the system requirements. 
Provided such a mechanism is in place, DSOs should take advantage of the potential 
reductions in power flows caused by distributed generators thus not building certain 
lines that would be necessary if DG were not present in the system. 
 
The SOLID-DER project has investigated the mechanisms in place in different 
systems to encourage efficient investment decisions by DSOs. Now, we shall focus 
on the barriers that hinder the implementation of efficient schemes to achieve this 
objective. These may include the difficulty to compute an efficient target level of 
investment costs to be incurred by the DSO, the difficulty to set the X efficiency factor 
to be deducted from CPI factor considered in this type of schemes or changing 
system conditions (regarding, for example, the penetration level of DG) that can 
justify a change in the target remuneration level of DSOs. 
 
In order to encourage DSOs to carry out efficient network investments, an incentive 
scheme must be put in place. The determination of a ‘reasonable’ allowed CAPEX 
remuneration level for the DSO is acknowledged by some parties (NL, SP) as one of 
the main obstacles to achieve an efficient development of the grid. In some countries, 
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the remuneration level is updated annually based on a formula, and is therefore 
completely decoupled from the actual level of costs (SP for quite a long time), while 
in others, some specific factors (connection density, penetration level of DG) 
affecting each DSO costs are not taken into account when computing its 
remuneration (NL). The penetration level of DG is a critical factor when computing an 
efficient level of CAPEX (NL, SP). To overcome these difficulties, some parties 
propose the utilization of network reference models separately for each distribution 
area (SP).  
 
Determining the efficiency factor X in revenue cap schemes is also considered a 
challenge to be overcome in order to provide the right incentives. Normally, the same 
factor is used for every DSO, thus disregarding its particular situation (SP). In other 
cases, efficiency factors are adjusted from time to time so as not to allow DSOs’ 
profits to increase much. 
 
Some parties (UK, D) state that incentives for the efficiency in the operation of the 
system (losses, quality) should, on their own, result in efficient investments by DSOs 
aimed at improving the corresponding operation indexes. 
 
Regarding the integration of DG in the process of planning the expansion of the grid, 
support schemes in some systems are believed to encourage DG to produce as 
much energy as it can regardless of the specific operation conditions that exist (SP, 
NL). DG generators in these systems are unwilling to reduce their output when it is 
needed by the system. Thus, their output cannot be controlled in the benefit of the 
system so as to avoid the construction of certain new lines.   
 
Lastly, when planning the expansion of their grids, DSOs in the considered countries 
are not taking into account the likely future adoption of ANM techniques. Therefore, 
no coordination exists between network expansion planning in the present and the 
future adoption of active network management techniques.   
 
6.2.4  Incentives for RES/DG to provide ancillary services to the DSO 
 
Ancillary services provided by DG may be related to the operation of the system as a 
whole (namely the transmission grid) or to the operation of distribution grids. Thus, 
DG/RES generators may sell ancillary services to DSOs or be forced to comply with 
certain requirements. Both mechanisms may achieve the participation of these 
generators in keeping the system within safe margins. However, adopting the first 
one could lead to the provision of this service by those generators that can perform 
this task most efficiently. 
 
Services that DG can provide the DSO will include voltage regulation and even black 
start capability under islanding operation, among others. Allowing DG/RES 
generators to participate in the corresponding ancillary services markets could 
represent an extra incentive for DG/RES promoters to install new DG.  
 
Participation of generators in these markets would depend on the expected price 
levels in these ancillary services markets and how they compare to the expected 
revenues from selling their energy in the markets. 
 
In some systems, distributed generators are required to comply with some minimum 
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requirements regarding voltage regulation (SP, UK). In others they are not required 
to provide any help in this regard (NL). Requirements made to DG may involve the 
provision of a certain load factor (SP), or even the provision of voltage regulation, 
and may vary depending on the capacity and the voltage level of the considered 
generator (as it is the case in the UK). If DG provides services beyond the mandatory 
requirement, like providing voltage or power factor regulation when it is not 
compulsory, then it receives some extra payments. In some systems, these 
payments may be equal to the price resulting from the voltage regulation market 
(SP). The provision of other ancillary services (AASS) may be agreed through 
bilateral contracts, as in the Netherlands. None of the considered systems has 
implemented DSO AASS markets.        
 
Conditions to be met by DG in order to be allowed to sell AASS are mainly technical, 
like controllability and fault ride through capability (NL). Not all the existing distributed 
generators in these countries comply with these requirements.  
 
Finally, we shall discuss main obstacles to the creation of markets for DSO’s AASS 
or the implementation of other kind of schemes that allow DG to sell this kind of 
services. Market liquidity (not enough potential providers/ all belong to the same 
company) is regarded by many parties as an important obstacle to the creation of 
AASS markets (UK, D). Lack of economic incentives for DG to sell AASS is also a 
major barrier to be overcome in order for DG to provide these services (NL, SP, UK). 
Finally, some state that due to the lack of controllability of these generators, as well 
as their inability to comply with other technical requirements, DG is not yet regarded 
by DSOs as a reliable option to provide AASS (NL). 
 
6.2.5 Conclusions 
 
Table 14 summarizes the main findings within this section. Columns correspond to 
the market response options that have been identified in this and previous sections, 
while rows correspond to the different barriers that may hinder the implementation of 
these response options. For each combination of a certain barrier and a certain 
option, the table provides the identity of the countries where the corresponding 
barrier is preventing the application of this response option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 : Summary of the main barriers related to the distribution of electricity 
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Locationally differentiated 
and time varying tariffs
DSOs incentives for active 
network management
DSOs incentives for efficient 
network planning taking into 
account DG
Provision of DSO ancillary 
services by  DG
Measure contrary to national 
regulation NL
Difficulty of computing 
efficient distribution charges D
Volatility of charges NL
Difficulty of computing the 
level of operation efficiency 
incentives
UK 
Not considering the impact 
of DG on quality of service 
and losses
NL
Incentives in place too weak NL, SP, D
Wrong refrence 
remuneration levels in 
revenue cap schemes
SP (remuneration decoupled 
from costs), NL(specific 
situation of each DSO not 
considered)
Wrong level of the efficiency 
factor 'X' in RPI-X schemes
SP (the same factor applied to 
every DSO)
Implementing incentive 
driven CAPEX remuneration 
schemes not necessary
UK, D (incentives to improve 
operation are considered 
strong enough)
DG/RES support schemes 
encourage DG not to follow 
DSOs instructions
SP, NL
DSOs not taking into 
account ANM when planning 
their grids
SP, NL, D, DK, UK
Some RES/DG do not 
comply with technical 
requirements
NL
Lack of market liquidity of 
AASS markets (not enough 
independent providers)
UK, D
Lack of incentives for DG to 
provide DSO AASS UK, NL, SP
DG not yet regarded by 
DSOs as a reliable source of 
AASS
NL
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7 Final Conclusions and recommendations 
 
In order to counteract the negative impacts resulting from the increase of intermittent 
RES and DG generation (identified in deliverable D4 of RESPOND project), a 
number of response options were defined, analysed and assessed in deliverable D5 
of the same project. Subsequently, this document has been developed to detect 
actual and potential barriers that may hinder the implementation of the identified 
respond options. For this purpose a detailed questionnaire was developed in order to 
expand and collect additional information for the five country case studies (Spain, 
UK, Denmark, Germany, and Netherlands) regarding the national situation and the 
position of national regulators on the different key barriers. 
 
In particularly in this report on the basis of the aforementioned questionnaire and 
survey, the barriers have been analysed and classified according to the segments or 
parts of the system, i.e. generation (including both conventional generation and 
renewable and combined heat and power (RES/CHP) generation), demand of 
electricity, national and regional electricity markets, and finally transmission and 
distributions (T&D) networks. Main conclusions on each segment and topic are 
presented below. 
 
RES and CHP Generation 
 
Pricing mechanisms and support schemes 
 
Considering the diversification of the generation mix as one of the prioritized options 
identified, the performance of the different support schemes (FIT, premium over the 
market price or TGC trading) can be benchmarked among different countries based 
on effectiveness and efficiency factors. FITs are technology-specific and thus may be 
used to favour also less economically efficient options. Consequently, in general 
TGC systems are considered to be more economically efficient support instruments. 
However, in the case that TGC prices were not technology-specific, higher initial-cost 
technologies might be also supported by FIT-like schemes, ensuring more generation 
technology diversity at higher overall system costs. Meeting country targets seem 
easier under FIT than under TGC regimes but at a higher system costs. 
 
In terms of efficient system integration, premiums attached to market prices or TGCs 
are in general more efficient than constant FITs, as generators are  pushed towards 
selling energy when it is more needed, providing suitable support to the system. In 
addition, location-based charges/incentives could help improve the overall network 
operation (for instance by avoiding congestion) by boosting penetration of suitable 
technologies where they are most needed. 
 
From the investors point of view a FIT system provides more security than a TGC 
system where the revenues per MWh are dependent on the demand for green 
certificates. However, effectiveness in terms of large RES/DG penetration cannot be 
the only driver to formulate suitable incentive mechanisms. The RESPOND project is 
focussed on efficient integration of RES/CHP when their production increases. 
 
From the point of view of network operators and balancing responsible parties, it is 
crucial that support mechanisms take into account the actual system needs. 
Differentiated time-of-use tariffs/incentives and premiums on top of the market price, 
Page 98/107 
as mentioned earlier on, instead of fixed-feed-in tariffs, are capable to provide 
efficient market signals. Similarly, quota obligation (TGC) mechanisms could be quite 
effective in inducing competition among technologies and send market-based signals 
for the network sake. Furthermore, support mechanisms should be combined with 
obligation to provide forecasts on the scheduled production in order to simplify the 
system burden in terms of ancillary service needs. 
 
From the point of view of the whole power system and society, RES/DG penetration 
could be increasingly expensive for the system, so that support schemes should be 
such that in the long run they do not hamper further deployment. In order to increase 
the system diversity/flexibility, incentives should decrease with time. In fact, owing to 
learning experience, typically production costs of RES technologies decrease with 
time. 
 
Pricing mechanisms for Ancillary Services 
 
Regarding pricing mechanisms for ancillary services (AS) provision, the main issue is 
relevant to the fact that RES/CHP systems, due to the design of the support scheme, 
do not receive incentives adherent to the real value of such services.  
 
In particular, FIT or market premiums much higher than AS prices would mean no 
RES/CHP participation in AS related to the provision of reserves or balancing energy, 
and thus, less flexibility even when those systems were technically able to support it. 
Controllability is a prerequisite to AS market participation. However, generators that 
in theory could be controllable such as CHP do not provide AS due to lack of enough 
incentives. In the long run, this could prevent further RES/CHP installation due to 
their perceived incapability to provide AS, with additional need for conventional 
generation support. These aspects all together highlight the need for an integrated 
and updated design of energy and ancillary services markets and the review of the 
support mechanisms in place. 
 
On the other hand, mechanisms such as availability payments or outside-the-market 
contracts between Transmission/Distribution System Operators (TSO/DSO) and 
RES/CHP for AS could help increase the share of controllable RES/CHP providing 
AS, as it this the case in UK. 
 
Finally, as increasing RES generation variability will impose additional system burden 
in terms of balancing energy, compulsory schedules of the expected production 
should be provided to the SO, with penalizations in the case of deviations from these 
schedules. By not doing so, the system cost for AS might skyrocket with larger RES 
penetration, preventing effective integration of additional green generation. 
 
RES/CHP Technical capabilities 
 
In general, there seem not to be major technical hurdles to prevent RES/CHP access 
to markets, owing to technical improvements in RES generation technology 
characteristics. Of course, participation to specific markets such as for AS is still 
related to the technical potential (controllability) of the units. More specifically, if the 
generation units cannot be controlled, they will be prevented from AS market 
participation.  
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Controllability of units can be improved through the means illustrated in the “demand 
response” section, such as availability of cheap enabling technologies (e.g., heat 
storage or electric heaters/heat pumps). Also, non-controllable units can be required 
to be able to provide some kind of frequency response such as primary frequency 
control.  However, in Netherlands, Germany, and UK, small units connected to 
distribution networks are not obliged by network codes to provide power reserves. In 
Spain, to facilitate the participation of units in reserve and balancing markets the role 
of centralized control centres for aggregation of such units have been demonstrated 
very relevant. 
 
Conventional generation 
 
Provision of reserves 
 
Provision of regulation reserve from conventional generators is a key issue in order 
not to hurdle the diffusion of RES/CHP with variability and unpredictability 
characteristics. When provision of primary, secondary and tertiary regulation services 
is voluntary, failure in achieving enough participation may occur if markets or other 
mechanisms are not backed by adequate prices, and if too complex prequalification 
criteria are required. Hence, it is crucial to design and run an effective regulation 
reserve market, and to simplify participation schemes/requirements. On the other 
hand, market mechanisms (above all for secondary and tertiary regulation), work 
very well when correctly in place (e.g., UK, Spain, and the Netherlands), owing to the 
possibility to accrue high revenues on the balancing markets, thus ensuring enough 
market liquidity. 
 
Again, aggregation represents an important resource for market participation. In this 
case, the SO should send signals to each company central dispatching centre with 
the required services, and this dispatching centre should in turn sends the directive 
signals to its own units. 
 
In the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands, primary regulation is compulsory, at least for 
the larger units, with no compensation. If specific units are not able to provide the 
service, contracting the service from other units may be an interesting option helping 
overcome possible technical barriers. 
 
Interestingly, in Spain the hourly contracted secondary reserve has not varied 
substantially in the last years, in spite of a high increase in wind generation capacity, 
likely owing to improvement of wind forecast and the well functioning of this market. 
Hence, in general forecasting techniques prove to be an enabling technology to 
increase the flexibility of the system and allow more effective RES/CHP penetration 
and operation. 
 
Availability of interconnection with neighbouring countries also enables the system to 
deal with higher penetration levels of RES/CHP units handling the variability in their 
production, even in the presence of relatively bad forecasts, owing to the possibility 
of exchanging energy through the interconnections. 
 
Mechanisms to provide sufficient generation capacity in critical periods 
 
Luring conventional generators into guaranteeing system firmness, ensuring their 
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energy production, in the most critical times (demand high and intermittent 
generation not able to supply it) is a delicate issue.  
 
Capacity firmness should be guaranteed in terms of both base-load and 
flexible/peaking units. Investment in only base-load technologies, for instance, might 
be insufficient to guarantee to the future system enough flexibility. The risk is that 
“wrong” units might be in operation, hurdling additional efficient RES and, at the 
same time, increasing the average market prices due to inefficient operation. 
 
Under market approaches without any additional payments, such as in Germany and 
UK, due to higher price volatility, capital costs might not be recovered by generators. 
New capacity will then not be built and older less efficient units will keep on running. 
On the other hand, if prices are attractive enough, generation participation to provide 
adequate firmness can be achieved. Therefore the need for introducing capacity or 
availability payments is an open issue.  
 
In Spain, availability payments for generators ensuring energy production at critical 
periods have been implemented. In Netherlands, the System Operator (SO) 
contracts on a yearly basis specific amounts of regulating and reserve power and 
emergency power to ensure the supply at critical periods.     
 
Investment in new generation capacity 
 
Further penetration of RES will increase the requirements for peaking capacity units, 
whose economic feasibility based only on market forces might be at stake. Indeed, 
their traded energy volume will decrease and their energy production cost will 
increase also due to off-design operation. In addition, on average the energy 
produced might be sold at lower average prices (cheaper RES will be dispatched 
first), even though they might set extremely high marginal prices in strategic peak 
hours. Uncertainty in market revenues might lead towards no additional capacity 
being installed. Therefore, if market forces are not sufficient to provide incentives to 
peaking units, system based upon capacity/availability payments or equivalent 
bilateral contracts between SO and generators prove to be quite effective. In 
particular, contracting balancing power outside the market prevents it from competing 
with power traded in the energy market. This kind of mechanisms appear a crucial 
resource in order to avoid reaching levels where the capacity margin is so thin as to 
generate price spikes and load-shedding intervention. Capacity payments outside the 
market aimed at providing system firmness implicitly also push towards additional 
capacity. Indeed, on average, such mechanisms increase the price for generation 
capacity and thus give incentive to new investment. 
  
In some countries (e.g., Germany), installation of capacity not expected to be able to 
run economically might prevent RES penetration and increase prices. Likewise, 
installation of base-load rather than peaking capacity might not be sufficient to 
provide enough security and reliability in the future. 
 
These issues might have to be dealt with at a regulatory level in order to prevent 
biased market outcomes that, besides damaging RES/CHP, would damage the 
consumers due to higher energy prices. 
 
Demand 
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Metering and communication issues 
 
Hourly meters are being installed in all five countries, although nowadays only Spain 
has a nation-wide programme. This is a precondition for exposing customers to 
hourly market prices. However, changing meters is costly and in most countries new 
meters are mainly argued by savings related to the billing of customers. What is 
relevant for the RESPOND project are the possibilities associated with new meters 
for automatic response and increasing demand flexibility, that would allow a more 
efficient integration of RES/CHP. Still communication standards and the functionality 
of meters are pending issues that should be solved for the successful penetration of 
this technology.. 
 
Pricing rules and incentives 
 
For customers to react to the varying costs of producing electricity, prices have to 
reflect the variations. Reflecting systematic daily/weekly variations in costs, Time-Of-
Use (TOU) tariffs have been introduced in many countries. Reflecting critical periods, 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) schemes have been introduced.  The Tempo tariff in 
France is a combined TOU- and CPP-tariff. Day-ahead market prices would reflect 
both systematic and un-systematic variations in the cost of producing electricity. 
However, currently the wholesale market prices are reflected only in annual rates. 
From a theoretical point of view market prices are preferable and all customers 
should be exposed to these, however, information costs of following and reacting to 
hourly prices is not negligible.  
 
Additionally, calculations of the gains seen by customers appear too small for shifting 
consumption in time. In addition, fixed price-additives e.g. grid-payment and taxes, 
reduce relative price variations and therefore reduces the incentive for reacting to 
market-prices. Getting these additives to follow system conditions, at least network 
charges, would give a better price signal and increase the incentive for customers to 
become flexible. 
 
Introduction of automatic response technologies will increase demand response. 
Massive introduction of price and/or frequency controlled cut-off technologies in 
individual household appliances has a quite large potential for increasing demand 
response within households. Again the technological barrier here is related to the 
costs and availability of communication standards and the huge volume of 
information to be managed. Moreover, a key issue is that experience in the United 
States suggests that customer reluctance to have unknown controls installed in their 
homes or businesses represents a barrier to more widespread participation in utility 
demand response programs.  
 
National energy and ancillary services markets 
 
Market access, size limitations and aggregation of units 
 
Existing barriers seem not to prevent the connection of RES/CHP and its 
participation in the energy market. However, there are some key aspects whose 
treatment could be modified. In particular, high trading fees might, in practice, 
represent an obstacle to market access. Aggregation of units is an effective solution 
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to overcome size limitation, and is already taking place in several countries. The 
aggregation of units can also reduce transaction costs, which are reported as an 
important barrier in the Netherlands and Denmark. In fact, virtual power plants are a 
priority area in the call for proposals for 2009 in the electricity research programme in 
Denmark. The deployment of commercial aggregators can be further improved by 
including the possibility of aggregation of production originated from micro-CHPs and 
heat pumps. In addition, the possibility of being curtailed by the TSO for network 
security reasons can also prevent the participation of RES in markets. 
 
Regarding access to ancillary or system services (AS) markets, the main issue refers 
to the controllability of the RES/CHP. Assuming that, from a technical point of view, 
some RES generators (wind) will be mature in the near future, their participation in 
AS requires that system operation practices are replaced by more modern ones, as 
well as the implementation of an adequate remuneration scheme that effectively 
encourage RES to participate in these markets. 
 
Responsibility for production deviations, prediction and gate closures closer to real-
time 
 
In most countries (Spain, UK, Denmark and Netherlands) RES are responsible for 
deviations, i.e. they must pay penalizations for the production deviations incurred, 
which in fact constitutes an incentive to develop better prediction tools. However, it 
has not been reported as a major barrier due to the fact that the support schemes 
compensate these costs. Only in Germany, RES producers are not made responsible 
for deviations (it is considered an important barrier for RES deployment). In this case, 
the prediction of production is transferred to the grid operators. Whether RES are 
made responsible for deviations or not, big efforts have been made in the 
improvement in the accuracy of the predictions: forecast errors for time horizons 
below 7 hours are nowadays less than 8% compared to figures over 15% in the past. 
 
Country analysis indicates that gate closure times within energy markets range from 
a maximum of 8 hours ahead of real time (last intraday market for each day closes at 
4 p.m in Spain) to 1 hour ahead of real time (UK, Denmark, Netherlands). Limitations 
due to start-up times and ramp rates, together with the time required to carry out the 
security’s studies and guarantee the technical viability of the scheduled production, 
have been reported as the major barriers to further reducing gate closure times. Gate 
closure time in Spain could be closer to real time by implementing more intraday 
markets or even merging the intraday market with the deviation management market. 
However, the division of responsibilities between the market operator (which is 
responsible of intraday markets) and the system operator (which is responsible for 
the deviation management market) is regarded as a major obstacle to implement the 
later measure. Even though intraday markets reduce gate closures times, in 
Germany the liquidity of these markets is considered a problem and employing a 
balancing market is preferred. 
 
Regional markets 
 
Two main market responses have been identified in order to facilitate the creation of 
regional markets: increasing the interconnection capacity between national markets 
and increasing the coordination of the operation of these markets. The most 
important barriers that hinder the construction of interconnection capacity are the 
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existing concerns about the impact of new transmission lines on the environment, 
and the lack of fairness of the method employed to determine which countries should 
pay the cost of these lines. Note that cross-border lines typically produce benefits 
that are very much widespread in a region, while costs/disadvantages are not. 
Moreover, the complexity of the process aimed to obtain the permits required to build 
these lines is much higher. Agents from several countries have identified these 
barriers as significant. Apart from this, the lack of harmonization of national market 
rules, which limits the power exchanges taking place between countries, has been 
identified as a barrier in Denmark. 
 
The most important barriers to the integration of the operation of national markets 
include the fact that, short term implicit energy and capacity auctions are not applied 
yet in Spain and Germany, though these countries are interconnected through a 
meshed grid. Moreover, in all surveyed countries there is a lack of coordination of the 
allocation of cross border capacity that is carried out in the long term. Finally some 
parties in Germany, due to security reasons, argue that some degree of 
discrimination between local and regional transactions should exist when providing 
long term generation capacity reserves.  
 
T&D networks 
 
Transmission 
 
The most important market responses related to transmission that would facilitate the 
integration of variable RES generation are the implementation of locationally and 
temporally differentiated transmission charges, the construction of new transmission 
lines allowing the transportation of the capacity produced by these units and the 
implementation of fair and efficient congestion management schemes. A barrier to 
implement locationally differentiated and time varying tariffs, according to some 
parties, is that locational marginal prices are too volatile,. Besides, they are also 
believed to be a source of unfair discrimination between agents in different parts of 
the grid, as well as between old and new generators. Other stakeholders are of the 
opinion that these tariffs may not affect investment decisions by agents due to the 
fact that payments resulting from support schemes to RES/CHP are so high in many 
systems that installing new RES generation will be profitable no matter which kind of 
generation it is or where it is installed. Finally, different stakeholders in the UK 
believe that implementing these charges makes regulation more difficult and 
therefore less attractive to policy makers. 
 
As for the construction of new lines, most stakeholders agree that concerns about 
their impact on the environment and health could represent a serious obstacle to 
these lines being built. Besides, parties in the UK have stated that the inefficiency in 
the allocation of the cost of these lines, the lack of efficiency of the use of 
transmission capacity that already is in operation, and doubts about the profitability of 
many of the transmission investment projects that are being considered now already 
result in a significant opposition to new lines. 
 
Finally, talking about the application of congestion management schemes, applying 
zonal or nodal prices (the most efficient solution under ideal conditions) is against the 
regulation in place in some countries, like Spain or the Netherlands. Besides, most, if 
not all, parties agree that implementing such scheme would result in an increase in 
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the degree of the market power held by power producers in importing areas. Finally, 
parties in Spain and Holland have stated that computing several energy prices within 
their territories would make the market clearing process more complex, and the 
coordination with neighbouring markets would be more difficult. Others say that using 
nodal or zonal prices would require changing computer applications and allocating 
the congestion rents. 
 
Distribution 
 
For efficient integration of DG/RES in distribution networks the design of distribution 
charges, connection and use-of-system charges, paid by this type of generation is a 
relevant issue. Locationally and time varying distribution charges should be 
implemented. In those systems where locational distribution charges have not been 
implemented yet, main barriers identified by parties are legal (changing the tariff 
codes would be necessary in Netherlands). Additionally, allocating charges to 
generators in an efficient, cost-reflective, manner is also regarded as a challenge by 
authorities in Germany. For most parties consulted, volatility is not considered a 
problem when implementing this kind of charges. An exception to this rule is the 
Netherlands. 
 
Active network management (ANM) is unanimously acknowledged as an effective 
measure to integrate variable distributed RES generation. In order to encourage 
DSOs to apply ANM, many countries have implemented efficiency incentives 
schemes that reward DSOs for reducing losses and increase service quality levels. 
However, the difficulty of computing an adequate level for these incentives and the 
fact that most systems are not taking into account the effect of DG-RES on losses 
and quality when computing the incentives is undermining their effectiveness. Finally, 
the incentives in place in some countries, like Spain, the Netherlands or Germany, to 
implement these techniques are believed to be too weak. 
 
A potential benefit from DG RES is the cost reduction that can be achieved by 
integrating it in the process of planning the expansion of the grid. However, where 
incentive schemes for the efficient planning of the expansion of the grid by DSOs are 
applied, in Spain and Netherlands, the reference remuneration level of the DSO and 
the efficiency factor ‘X’ are computed not taking into account the effect of DG.  Other 
countries, like UK and Germany, believe that implementing incentive schemes of this 
type is not necessary because incentives already in place for efficient system 
operation (losses and quality) are strong enough. Again, some parties believe that 
DG RES support schemes encourage variable DG RES not to follow DSO’s 
instructions, which renders the installation of variable DG RES as less beneficial, or 
even problematic, to operators. Related to the previous market response option, 
DSOs are not considering the possible future application of ANM when planning the 
expansion of their grids, which makes it more difficult for the system also to benefit 
from the presence of variable DG. 
 
Variable type of DG may provide some system services that can be of help to the 
DSO. However, many of the existing generators do not comply with the technical 
requirements that must be met to provide these. Apart from this, the markets where 
variable DG could sell these services to the DSOs would probably not be liquid 
enough, since most of the potential generators that could provide a certain service 
would be owned by the same company. Even if competition could be established 
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among potential providers of AS, generators may not find it profitable to offer them, 
since the revenues resulting from the sale of their energy in the market are much 
higher in many countries than those they would obtain by providing these services. 
Finally, as a consequence of all this, so far variable RES DG is not regarded by 
DSOs in most countries as a reliable source of AS. 
 
Future research work 
 
This document has shown that important barriers are present in every segment of the 
electricity system. Some of them appear in several countries, while others 
correspond to country specific barriers, see also tables 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 14 with 
the main barriers in system segments generation, demand, national markets, 
regional markets and transmission and distribution networks, found in the analysis 
and the countries where the barriers are significant. 
 
Based on the analysis and conclusions in this report in a next step in the RESPOND 
project the work will focus on formulating measures, regulatory changes etc 
necessary to implement the earlier as viable and efficient (report D5 of RESPOND) 
identified options to mitigate the system cost impacts by penetration of much more 
variable RES generation in the five EU countries. An efficient regulatory framework 
will be proposed and a roadmap for implementing these regulatory improvements 
step by step in effective and efficient manner. 
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